



Enhancing the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism through Endogenized Value-Added Inputs and Embodied Carbon Prices

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Where you draw the accounting boundary changes CBAM

- **Scope 1 (Direct emission only), Scope 2/3, Consumption-Based Emission ...**
- **Standard carbon accounting treats investment and government as exogenous final demand.**
 - Yet, capital goods are emission-intensive inputs that feed back into production (Södersten, Wood, and Hertwich, 2018); the governments provide public services that ultimately serve household consumption and support industrial production.
 - Treating them as standalone endpoints mis-assigns embodied carbon.
- **Explicit carbon price may not be the right metric for CBAM base.**
 - It may ignore the global value chain of carbon price pass-through.

RESEARCH QUESTION

How does endogenizing value-added inputs and embodied carbon pricing change:


- (a) consumption-based emissions & the carbon transfer between regions, and
- (b) the carbon leakage and GDP outcomes of a CBAM?

Endogenizing final demand through value-added inputs

• Closed Input–Output Model

- The closed model internalizes capital investment and government expenditure via value-added payments. Their responsibility for emissions must sit inside the accounting boundary, not outside it.
- Capital (K) and government (T) payments re-enter the system as emission-bearing flows [Equations (1)–(3)]

• Accounting Scopes



Extended System of Equations for Carbon Content (Building on Bohringer et al. 2018)

$$cc_{gr}^Y Y_{gr} = \sum_j (cc_{jr}^M + co2_{jgr}^M) Z_{jgr}^M + \sum_{g'} (cc_{gr}^Y + co2_{g'gr}^D) Z_{g'gr}^D \quad (1)$$

$$cc_{ir}^M M_{ir} = \sum_{s \in R} (cc_{is}^Y X_{isr} + \sum_{u \in U} cc_u^T T_{uisr}) \quad (2)$$

$$cc_u^T \sum_{r \in R} T_{ur} = \sum_{r \in R} cc_{ur}^Y T_{ur} \quad (3)$$


Data, aggregation & three nested accounting scopes

- **Data: GTAP 12, input–output tables for 2023**
 - Sectors: 65 → 21 aggregate sectors.
 - Regions: 163 → 6 IPCC AR6 WG3 groups (AFR · APC · DEV · EEA · LAM · ME)
→ then grouped into IC (= DEV) vs. DC (the other five).
- **Scenarios**

Scenario	Tariff base	Endogenized inputs	Description
BAU	—	—	Baseline; no climate policy.
Ctax	Domestic carbon tax	—	DEV carbon tax for 20% CO ₂ reduction; induces leakage.
Cbam0	Direct emission	—	CBAM on direct (Scope-1) emissions of imports.
Cbam	Embodied carbon content	—	CBAM on embodied carbon content.
CbamK	Embodied carbon content	Investment	Carbon Content with endogenized investment.
CbamKG	Embodied carbon content	Investment + government	Carbon Content with endogenized investment & government.
CbamEcp	Embodied carbon price	—	CBAM priced on embodied carbon price (ECP).
CbamEcpK	Embodied carbon price	Investment	ECP with endogenized investment.
CbamEcpKG	Embodied carbon price	Investment + government	ECP with endogenized investment & government.
CbamEcp2w	Embodied carbon price (two-way)		ECP, two-way: import tariff + export subsidy.

All Cbam scenarios: CBAM levied by DEV on imports from all other regions. DEV CO₂ target = –20% throughout.*

Widening the scope shifts embodied carbon to DEV



	AFR	APC	DEV	LAM	EEA	ME
■ PBE	1,323	17,267	10,031	1,655	2,432	2,160
■ CBE	1,359	15,502	12,022	1,823	2,114	2,047
■ CBM	1,366	15,314	12,180	1,820	2,125	2,062
■ CBMeK	1,399	14,436	13,029	1,898	2,101	2,004
■ CBMeKG	1,424	13,983	13,481	1,957	2,076	1,946

NET CARBON IMPORT IN DEV (relative to PBE)

CBE 1,991

* CBE is the consumption-based emission based on embodied emission in bilateral trades (EEBT)

CBM 2,148


CBMeK 2,998

CBMeKG 3,450

2,148 → 3,450 MtCO₂

≈ 60% larger transfer once capital & government are endogenized (CBM → CBMeKG).

Carbon moves from final demand categories to the demand that pulls it



- **Endogenizing investment and government (CBMeK, CBMeKG) shifts emissions further toward household final demand sectors; emissions shrink in production-heavy sectors, and increase in consumption-linked sectors.**
 - Power, Transport, Metal recede under consumption-based views — output embodied downstream.
 - Service, Food, and Health rise sharply as investment & government demand is folded into consumption.

Embodied Carbon Prices


- **Global supply-chain intensities (carbon content) reflects the global carbon value chain**
 - They include emissions originating in the importing region, which may already price carbon (a Koopman double-counting analog, as for value added in trade).
- **Direct carbon price (cp_r) alone, as a CBAM base, ignores the value chain.**
 - Regions buy and sell intermediate goods globally; a $[cp_r - cp_s]cc_{is}^Y$ tariff misses this.
- **Solution: Embodied Carbon Price (ECP: ecp_{ir}^Y)**
 - A supply-chain propagated effective price that accounts for the fact that a zero-explicit price region can still face a non-zero effective rate if it imports carbon-priced inputs.
 - Correct tariff base: $[ecp_{ir}^Y - ecp_{is}^Y]cc_{is}^Y$

$$ecp_{gr}^Y cc_{gr}^Y Y_{gr} = \sum_j (ecp_{jr}^M cc_{jr}^M + cp_r co2_{jgr}^M) Z_{jgr}^M + \sum_{g'} (ecp_{g'r}^Y cc_{g'r}^Y + cp_r co2_{g'gr}^D) Z_{g'gr}^D \quad (1')$$

$$ecp_{ir}^M cc_{ir}^M M_{ir} = \sum_{s \in R} (ecp_{is}^Y cc_{is}^Y X_{isr} + \sum_{u \in U} ecp_u^T cc_u^T T_{uisr}) \quad (2')$$


$$ecp_u^T cc_u^T \sum_{r \in R} T_{ur} = \sum_{r \in R} ecp_{ur}^Y cc_{ur}^Y T_{ur} \quad (3')$$

Effective carbon prices diverge from explicit ones




- DEV (dark) sits below its explicit price $\approx$ USD 32.85/tCO₂.
- Every unregulated region still shows a non-zero ECP from importing carbon-priced DEV goods, with LAM(amber) the highest among them.

Leakage falls as the base widens, at a GDP cost to DC



- **Scope-1 CBAM alone prevents leakage.**
 - Cbam0 (direct emission) cuts leakage to ≈ 0 ;
 - Scope 3 or closed-model CBAMs push it negative.
- **Wider base $\rightarrow$ deeper DC GDP loss.**
 - DC GDP falls $-0.04\% \rightarrow -0.32\%$ (Cbam0 $\rightarrow$ CbamKG)
 - DEV's own loss shrinks.
- **Caveat: DEV is $> 50\%$ of GDP.**
 - Small leakage is partly mechanical — sensitive to regional grouping.

Every CBAM lowers global emission intensity ~6%



Scenario	GDP (bn \$)	CO ₂ (Mt)	Intensity (t/\$1k)	Δ Int.
BAU	106,803	34,867	326.46	—
Ctax	106,717	32,906	308.35	-5.55%
Cbam0	106,713	32,861	307.94	-5.67%
Cbam	106,676	32,804	307.51	-5.81%
CbamK	106,649	32,790	307.45	-5.82%
CbamKG	106,641	32,786	307.44	-5.83%
CbamEcp	106,689	32,833	307.75	-5.73%
CbamEcpK	106,682	32,836	307.79	-5.72%
CbamEcpKG	106,680	32,836	307.80	-5.72%
CbamEcp2w	106,716	32,759	306.97	-5.97%

BAU intensity 326 → ~307 t/\$1,000 (≈ -5.8%). *CbamEcp2w* cuts emissions most (-6.05%) with the smallest GDP cost among the CBAMs.

- Global GDP loss is modest (-0.08% to -0.15%) across all scenarios; emission cuts dominate the intensity improvement.

Conclusion

- **Endogenizing value-added inputs gives a more complete picture of trade-embodied carbon and a more comprehensive consumption-based responsibility (net transfer to DEV: 2,148 → 3,450 MtCO₂).**
- **Wider accounting scope eliminates leakage and induces reductions in developing regions, but raises global GDP loss and shifts burden to unregulated developing nations**
 - Combined with Embodied Carbon Price (ECP) with export subsidy may be more effective in minimizing global carbon intensity
- **Carbon pricing by the wide group of developed regions may limit carbon leakage in developing regions**
 - A direct-emission (Scope-1) CBAM might be enough to prevent leakage.
- **Limitations & Future Work:**
 - Dynamic model simulation for more systematic evaluation of capital stock dynamics in carbon leakage
 - Deeper analysis of embodied carbon prices, and a fuller evaluation of ECP's role as the CBAM base.
 - Game-theoretic analysis of carbon pricing incentive of non-regulating regions under ECP vs CP-based CBAM

Q&A

