INTERGRATING WEST AFRICAN AGRICULTURE INTO THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM: ISSUES IN REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS♠

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Introduction

West African countries like their counterparts in the rest of the continent are currently engaged in simultaneous negotiations of trade agreements. Prominent among these negotiations are: negotiations of multilateral trade agreements under the auspices of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and this is within the framework of Doha Development Agenda (DDA); and the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between West Africa and the European Union (EU). An integral part of the latter is the intra-West African negotiations that are required in order for the region to speak with one voice and act as an entity.

The objective of this paper is two-fold. First, it summarises negotiations on agriculture at the two levels (DDA and West Africa EPA). Second, it attempts to integrate West African concerns and perspectives into these negotiations, with a view to ensuring that the outcomes of the negotiations are favourable for the region's development prospects. The emphasis of the paper on the agricultural sector is justified by the region's dependence on the sector (See annex A)

Consequently, the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a background of West African negotiations at the WTO and EPA with emphasis on mandates, state of play and main challenges.

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Section 3 assesses progress and challenges in the three pillars of negotiations of agriculture. It also examines issues that are of interest to the development of the region such as special products, a special safeguard mechanism, tropical products, and preference erosion among other issues. Section 4 is on the evaluation of impact of possible reforms on exports and imports of West African agricultural commodities. Section 5 concludes.

Negotiating Mandates

The negotiating mandate of the DDA covers four broad areas: development related issues; market access in goods and services; rules related issues; and dispute settlement. For EPA, two broad areas of the negotiation mandate are market access issues in goods and services and trade related issues.

Agricultural trade negotiations are integral parts of DDA and EPA. The Uruguay Round (UR) of negotiations produced the first Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) within the multilateral trade framework. This agreement presented some challenges not only to the developed countries, but also to their developing and least developed counterparts. While, it was recognised that weak multilateral discipline in the agricultural sector has unwittingly permitted applications of various distortions[1], the sector needs to be strengthened and to take into consideration the various roles of agriculture in the process of development and especially as it relates to food security, rural livelihood, and environmental concerns limits the extent of liberalisation of the sector. Thus, social and development considerations significantly differentiate the AoA negotiations from other areas. However, there is a thin line between incorporating these considerations into negotiations and for them masquerading as protectionist measures.

The pre-Uruguay Round developments created imbalance in the level of protection in the sector. On one hand, the developed countries were able to support a very high level of protection of the sector simply because they have the means to do so. In the pre-adjustment period, the developing and least developed countries, on the other hand, imposed heavy taxes on the sector and the adjustment that were implemented in the 1980s did not only wipe-off the taxes but also eliminated the hitherto meagre government supports to the sector.

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[1] Some of the impediments to agricultural trade during this period include import bans, quotas, setting the maximum level of imports, variable import levies, minimum import prices and non-tariff measures maintained by state-trading enterprises (WTO, 2000).

The UR AoA aimed at establishing a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system and consequently based the reform in the sector on improvement in market access, and reduction in and/or elimination of domestic support and export subsidies. Beyond this, various exceptions and exemptions were introduced partly to take care of the non-trade concerns (such as food security, rural livelihood and environmental issues), and partly to allow for sufficient time for adjustment given the level of pre-Uruguay Round distortions. The reform of the agricultural sector has revolved around the nature of the agreement, the implementation especially with respect to issues that are germane to developing and least developed countries, and the reluctance on the part of developed countries to forgo various support to the sector. These and other issues characterised the ongoing negotiations of the sector and it was clear that unresolved issues in the agriculture negotiations contributed significantly to the limited achievement at the fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun. Since, some of the issues must be resolved for the DDA negotiations to progress, the General Council Decision of 27 to 31 July 2004, also known as "July package", is a bold step at charting a path for the continuation of the negotiations. It, however, left important issues in the negotiations of AoA to the negotiators or members to decide.

In compliance with the WTO provisions on regional trading arrangements, the trade relationship between the European Union (EU) and the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) countries is under review. The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) was launched in 2000; its trade component was, however, suspended pending a comprehensive negotiation of a free trade area (FTA) agreement. The trade component of Lome IV convention subsists under a waiver that expires in December 2007 and thus the current the negotiation is expected to produce Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) that will be effective from 2008. The emerging EPA should be comprehensive (covering substantially all trade – generally assumed to mean 90 per cent), asymmetrically reciprocal in favour of ACP countries, and satisfy some other conditions to be WTO- compatible. The negotiation of EPA is now in the second phase having successfully completed the first phase that lasted between September 2002 and March 2004. The second phase, which will run up to December 2007, is devoted to detailed negotiations. For the West African EPA that comprises the 15 ECOWAS members and Mauritania, a roadmap for the negotiation was adopted in August 2004.[2] Further

[2] The delay in coming up with an agreed roadmap was caused by the insistence on the two parties about their positions with respect to additional funding (on

details about the roadmap and the West Africa negotiations since 2004 are provided in the following section of the paper.

Progress and Challenges in the Negotiations of West African Agriculture at EPA and WTO Levels

Economic Partnership Agreement

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) in Chapter 2 noted the need for new trading arrangements that will be WTO compatible and recognised the need for a transitional arrangement pending the conclusion of a new trade regime, hence, the retention of the non-reciprocal trade preferences under the Lome IV. In the existing agricultural trade arrangement, special preferences were defined by some protocols that were either commodity-specific or country-specific such as protocol on sugar, Protocol on beef and veal, and the banana protocols. These protocols essentially define the tariff rate quota access for selected ACP countries to the EU market. They confer on beneficiaries some advantages. First, these products are protected (high tariffs as well as domestic support) in the EU market. Second, these products entered the EU market duty-free or at special tariff rate quotas, thus, the exporting countries benefit from high internal prices in the EU market. However, it is one thing to be designated as a beneficiary country, and another thing altogether to be able to maximally utilise the quotas. In all the protocols, only Cote d'Ivoire in West Africa is a potential beneficiary of sugar protocol. Ogunkola and Oyejide (2001) show that Nigeria did not utilised the preferential market access granted to it in the EU under the Lome Convention pointing to the need to address supply response capacity of the country.

As at the time CPA was launched, some joint declarations which also define the scope the agricultural trade relationship between the EU and West Africa were in place. Some of them include Declaration XXII (which spelt out the preferential treatment applicable to agricultural products and food stuffs originating in the ACP states), Declaration XXIV on rice and Declaration XXV on rum, Declaration XXVI on beef and veal and Declaration XXIX on products covered by the common agricultural policy (CAP).

At the beginning of the first phase of the EPA negotiations, the EU's main interest with respect to agriculture was summarised as:

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the West African side) and the EU's positions that financial assistance or package that was negotiated in the CPA cannot be renegotiated now.

- elimination of charges having equivalent effect to tariffs;
- national treatment for the EU's trade in goods including agriculture;
- the base for tariff reductions should be applied rates on entry into force of the EPA agreement;
- ensure that safeguard and anti-dumping measures do not neglect the concerns of ACP countries; and
- elimination of quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect on entry into force of EPA negotiations.

Similarly, the list of "requests" and "offers" by ACP countries include:

- Eliminations of subsidies and domestic support for all agricultural products originating from ACP countries;
- Preservations of existing preferential arrangements;
- Increase in quotas under commodity protocols;
- Restoration of cost quotas under the sugar Protocol; and
- Measures to address the special needs of net-food-importing States, single commodity producers and non-trade concerns such as rural development.

The discussion of agricultural market access in the first phase of EPA negotiations achieved limited success. A thorny issue was the sequencing of trade liberalisation of agriculture under EPA in relation to the provisioning of support for the development of the ACP countries' agriculture. The ACP countries wanted more assistance for the sector before EPA negotiations could start. The EU argued that liberalisation of the sector and financial supports to the sector are two complementary processes that they need not be rearranged and they should "go hand in hand so as to foster their mutual supportiveness". The issue is deferred to negotiations at regional levels (ACP, 2003).

The second phase of EPA negotiations (i.e. West Africa-EU negotiations) was launched in Cotonou on 6th of October 2003. A roadmap for EPA negotiations between West Africa and the EU was adopted on the 4th of August 2004. The roadmap spells out the issues as deepening of integration process in the region and improving competitiveness through capacity building and upgrading. Among other issues, the roadmap states the negotiating structure and operational modalities and indicative schedule for the negotiations.

Some issues in the simultaneous negotiations of intra-regional (within the ECOWAS), extra-regional (West Africa and EU), and multilateral (Doha Development Agenda within the framework of the WTO) concern the pressure they exert on the limited capacity of negotiators. The need to build capacity of developing and least developed countries' negotiators is a recent development. This is a post-UR development as there is no longer dividend for passive participants in the multilateral framework. The simultaneous negotiations also raised concerns with respect to coherence of the whole process (Oyejide, Ogunkola and Bankole 2005). Given the weak institutional structure in most West African countries, it is not evident that DDA and EPA negotiations are being properly coordinated. Neither is it clear that they are being properly related to and evaluated against the development goals of the different countries.

A related development at the regional level is the adoption of an agricultural policy for the community: ECOWAS. This policy, the Economic Community of West African States Common Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP) which covers agriculture, livestock, fishing, forestry and natural resource management was adopted on the 19th January 2005 with a view to contributing to meeting the food needs in a sustainable way; economic and social development; and reduction in poverty of the members of the regional body. The issue of poverty reduction among members and providing adequate food for the teeming population is central to ECOWAP. This is understandable especially given the current food crisis in Niger and some other parts of the region.

Various technical committees are working on the different aspects of the negotiations. A group is working on the agriculture while another one is on fishery. These groups have not been able to meet regularly as scheduled. Perhaps, more importantly is that the negotiation structure was designed to draw minimally from the respective member countries. The challenge for the negotiators is to reflect individual country level needs. For the purpose of illustration with particular reference to agricultural sector negotiations, the need to define sensitive or special products requires input from various sovereign states. This may involve a restructuring of the negotiating scheme. The point is that as long as West Africa is not a customs union with a common external tariff, it will be difficult for ECOWAS to negotiate on behalf o f these countries.

The sensitivity of EU to agricultural trade liberalisation is also demonstrated in everything-but-arms (EBA) initiative. At beginning of the initiative on 5 March 2001 apart from arms and ammunitions that were excluded the liberalisation of three important agricultural products: bananas, rice and sugar were delayed. They are to be granted duty-free and quota-free access by January 2006, September 2009 and July 2009 respectfully. In the interim the duty-free tariff quotas on rice and sugar are to be expanded annually.

According to WTO (2003), the EU has signed agreements with Turkey, Mexico, South Africa, and Chile. The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements have either been concluded or are being negotiated between the EU and the countries of North Africa and the Middle East. Indeed, the International Lawyers and Economists Against Poverty (ILEAP) in collaboration with the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) have jointly analysed different aspects of these agreements. For instance, the analysis that focuses on the agricultural sector compared four of the agreements. These are the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements comprising of EU's agreement with Tunisia (1995), Israel (1995), Morocco (1996), The Palestinian Authority (1997), Algeria (2001), and Lebanon (2002); the EU-South Africa Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) (1999), the EU-Mexico Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement (1997); and the EU-Chile Association Agreement (2002).

Given that EU has signed several FTAs with developing countries in recent times and these agreements, without exception, clearly demonstrate the sensitivity of agricultural trade in the EU. While the EU generally advances the goal of free trade in agriculture in these agreements, such an objective is offset by exceptions and concessions strictly defined in advance for individual products and countries (Rudloff and Simons, 2004). Like with other FTAs signed by EU, issues in the West Africa-EU EPA negotiations on agriculture are expected to include product coverage, transition and sequencing of liberalisation, tariff concessions, tariff rate quota concessions, safeguard clauses, specific rules of origin for agricultural products, and options for flexible adjustment. These are the issues that negotiators will need to clearly articulate and defend during the course of negotiations. It is not yet evident that the negotiating structure as currently constituted has sufficient required capacity to do this. Apart from the inability of the ECOWAS to sufficiently and effectively engage the pool of experts in the subregion, the regional body lacks the required financial capacity. More importantly, the region may need to learn from other negotiating structures of other EPAs in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. This is important since ECOWAS is not yet a customs union with external tariff.

Although removal of subsidies and government support to agricultural practice in the EU is on the West Africa's request, issues relating to domestic support were not included in any of the FTAs that have been signed by EU (Rudloff and Simons, 2004). The challenge, therefore, is for West African countries to ensure that distortions created by domestic support and export subsidies – particularly for products of export interest to the region, are minimised if not eliminated.

Studies on the impact of agreeing to an EPA will not only clear some of these issues; such studies should also provide quantitative assessment of trade, fiscal and welfare effects. Effects on environment, food security and other second-degree analysis especially as they affect the developmental goals of West African countries and whether or not they promote or impinge on the overall goal of the CPA should be analysed. According to Pearson (2005) the challenge before ACP countries is to negotiate two issues in the various EPAs: trade, on one hand and development on the other. Indeed, CPA is more than trade and trade component should be viewed as a means to an end – namely, development. Two main challenges are lack of capacity to carry out independent and objective impact assessment studies at country as well as regional level; and capacity to negotiate the development component of the CPA. It should be noted that this is a carry over from the first phase of negotiations. The impact assessment studies should be able to identify the needs of these countries especially the adjustment costs[3].

Another challenge is the area of securing flexible rules of origin (RoO). Rules of origin with respect to agricultural products in the West Africa EPA should aim at securing a flexible cumulating of rules of origin possibly across all developing countries or at least with all ACP countries. This should not pose too much a problem given the agriculture-specific rules of origin entrenched in the Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) between EU and South Africa. In the TDCA, "origin" was broadly defined to encompass all ACP countries provided the value added in South Africa is greater than the imported ACP values. Similarly, products so granted origin status, are not required to undergo additional processing in South Africa (Rudloff and Simons, 2004)

Options between EBA and EPA for LDCs must of necessity consider the implications of reciprocity. While this is expected to be asymmetry, provisions for addressing the consequences of reciprocal

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[3] Available information indicates that some of these studies which are sponsored by the EU are being finalised.

opening up by the LDCs to the EU market should be balanced with the shortcomings of EBA.

In the case of West Africa, only three of the 16 countries are classified as developing countries: Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria. The least developed countries are covered by the EBA initiative of the EU, implying that goods (including agricultural products) from this group of countries enter EU market duty-free and quota free but they are otherwise restricted by very stringent rules of origin and other technical constraints. In West Africa, all the remaining 13 countries are potential beneficiaries of EBA. Policy options facing these countries include: maintaining status quo (i.e. protect their status in the WTO and EU by holding on to EBA) or opt for active participations in the EPA negotiations.

Apart from unpredictability nature of EBA and GSP since they can be withdrawn at the discretion of the EU, EPA is a regional arrangement and it may be difficult excluding some members from the agreement. More so, the rules of origin obtainable under EBA may be enhanced either by negotiating for a less restrictive one or by expanding the dimensions of "cumulation". Perhaps, a most viable position is to start the EPA negotiations with exceptions, exemptions and additions to EBA initiative. This way, the LDCs will be able to evaluate the additional benefits offered by EPA above EBA and the required adjustments for effective participation in the negotiations as well as implementation of EPA. It is reasonable for West African LDCs to consider their relative positions in their trade relationship with the EU. Put differently and more directly, the LDCs of West Africa should be sure of additional benefits from their participation in EPA. While the need to make EPA EBA plus has been emphasised, the main task is to ensure that the agreement delivers on this promise[4]

For non-LDCs West African EPA members, the need to synchronise EPA negotiations with DDA is complicated in at least three dimensions. First, the negotiations are being conducted almost simultaneously and given the weak structure of administrative mechanism in these countries, proper coordination and harmonisation of positions may not be strong. Second, the already limited technical and financial capacity to engage in meaningful negotiations is being over-stretched and third, simultaneously conduct of the negotiations is an

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[4] For instance, Peter Mandelson, the EC Trade Commissioner was quoted as saying that "ACP countries will be no worse off once the EPAs kick in, from the EBA. That is very important. We are asking for EBA plus, not EBA minus."

invitation to inconsistent commitments between the two agreements. Sequencing of the negotiations becomes an important issue if these countries are to optimally participate in EPA and WTO. Oyejide (2004) has argued that EPA should be a “Doha plus”. Similarly “there is little point in ACP struggling hard for “concession” in an EPA that will be devalued by the time they come into effect or to resist “demand” from EU that may be conceded anyway in other fora” (Stevens, 2002).

In the case of EPA, experience from various FTAs between EU and other countries reveals the EU’s strategic position and defines the scope for bargaining for contracting partners (Rudloff and Simons, 2004). The EU has a list of strategic (sensitive) agricultural products that are exempted from negotiations. Preferential tariff rates and tariff quota concessions were however negotiated for some of them (Tables 1a through 1c and 2).

Table 1a: Exceptions from trade liberalisation (Association Agreement with Chile)

Exceptions in Association Agreement	
EU	Chile
Beef, swine, sheep and goats, poultry	Dairy
Dairy	Leguminous vegetables
Eggs	Sweet corn
Some fruits and vegetables (e.g beans, mushrooms of the genus agaricus, olives, for the production of oil, sweet corn, manioc)	Wheat and meslin flour
Cereals and the corresponding products of the milling industry	Wheat groats and pellets of cereals
Sugar	Vegetables oil and margarine
Vermouth	Sugar
Ethly alcohol	
Vinegar	

Source: Compiled by the author from Rudloff and Simons (2004)

Table 1b: Exceptions from trade liberalisation (EU-South Africa Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA))

Exception in The Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA)	
EU	South Africa
Beef	Beef, swine, goats sheep
Sugar	Sugar
Some dairy(powdered milk products)	Some dairy (butter and other fats and oils derived from milk; dairy spreads cheese and curd,ice cream)
Sweet corn	Sweet corn
Maize and maize products	Maize and maize products
l rice products	Barley and barley products
Starches	Wheat and wheat products (incl. wheat starches)
Some cut flowers	Chocolate
Some fresh fruits(certain citrus, apples, pears grages, bananas)	
Prepared tomatoes	
Some prepared fruits and fruit juices	
Some wines	
Vermouth	
Ethly alcohol	

Source: Compiled by the author from Rudloff and Simons (2004)

Table 1c: Exceptions from Trade liberalisation (Global Agreement with Mexico)

Exception in Global Agreement	
EU	Mexico
Bovine animals, beef, swine, poultry	Bovine animal, beef, swine poultry
Dairy	Dairy
Eggs	Eggs
Honey	Potatoes
Cut flowers	Bananas
Some fruits and vegetables (e.g. olives for the production of oil, sweet corn, asparagus, peas, beans, apples, pears, strawberries, grapes, bananas	Cereals except buckwheat
Cereals except buckwheat	Roasted coffee
Sugar	Some oil and fats(palm oil cobra, animal fats or oil)
Some juices (tomatoes, citrus fruits, pineapple, apple, pear)	Sugar
Vermouth	Cocoa
Ethyl alcohol	Grape juice and grape most
Vinegar	Rum

Source: Compiled by the author from Rudloff and Simons (2004)

The EU's domestic support creates unfair competitive advantage, and displaces of domestic production in most West African countries especially those that possess natural comparative advantages in cereals, dairy and meat products, and sugar. However, the reduction or elimination of EU's domestic support will hurt net food importing West African countries since the removal of subsidies would translate to increase in import prices for affected products. In the medium to long-term period and of course, depending on the supply capacity constraints, the increase in import prices will stimulate domestic production. The implication is that there is the need to address the fall out from EPA and DDA induced CAP reforms in the short run. A possible suggestion is to seek for assistance under the financial cooperation components of the CPA.

Table 2: Tariff Rate Quotas conceded in EU's FTAs

Exceptions in The Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA)		**Exceptions in Global Agreement**		**Exceptions in Association Agreement**	
EU	**South Africa**	**EU**	**Mexico**	**EU**	**Chile**
Cut flowers: 1600t,half duty		Eggs: 1500t half duty		Beef: 1000t,duty free	Cheese and curd: 1500t, duty free
Strawberries: 250t half duty		Honey: 30000t half duty		Meat of swine and prepared food: 3500t,duty free	Olive oil: 3000t per year ,duty free
Several canned fruits: 60000t half duty	Cheese and curd: 5000t half duty	Cut flowers: 1500t duty free	No TRQs conceded	Meat of sheep : 2000t, duty free	
Several fruit juices: 5700t, half duty		Aspargus: 600t duty free; 1000t prepared,half duty		Meat of poultry and prepared food : 7250t,duty free	
Some wines: 32 million litres, duty free		Peas : 500t half duty		Cheese and curd: 1500t,duty free	
		Cane molasses: 275000t,duty free		Worked cereal grains: 1000t,duty free	
		Prepared tropical fruit: 1500t,duty free		Prepared mushrooms : 500t, duty free	
		Juices: Oranges 1000t,half duty; 30000t,25% duty;2500t,pineapple juice, half duty.			

Source: Compiled by the author from Rudloff and Simons (2004)

The experience with the implementation of the Ministerial Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net-Food Importing Developing Countries (NFIDCs) at the WTO level should guide the West African countries in formulating their requests for assistance. In particular, they should ensure that such an agreement on financial provisions carefully spelt-out the type of assistance; the amount and the agency responsible for providing the funding at the different stages, the implementation should be secured and mode of disbursement should be devoid of excessive bureaucracy. Similar principles should guide the negotiations at the WTO level to ensure that decisions are effectively implemented.

A related problem that needs to be addressed concerns the issue of supply capacity constraints. It is one step forward to remove external obstacles to the development of the sector; it is a greater step to elicit appropriate response from the sector. Measures required in this direction are in fact not separable from those required to promote development of the economy as a whole and the sector in particular. In general, they include appropriate and adequate infrastructure, incentives and measures directed at the characteristics of the sector, especially its vulnerability to vagaries of nature.

Progress and Challenges in the WTO

Issues in the DDA negotiations should also be viewed from a broader perspective of the long-term objective of agricultural sector reform in the WTO. Again just like in any other negotiations, agriculture trade liberalisation is a sensitive issue. The negotiations are structured around the three pillars of the AoA: *market access, domestic support* and *export subsidies*. Special and differential treatment in tariff reductions is built around the product coverage, base rate from which tariffs are to be reduced (applied or bound rates), formula for further commitments, implementation period and simplifications of tariffs structures. The main issues in *market access* include tariffication and tariff reduction formula, tariff quota including tariff quota volume and in-quota tariffs. Tariff quota administration is also an important issue in this regards. Special safeguard measures, importing state trading enterprises and other issues such as preferential schemes, food safety, and labelling are the other components of markets access issues in the negotiations of the sector under the auspices of WTO. The negotiations under the second pillar, **domestic support**, encompass issues in the green box (de-coupled payments or support), blue box measures and the amber box measures. Finally, *export competition*, the third pillar of AoA negotiations, covers export subsidies, export credits, insurance and guarantees, food aid, exports state trading enterprise, export restrictions.

The negotiations of AoA that started in 2000 have reached a critical stage where modalities for reforms are being negotiated. Despite intensive efforts over the past five years, however, negotiations are behind schedule. Notwithstanding various efforts at making progress on negotiations, it is doubtful if modalities for further reform of the sector will be adopted at Hong Kong Session of Ministerial Conference. Thorny issues are mainly in the area of the tariff reduction formula. For example, negotiations of formula for converting non-*ad-valorem* tariffs to *ad-valorem* equivalents (AVEs) have taken up a substantial portion of post-July discussions at the special (negotiating) session of the WTO Committee on Agriculture.

Market Access

Tariff reduction is an important component of the market access in the negotiation of agriculture. Notwithstanding the very low average applied tariff rates in the EU, agricultural products that are of interest to West Africa are characterised by tariff peaks and escalations. The July package reiterated the stance of members as contained in the Doha Ministerial Declaration that calls for substantial improvements in market access, and specifies a tiered formula and bound rates as the bases for tariff reduction. Thinking through the details, technical issues on how to obtain *ad valorem* equivalents for specific duties are equally cropping up in the early part of the post-July negotiations.

A tiered formula was suggested prior to agreement on the July package. According to the package, however the number of tariff bands and their cut-offs remained to be negotiated. Given the intention of achieving progressive tariff reductions through deeper cuts in higher tariffs, a Swiss formula approach may be applied to some bands, or members may instead choose a higher flat percentage reduction. In any case, with the creation of the sensitive product and special product categories, and the fact that bound rates rather than applied rates are to be used as the basis for reduction, any agreed formula defined by the parameters set out in the July package will only produce limited cuts in tariffs. This is particularly the case given the water in tariff bindings in developing countries. That is, the wide gap between applied and bound rates in these countries

The negotiations of AoA have been overtly concentrated on market access issues and arguably to the detriment of other pillars of negotiations. Even on the market access issue there is the need for the West African group and the various alliances within which their interests are being pursued to insist and put development issues on very high priority. In specific terms, issues such as special products special safeguard mechanism, tropical products and preference erosion should be defended at the negotiations. Other issues that must be taking on board include sectoral initiative on cotton and of course measures aimed at addressing supply response constraints.

Special and Differential Treatment

Special and differential treatment is integrated with the discussion on the different elements enumerated in the preceding paragraphs with a view to addressing the special and differential needs of developing and least developed WTO members[5]. In practice, WTO members are classified into three distinct groups: developed, developing and least developed countries. The latter are in principle exempted from reduction commitments.

In the case of WTO, the July package endorsed the concept of special products and sensitive products. The latter is available for use by all members -- developing and developed alike..

> "Without undermining the overall objective of the tiered [tariff reduction] approach, members may designate an appropriate number, to be negotiated, of tariff lines to be treated as sensitive, taking account of the existing commitments for these products." (July package, Annex A Paragraph 39)

This concept differs significantly from that of special products that was endorsed by the General Council Decision in Paragraph 41 of the same annex that states that:

> "Developing country members will have the flexibility to designate an appropriate number of products as special products, based on criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development needs. These products will be eligible

[5] This is in accordance with the Doha Declaration, which directs that special and differential treatment for developing countries should be an integral part of all elements of negotiations of AoA.

> for more flexible treatment. The criteria and treatment of the products will be further specified during the negotiation phase and will recognise the fundamental importance of Special Products to developing countries."

Indeed it is difficult to clearly distinguish between the purpose of "special" and "sensitive" products at least from the developing countries' perspective. The concept of sensitive products appears to be the creation of developed countries to counter the concept of special products. Diverse issues such as the appropriate number and the method of their determination are to be resolved at the level of negotiations of "special" and "sensitive" products.

Related to the concept of "special" and "sensitive" products is the concept of a special safeguard mechanism (SSM), available to developing country members. The mechanism is a contingency measure designed to be available in the case of sudden import surges. The current debate centres on whether or not the availability of the mechanism should be tied to liberalisation of the agricultural products in question. Special safeguard mechanism (SSM) is similar to special safeguard under Article 5 of the AoA. It is however, intended to be applicable to developing and least developed countries only. The objective would be to allow these countries to respond effectively and swiftly to import surges and price depressions. For SSM to serve its purpose, then it must be simple to apply. It is expected to correct imbalance in the use of safeguard measures. The debate is whether is should not be tied to one form of liberalisation or the other. The proponents of SSM distinguish between this mechanism as a short and coping strategy in the face of import surges and price fluctuations.

Analyses of these issues, (see for example Ruffer, (2003), ILEAP (2003), and ILEAP (2004)), point to the need for further and rigorous analysis at country level (and/or regional level in the case of EPA negotiations). Ruffer (2003) has suggested that developing countries should nominate special products based on an objective criterion and/or a combination of criterion to be agreed at the negotiations. He has suggested possible criteria for some countries including Nigeria in West Africa. The result for Nigeria is summarised in Table 3. From the Table, Nigeria can nominate between two and 17 products depending on what criteria are adopted.

Table 3: Suggested list of SP products from alternative criteria

Export of product X less than 5 % of World exports	Country not an exporter of product X	Imports more than 50% of total consumption	Consumption of Product X greater than domestic production	Consumption of Product X greater than 10 % of total domestic production
Sugar Cane	Palm kernel oil	Barley	Cassava	Beverages, fermented
Groundnut oil	Palm oil	Rye	Yams	Sorghum
Soyabeans		Tea	Beverages, fermented	Millet
Soyabean oil		Rape and Mustard oil	Sorghum	Rice (milled equivalent)
Maize		Wheat	Millet	Wheat
Palm oil		Milk excl butter	Sweet potatoes	Maize
Palm kernel oil			Pulses, other	Plantains
Groundnut (shelled eq)			Groundnut (shelled eq)	Sweet potatoes
			Plantain	Pulses, other
			Palm oil	Beer
			Pineapples	Tomatoes
			Tomatoes	Pineapples
			Sugar Cane	Milk excluding butter
			Potatoes	Palm oil
				Onions
				Groundnut oil
				Potatoes

Source: Based on Ruffer (2003)

Tropical products

Liberalisation of tropical agricultural products is also a component of S&DT in the agriculture negotiations. These products have the potential of benefiting West Africa as the countries in the region specialise in their production. For the liberalisation of these products to be fully effective, at least from West Africa perspective, it should go beyond cutting tariffs and remove para-tariff measures such as tariff quotas to include removal of non-tariff measures. This is because tariff quotas currently apply to tobacco, sugar, cotton and bananas. While there are outstanding issues in terms of product coverage (the list of products as some products are produced both in the tropics and in temperate regions) raw versus processed products, there are indications that some of the products that do not enjoy quota-free market access in developed country markets would qualify. ILEAP (2005b) listed such products to include tobacco and related products, cocoa products, pineapples. These are some of the products that appear very important to West Africa. Cotton, sugar and bananas also have the potential of being included in the list.

Preference Erosion

Preference erosion is another issue of great importance to West Africa and preference receiving countries. While preference receiving countries are not in favour of lowering most-favoured-nation tariffs which is directly contradicting the call for liberalisation of tropical products by potential exporters contradicts this position. Perhaps, where significant erosions are expected, the phasing in of liberalisation (tariff liberalisation, elimination of in-quota tariffs) should allow for preference-receiving countries to adjust to a more competitive environment. Significant preference erosion can be defined as products representing more than 20 per cent of total merchandise exports. In this sense, cashew-nuts in the case of Guinea-Bissau, Cotton lint in the case of Burkina Faso, Benin, Mali, and cocoa beans in the case of Cote d'Ivoire are the products that constituted between 48 per cent and 30 per cent of total merchandise exports of the respective countries (ILEAP, 2005b).

Cotton Initiative

Though originally an initiative of four West African countries,[6] a sectoral initiative on cotton has been included as part of the July package on agriculture. Other West African countries also stand to gain from the initiative even if they are not currently producing cotton, since they have the potential to supply cotton given the right environment. The cotton initiative calls for elimination of subsidies by phasing out subsidies to developed countries' producers on the basis that such support creates undue advantage and negatively affects the supply of cotton by this group of West African countries. Subsidised over-supply of cotton from OECD countries also depresses world market prices for the product, further impacting negatively on West African cotton farmers. The initiative takes a step further by including for compensation mechanism to offset the income loss experienced by the cotton farmers in the least and developing countries until the completion of the phase out.

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[6] Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali

The initiative which was raised first at both the General Council and the agricultural negotiations was part of the Cancun Ministerial Conference and since then has received attention in the ongoing negotiation. The discussion of the issues at the Conference was around whether the initiative should be handed as a specific question or should be integrated with the existing three pillars of agricultural trade negotiations. The discussion of initiatives was further compounded by the fact that the WTO has no development fund.

With no agreement on the initiative at the Conference, it became a subject matter for the July package which directed continuation of work on the initiative. This work is to involve both the development community and related international organisations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nation Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO). It also directed that the initiative should be given "appropriate" priority.

About three months after the July Package, the Cotton Sub-Committee was set up. While the July Package puts the negotiations of cotton with the agriculture negotiations, the Sub-Committee is to work on "all trade distorting policies affecting the sector"

Impact Analysis

The effects of trade reform on three groups of stakeholders (consumer, government and producers) are examined in the process of evaluating of the impact of negotiations. In most cases, the effects on the consumers (the voiceless group) are usually discounted especially when they are not organised as in the case of West Africa. An aggregate measure of trade reform is the change in welfare. The different components of the welfare (consumer surplus, producer surplus and government revenue) may be in any direction, a positive change in welfare implies that those who lose from liberalisation can be adequately compensated and the society as a whole will benefit.

Two models are applied to gauge the effects of liberalisation of the sector on West African economies. The first model examines the combination of multilateral and regional trade liberalisation arrangements. In this case, the effects of different arrangements are not separately analysed. The second model focuses only the preferential trading arrangement. The two models are briefly discussed before the presentation of estimated results.

Agricultural Trade Policy Simulation Model

The quantification of the impact of the main proposals on tariff reduction is based on UNCTAD (2003). Four main equations drive the model: the demand, supply, export, and import equations. The model is capable of evaluating the effects of tariff cuts, subsidy reductions and quota changes simulating the effects of reduction in out-of-quota tariffs, reduction of within-quota tariffs, reduction of extra farm price support, and reduction of export subsidies. It offers the choice of combining these changes. It produces five categories of estimates of changes in volume of production, consumption, imports and exports, value of exports, import and net trade revenue, welfare (producer surplus, consumer surplus and net government revenue). Other outputs include changes in price (world market prices, wholesale consumer and farm prices) and changes in tariff quota rents (both forgone and receivable).

A change in any of the policy variables induces price changes that changes supply, demand, exports and imports. The model calculates a market clearing world price and the corresponding parameters such as changes in volume and values of production, consumption; imports and exports, welfare, and tariff quota rents.

Without prejudice to the outcome of negotiations that will produce detailed figures and final text of the agreement, an empirical evaluation of a tiered formula is attempted. Some caveats about the database are appropriate at this juncture. Detailed data required for such an evaluation are difficult to obtain, however, the model relied on the data as contained in Version of 1.2 (February 2003) of Agricultural Trade Policy Simulation Model (ATPSM) of FAO/UNCTAD. The tiered formula that is applied also differentiates between developed and developing countries. First, for developed countries, a 60 per cent reduction in out-of-quota tariff for bound tariff rate greater than 90 per cent; a 50 per cent reduction in out-of-quota tariff for bound tariff rate between 15 and 90 per cent; and a 40 per cent reduction in out-of-quota tariff for bound tariff rate less than or equal to 15 per cent and also 80 per cent and 60 per cent reduction in export subsidy and domestic support respectively.

Second, for developing countries: a 40 per cent reduction in out-of-quota tariff for bound tariff rate greater than 120 per cent; a 35 per cent reduction in out-of-quota tariff for bound tariff rate between 60 and 120 per cent; and a 30 per cent reduction in out-of-quota tariff for bound tariff rate 20 and 60 per cent and 25 per cent reduction in out of quota for bound tariff rate less than 20 per cent. A 70 per cent reduction export subsidy and 20 per cent reduction in domestic support were also specified. Reciprocal preferential treatment of total exports between EU and West Africa EPA was also specified.

The effects of all these on government revenue show that government revenue will decline between 3.7 per cent in Nigeria and 22.1 per cent in Togo (Table 4). Annex B presents the estimated decline in government revenue by countries and commodity groups. Apart from Benin, Guinea Bissau and Nigeria that recorded below ten per cent, all other countries in the region recorded above ten per cent decline in government revenue. Indeed, the average for all the countries is about 15 per cent.

Table 4: Estimated Decline in Government Revenue, %

	Benin	Burkina Faso	Gambia	Ghana	Guinea	Guinea Bissau	Ivory Coast	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Nigeria	Senegal	Sierra Leone	Togo
Average	9.68	16.25	10.58	17.62	18.37	8.63	15.19	16.63	16.14	18.07	3.68	17.86	11.05	22.12

Source: Calculated by the author

Busse-Borrmann-Grossmann Model

The second model is limited to examining the impact of EPA on the West African agriculture and to only the developing West African countries of Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria. The database and methodology are obtained from Busse, Borrmann and Grossmann (2004). While the study by Busse *et al (Ibid)* report empirical analysis at aggregate level, this paper reports the estimated impacts of trade liberalisation on agricultural sector

A version of Verdoorn's partial equilibrium model that distinguished among imports from different sources is adopted together with the elasticities of substitution, and imports demand was assumed. Total change in import is decomposed into trade creation (TC) and trade diversion (TD). Change in import duties is calculated from preferred countries, which are now excluded from import tariff and the product of import from non-preferred countries and the import tariff.

Three scenarios are created based on assumed values of elasticities of demand and substitution. For the agricultural sector, import elasticity of demand is 0.4, 0.7 and 0.9 for low, medium and high scenarios respectively. The assumed values for elasticity of substitution are 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0 respectively. The estimated trade effects decomposed into trade creation and trade diversion and change in import duties are presented in Tables 5 and 6.

Table 5: Agricultural Trade Liberalisation Effects of EPA on Developing West African Countries

		Trade creation		Trade diversion		Total trade effects	
Country	Scenario Setting	Mill. US$	% of preferred Imports	Mill. US$	% of non-preferred Imports	Mill. US$	% of preferred Imports
Cote d'Ivoire	Low	8.5	3.0%	3.5	1.0%	12.0	5.0%
	Mid	15.0	6.0%	7.4	3.0%	22.4	9.0%
	High	21.4	9.0%	11.4	4.0%	32.8	13.0%
Nigeria	Low	38.4	7.0%	22.9	4.0%	61.3	11.0%
	Mid	67.1	12.0%	49.7	8.0%	116.8	21.0%
	High	95.9	17.0%	76.5	12.0%	172.3	31.0%
Ghana	Low	2.6	2.1%	1.7	1.0%	4.3	5.3%
	Mid	4.6	3.7%	3.5	1.4%	8.2	6.6%
	High	6.6	5.3%	5.5	2.2%	12.1	9.8%

Source: Computed by the Author

Table 6: Agricultural Trade Liberalisation Effect on Import Duties in Developing West African Countries

Country	Scenario Setting	Mill US$	% of total import Duties	% of total government revenue	% of GDP
Cote d'Ivoire	Low	25.1	17.0%	1.0%	0.0%
	Mid	25.7	17.0%	1.0%	0.0%
	High	26.3	18.0%	1.0%	0.0%
Nigeria	Low	132.2	14.0%	1.0%	0.0%
	Mid	140.2	15.0%	1.0%	0.0%
	High	148.2	16.0%	1.0%	0.0%
Ghana	Low	8.6	6.3%	1.0%	0.2%
	Mid	9.0	6.6%	1.0%	0.2%
	High	9.5	6.9%	1.1%	0.2%

Source: Computed by the author

As a result of Nigeria's full agricultural trade liberalisation with EU, this is expected to lead to increase in total agricultural imports from EU by about \$177 million in medium scenario or by about 21 per cent of the country's agricultural imports from EU. Similarly, the calculation for Ghana, suggests that the country's imports of agricultural commodities from EU will increase by about \$8.2 million or 6.6 per cent. For Cote d'Ivoire, the corresponding figures are \$22.4 million or about 9 per cent of its agricultural imports from EU respectively. Trade creation exceeded trade diversion in all the three countries (Table 5) suggesting that an EPA between the EU and West Africa is likely to be welfare enhancing.

Import duties are expected to decline. In terms of magnitude, it is about \$9 million in Ghana, \$140 million in Nigeria and \$25.7million in Cote d' Ivoire. The decline as percentage of total import duties ranged between 6.6 per cent in Ghana to 17 per cent in Cote d' Ivoire (Table 6). It is estimated at about 15 per cent for Nigeria. These estimates compared favourably with the estimates from the ATPSM reported earlier.

Table 7 presents the decline in import duties by HS chapter. Only five HS chapters (Miscellaneous edible preparations, cereals, dairy produce, fish and sugar) accounted for about 76 per cent of the decline in import duties. The effects are widespread across the HS chapters in the case of Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana. While the decline in import duties on fish (HS03) (Cote d'Ivoire), dairy produce (HS04) (Ghana) and miscellaneous edible preparations (HS21) in Nigeria ranked first, the magnitude of the decline in import duties on dairy ranked high in all the countries (first in Ghana, third in Nigeria, and second in Cote d'Ivoire).

Table 7: Decline in Import Duties by HS Chapter, % of Total Import Duties

	Nigeria	Ghana	Cote d'Ivoire
01 Live Animals	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%
02 Meat and Edible Meat Oval	0.0%	3.3%	2.1%
03 Fish and Crustaceans, Molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates	7.6%	2.5%	15.0%
04 Diary produce	7.9%	8.7%	8.9%
05 Products of animal origin	0.3%	0.0%	0.0%
06 Live trees and other plants	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
07 Edible vegetables and certain fruits and tubers	0.1%	0.1%	2.2%
08 Edible fruits and nuts	0.0%	0.1%	0.4%
09 Coffee, tea, mate and spices	0.4%	1.5%	0.4%
10 Cereals	8.0%	1.1%	4.2%
11 Products of the milling industry	1.6%	1.4%	1.4%
12 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%
13 Lac; gums, resins	0.2%	0.1%	0.0%
14 Vegetable plaiting materials	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
15 Animal vegetable fats and oils	0.9%	4.8%	0.9%
16 Preparation of meat, of fish of crustaceans	0.1%	2.6%	0.6%
17 Sugars and sugar confectionery	6.8%	0.2%	3.2%
18 Cocoa and cocoa preparations	0.0%	2.8%	0.2%
19 Preparations of cereals, floor starch or milk	1.8%	1.7%	4.2%
20 Preparations of vegetables, fruits, nuts	0.6%	3.1%	3.4%
21 Miscellaneous edible preparations	10.5%	2.5%	4.9%
22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar	2.7%	2.7%	5.5%
23 Residues and waste from the food industries	0.2%	0.5%	0.3%
24 Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes	3.4%	0.7%	4.1%

Source: Calculated by the Author

Towards Integrating West African Development Priorities into Reforms

The agricultural sector of West African countries is vulnerable to different factors including external shocks as policies especially those originating from their main trading partners. Trade liberalisation at any level must not only factor in the structure and composition of the regions' agriculture, it must also aim at promoting the development of the sector on a sustainable level. The task before DDA and EPA negotiations is to ensure that the development of West African agriculture is promoted and the onus is on West African countries to push harder for improved market access for the sector and to secure external assistance that will help to optimise the opportunities created by liberalisation and thus efficiently utilise abundant agricultural resources of the region.

It is important to note that most elements of the DDA negotiations and EPA negotiations overlap considerably. Tariff reductions, tariff rate quotas (TRQs), special and differential treatments are some of the subjects of discussion at both negotiation fora, however, substantial market access into the EU may be long in coming. The creation of sensitive products in the DDA negotiations coupled with the experience with the various EU's FTA arrangements especially with respect to the EU's list of strategic/sensitive products, the West African country has a limited leeway to secure an appreciable increase in their access to EU market. Other measures such as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS), technical barriers to trade (TBT) and regulatory measures are also capable of impinging on the access of these countries to the EU market.

Domestic support was not an item in the West Africa EPA negotiations. The magnitude of the support makes the initial conditions for tariff liberalisation uneven. This support depresses international prices of agricultural commodities. It is inconceivable that tariff will be liberalised without addressing the huge sums devoted to support agriculture in the EU. Even if it is impossible to bring domestic support under negotiations in the EPA, ACP countries should not fail to use the WTO negotiation forum to deal with the issue.

By default, the roadmap for the negotiations of EPA between the EU and West African countries structured the negotiations in such a way that actual negotiations may not commence until the negotiations of AoA has begun in earnest. According to the roadmap, the first phase of negotiations will be devoted to efforts at deepening regional integration process in the region. The need to harmonise the two negotiations cannot be over emphasised. The developments in the DDA negotiations should be closely monitored to guide the EPA negotiations.

Irrespective of the procedure adopted in the identification and selection of "special" and "sensitive" products in the DDA negotiations, the complementarity offered by these negotiations should not be neglected. Since countries are the negotiators in the DDA and coupled with the fact they are likely to nominate their "special" and "sensitive" products for DDA negotiations prior to regional negotiations of EPA on the same subject, DDA in this case would have served as a spring-board and a useful input in the process of collating sensitive/strategies products at the regional level.

The short run impact should be clearly distinguished from the dynamic impacts of the EPA negotiations. The estimates presented in this paper capture only the short run. Apart from being inadequate for an analysis of long-term effects since the time path of adjustment is not captured, the other components of the CPA are not analysed. While EPA should be evaluated, there is the need to situate the analysis within a CPA as a package. Full liberalisation is only expected 10 to12 years after the conclusion of the EPA negotiations an analysis that incorporates gradual movement towards full liberalisation.

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Annex A : **Commodity Dependence of West Africa**

	>$ 1 million in 2002	**> 30% of Agricultural Exports**	**> 5% of GDP**
Benin	Cotton (Lint), Cashew nuts (in shell, shelled)	Cotton (Lint) 83%	Cotton (Lint) 6%
Burkina Faso	Cotton (Lint), Cattle	Cotton (Lint) 77%	Cotton (Lint) 5%
Cote d'Ivoire	Cocoa beans, Cotton (Lint), tobacco leaves, Coffee (green), cocoa paste, Rubber (natural dry), cashew nuts (in shell, shelled) cocoa butter	Cocoa beans 58%	Cocoa beans 14%
Ghana	Cocoa beans, tobacco leaves, cocoa paste, cocoa butter	Cocoa beans 76%	Cocoa beans 5%
Guinea	Cattle		
Guinea Bissau	Cashew nuts	Cashew nuts 91%	Cashew nuts 6%
Mali	Cotton (Lint), sheep, cattle	Cotton (Lint) 63%	Cotton (Lint) 7%
Mauritania	Cattle	Cattle 49%	
Niger	Sheep, cattle		
Nigeria	Cocoa beans, rubber, cocoa butter	Cocoa beans 39%	

Source: ILEAP (2005a)

Annex B: Estimated Change (decline) in Government Revenue by Products and by Countries, %

		Burkina				Guinea	Ivory						Sierra	
	Benin	Faso	Gambia	Ghana	Guinea	Bissau	Coast	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Nigeria	Senegal	Leone	Togo
Bovine meat	13.70	0.33	4.12	11.10	0.00	0.00	16.30	0.20	0.00	1.73	0.00	9.16	1.98	1.92
Sheepmeat	1.11	0.29	0.00	1.17	0.65	0.00	1.17	0.00	0.84	0.08	0.00	1.06	1.16	0.03
Pigmeat	0.00	0.00	6.80	7.50	0.00	0.00	14.60	5.45	0.00	0.00	0.00	8.08	0.00	5.24
Poultry	17.02	1.81	0.00	16.59	9.27	2.19	14.82	0.70	13.72	0.76	10.66	7.80	11.10	15.80
Milk, fresh	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Milk, conc.	33.80	27.38	28.84	26.75	27.78	36.31	26.69	30.17	27.87	27.34	0.00	26.57	42.07	28.73
Butter	21.17	21.05	20.48	21.47	20.04	14.20	21.10	20.99	21.41	19.02	21.50	21.40	19.37	20.12
Cheese	55.62	69.85	62.10	48.00	63.65	74.01	49.28	71.26	75.32	68.22	0.00	40.01	69.51	69.18
Wheat	16.10	16.17	16.97	14.94	15.49	26.44	14.95	16.27	15.06	16.75	0.00	15.01	17.37	16.29
Rice	1.88	1.88	1.99	1.86	1.86	1.92	1.85	1.91	1.95	1.88	0.00	1.84	1.86	1.11
Barley	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	48.51	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	48.33
Maize	0.70	2.69	0.00	0.45	0.00	0.00	0.33	2.83	3.00	0.25	0.00	0.31	2.80	2.98
Sorghum	0.00	0.36	18.82	6.80	0.00	0.50	0.42	0.00	0.00	0.37	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Pulses	0.00	7.58	49.76	45.08	9.02	28.77	14.80	48.91	13.49	50.20	48.49	17.76	8.53	45.43
Tomatoes	0.00	12.42	11.58	0.00	12.39	0.00	11.37	0.00	9.28	12.31	0.00	10.95	10.32	9.30
Roots & tubers	44.21	39.96	29.41	39.94	44.25	48.56	27.94	37.22	28.23	28.66	0.00	27.62	40.48	37.01
Apples	32.22	45.36	0.00	39.78	48.44	0.00	22.96	0.00	28.62	62.73	0.00	24.61	0.00	52.59
Citrus fruits	0.00	84.51	0.00	79.46	84.74	0.00	58.13	84.22	55.27	63.01	0.00	47.26	0.00	84.36
Bananas	0.00	1.37	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.06	4.05	2.65	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00
Other tropical fruits	0.00	11.31	0.00	10.35	9.36	0.00	7.37	11.06	6.47	4.13	0.00	9.78	0.00	15.86
Sugar	16.23	24.09	14.24	13.98	15.86	18.68	28.19	15.12	14.10	15.76	0.00	29.64	18.47	17.25
Coffee green	0.00	3.06	0.00	3.22	0.92	0.00	6.73	0.63	0.33	0.00	0.00	0.92	0.00	9.88
Coffee roasted	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Coffee extracts	0.38	0.00	0.00	0.40	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.30	0.00	0.36
Cocoa beans	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.73	1.63	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.10
Cocoa powder	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	86.04	0.00	0.00	90.36	90.36	90.36	0.00	87.86	88.45	90.14
Cocoa butter	0.00	0.00	0.00	80.40	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	79.06	0.00	80.40
Chocolate	24.70	33.84	25.72	23.90	24.36	33.84	23.23	29.62	25.72	32.46	0.00	22.76	23.66	21.07
Tea	1.32	1.27	1.40	1.43	1.40	0.00	1.42	1.44	1.44	1.43	0.00	1.44	1.01	0.83
Tobacco leaves	11.79	15.30	13.57	14.31	14.41	0.00	15.45	14.58	14.89	10.28	15.12	15.41	15.04	0.00
Cigars	26.47	28.20	27.53	28.77	28.90	23.84	9.20	27.84	28.67	28.78	28.78	0.00	27.83	28.35
Cigarettes	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Other mfr tobacco	33.38	30.72	44.64	0.00	79.02	0.00	35.26	63.96	0.00	79.02	0.00	67.88	0.00	0.00
Oilseeds	0.00	32.69	7.29	29.50	0.00	0.00	17.88	29.06	33.76	31.86	7.06	0.00	0.00	25.97
Cotton linters	0.00	80.76	0.00	78.34	76.06	0.00	64.41	0.00	78.33	13.49	0.00	80.75	0.00	80.76
Vegetable oils	6.37	6.91	6.25	6.35	5.67	10.05	5.79	8.65	5.14	5.22	4.46	4.52	7.81	7.08
Average	9.68	16.25	10.58	17.62	18.37	8.63	15.19	16.63	16.14	18.07	3.68	17.86	11.05	22.12

Source: Computed by the Author from ATPSM