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TRADE PREFERENCE EROSION: POTENTIAL ECONOMIC IMPACTS

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By Douglas Lippoldt and Przemyslaw Kowalski

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ABSTRACT

This paper presents the new findings from the on-going work of the OECD project on trade preference erosion. Following a review of the recent literature, the paper develops two main types of analysis. First, a detailed statistical analysis is undertaken drawing on the trade preferences database developed by the Secretariat and covering the Quad countries and Australia. This includes a presentation of the structure of tariff regimes in these key developed countries and identification of countries and sectors that are most reliant on tariff preferences. The second analytical approach uses the standard model and database of the Global Trade Analysis Project to simulate trade liberalisation scenarios that would entail preference erosion. While highlighting a number of cases of preference reliance, the paper underscores the advantages of multilateral liberalisation. Globally and for a majority of developing regions, liberalisation by preference-granting countries will result in positive welfare gains, notwithstanding the effects of preference erosion. In a comparatively small number of cases, however, the analysis points to a risk of net welfare losses under the scenarios modelled here.

Keywords: tariff reductions, multilateral trade negotiations, nonreciprocal preferences, preference erosion, statistical review, CGE simulation, developing countries

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TRADE PREFERENCE EROSION: POTENTIAL ECONOMIC IMPACTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The OECD Trade Directorate's preference erosion project focuses on developing country concerns with the economic impacts of preference erosion that may arise following MFN tariff reductions under the Doha Development Agenda. The specific objective of the project is to consider selected major non-reciprocal preference programmes of the Quad countries (Canada, the European Union, Japan and the United States) and Australia with a view to identifying trade partners that are particularly vulnerable to the problems of preference erosion, assessing sectors that may be most affected, and evaluating the possible first round economic impacts. In light of this focus and objective, preference erosion is defined – for the purposes of this project – as a decrease in the margin between a preferential tariff rate and the tariff rates that are “normally” applied, and which occurs as a consequence of multilateral tariff liberalisation.

This paper presents the findings from the second phase of work under this project, building on the initial data and statistical work conducted in the first half of 2004. Following a review of the recent literature, the present paper develops two main types of analysis. First, a detailed statistical analysis is undertaken drawing on the trade preferences database developed by the Secretariat and covering the Quad countries and Australia. This analysis includes a presentation of the structure of tariff regimes in these key developed countries and then identifies countries and sectors that are most reliant on tariff preferences and consequently may be particularly vulnerable to preference erosion. The database draws on actual trade flows under preferential arrangements for Australia, Canada and the United States. Detailed and consistent data on actual preferential trade flows into the European Union and Japan are not available to the OECD Secretariat. Consequently, drawing on UNCTAD/World Bank data, the Secretariat has inferred trade flows under the preferential arrangements for the European Union and Japan, based on the assumption that imports from developing countries into these destination markets enter at the best available tariff rates, recognising that this assumption overstates the role of tariff preferences in these cases.

A full economic assessment of the risks of preference erosion depends on consideration of the multiple trade-offs under MFN tariff liberalisation, including indirect impacts that are not evident from a simple review of reliance on preferences. Consequently, the second analytical approach in this paper uses a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model capable of simulating trade liberalisation scenarios and assessing the economic trade-offs and effects on regions around the world. This analysis employs the model and database of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP, which is a global network of researchers and policy makers hosted by Purdue University). In contrast to earlier iterations of the GTAP database, the new GTAP 6.05 database used here takes into account a broad range of tariff preferences.

The risk of negative direct economic impacts from preference erosion is associated with the potential loss of a non-reciprocally granted tariff advantage upon which a developing country depends. Such dependence would entail substantial shares of real trade entering under preferential programmes which confer non-negligible tariff advantages. This does occur, but it is less frequent than the aggregate numbers might suggest. As highlighted in the literature and statistical reviews:

- Substantial shares of imports from developing countries enter Australia and the Quad countries via duty-free or low MFN tariff rates. MFN imports are estimated to account for more than 2/3 of the imports from preference-eligible countries into Canada, Japan and the United States, almost ½ of the trade flows from preference-eligible countries into the European Union and about 3/7 of imports from preference-eligible countries into Australia.
- Preference margins are available across a wide range of tariff lines, but under a number of programmes it also appears that the effective preferences (*i.e.* those with substantial trade volumes) are sometimes confined to a limited number of tariff lines. The literature suggests that constraints built into the preferential programmes may limit their utility due to exclusion of specific products of particular interest or problems associated with satisfaction of the programme conditions (*e.g.* rules of origin). Supply problems may also constraint the ability of exporters to capitalise on the access afforded by preferences.
- Imports under the preferential programmes are often dominated by a few large developing countries such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines or Thailand, among others. With a few exceptions, the countries that supply the most under preferential arrangements into the developed country markets are not among the suppliers most reliant on preferences in terms of shares of their total exports to these destinations. The exceptions are China and India, which are large preferential suppliers with high shares of preferential trade in their total exports to both Australia and the European Union. Indonesia, as well, exported a large volume and a high preferential share in its total exports into the European Union.
- The group of countries with the highest shares of trade entering the destination markets under preferential arrangements tends to be dominated by medium and small suppliers including a number of economically vulnerable countries falling into the LDC or small island categories (*e.g.* Haiti or Samoa) or located in Sub-Saharan Africa, among others.
- The European Union stands out among the five destination markets as having the largest number of suppliers importing substantial volumes under preferences and a large number of countries that rely on preferences for a high share of their imports into the European Union, including many instances of sector-specific preference reliance. There are a number of cases of preference reliance with respect to the US market, as well (*e.g.* certain countries that benefit from Caribbean or African preferences for apparel). There appears to be comparatively little reliance on exports of specific product groups by developing countries under preferences into the Australian, Canadian and Japanese markets. That is, with a couple of exceptions, there is relatively little sectoral concentration in the reliance on preferential exports into these three markets.

Preference erosion resulting from MFN tariff liberalisation will remain a concern only to the extent that preferential tariff margins give these (generally smaller) preference-dependent countries a significant market access advantage. In this context, the CGE modelling simulations help to assess the implications of various trade liberalisation scenarios (in this case, ranging from unilateral liberalisation by preference-granting countries to global liberalisation):

- Separate simulations of individual, unilateral liberalisation by each of the five preference-granting countries indicate that for beneficiary countries there is a negative correlation between the size of the initial effective preferential margin and the liberalisation-related welfare gain (with some exceptions).

- Multi-country trade liberalisation scenarios may open new opportunities in alternative markets for a preference-reliant exporting country. Due to the significant differentiation in sectoral and regional emphasis of preferential schemes across preference-granting countries, a simultaneous liberalisation by all five preference-granting countries may help to offset potential losses in a single market.
- The outcomes from multi-country trade liberalisation are further enhanced under a global liberalisation scenario that also includes developing country participation in market opening.
- Due to a combination of the high EU shares in the total exports of several beneficiary countries and the substantial size of EU preference margins in certain sectors, the preference schemes of the European Union have a more significant impact on beneficiaries than those in the United States, Japan, Canada or Australia. Consequently, an MFN liberalisation by the European Union may be associated with net negative welfare impacts for some especially preference-reliant or resource-constrained economies.

In conclusion, it appears that, globally and for a majority of developing regions, liberalisation by preference-granting countries will result in positive welfare gains, notwithstanding the effects of preference erosion. In a comparatively small number of cases, however, the analysis points to a risk of net welfare losses under the scenarios modelled here.

TRADE PREFERENCE EROSION: POTENTIAL ECONOMIC IMPACTS

I. Introduction

1. Eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations since 1947 have succeeded in substantially reducing import duties as a barrier to trade. The World Trade Organisation's (WTO) Doha Development Agenda is currently underway with a mandate to seek further multilateral tariff reductions. Under provisions permitting derogation from the most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle, WTO members can accord additional tariff concessions to specific trading partners. Developed countries have often granted such tariff preferences to developing economies in a non-reciprocal manner, either via the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) or on a categorical, regional or bilateral basis. However, as multilateral trade negotiations progress and MFN tariffs are reduced, the preference margins between the MFN tariff rates and the preferential tariff rates get squeezed.¹

2. The OECD Trade Directorate's preference erosion project focuses on developing country concerns with the economic impacts of preference erosion that may arise following MFN tariff reductions under the Doha Development Agenda.² The specific objective of the project is to consider selected major non-reciprocal preference programmes of the Quad countries (Canada, the European Union, Japan and the United States) and Australia with a view to identifying trade partners that are particularly vulnerable to the problems of preference erosion, analysing sectors or products that may be most affected, and assessing the possible first round economic impacts. In light of this focus and objective, *preference erosion is defined --*

¹ A similar phenomenon can happen among different preferential tariff regimes, such as when tariff rates are reduced under one scheme but not another. Other factors, such as outcomes of dispute settlement cases, may also contribute to preference erosion (*e.g.* see the UK Department of Trade and Industry summary on EU banana preferences available at: <http://www.dti.gov.uk/ewt/bananas.htm> as of 20 November 2004).

² This project responds to a mandate from the OECD Trade Committee to examine the issue of preference erosion. See Annex 1 for an overview of the project specification for this phase of the work.

for the purposes of this project -- as a decrease in the margin between a preferential tariff rate and the tariff rates that are “normally” applied, which occurs as a consequence of multilateral tariff liberalisation. Due to constraints in the two main data sets utilised in this study, “normally applied tariffs” are defined in two ways as either the most-favoured-nation rates or as the trade-weighted average tariff rates.

3. Following a review of recent literature on preference erosion, the present paper presents two main types of analysis. First, a detailed statistical analysis is undertaken drawing on a new trade preferences database developed by the Secretariat and covering the Quad countries and Australia. It aims to provide a sense of countries and sectors that are most preference reliant and that consequently may be particularly vulnerable to preference erosion. The database draws on actual trade flows under preferential arrangements for Australia, Canada and the United States. Detailed data on actual preferential trade flows into the European Union and Japan are not available to the OECD Secretariat.^{3, 4} Consequently, estimates of preferential trade flows have been developed for the European Union and Japan based on an assumption that imported products enter these markets at the best available tariff rates⁵, recognising that this assumption overstates the role of preferences.

4. Second, the paper presents analysis conducted using the Global Trade Analysis Project’s (GTAP) computable general equilibrium (CGE) model in a standard configuration. This analysis permits an assessment of the economic effects (*e.g.* on welfare or trade flows) of trade liberalisation on regions around the world, including those that presently benefit disproportionately from tariff preferences. The GTAP data on trade protection take into account the combined effects of various types of border protection (*e.g.* tariffs, specific duties and tariff-rate quotas) expressed as an *ad valorem* equivalent measure of applied protection. In contrast to earlier iterations of the GTAP database, the new GTAP 6.05 database takes into account a broad range of tariff preferences (previous editions considered preferences only in the context of a few regional trade agreements).

5. The paper is organised in the following sections: 1) an introduction, 2) a literature review, 3) a statistical review, 4) a CGE analysis and 5) conclusions. A number of detailed tables and annexes provide information to support and frame the main text.

II. Literature review

6. The literature on various types of trade preferences has been extensively referenced or reviewed in a number of papers and volumes (*e.g.* Achterbosch (2003), Hoekman *et al.* (2003), OECD (2001)). Hence, the present paper primarily aims to provide an update, emphasising the most recent literature and selected additional references that are of particular use in establishing the context for the analysis that follows. Emphasis has been given to references that help to highlight usage of existing Quad country and

³ Although the OECD Secretariat does not have access to detailed official data on preferential imports in the EU, there are steps underway to remedy the situation eventually. Eurostat is presently engaged in a project to improve its database on preferential trade. Although the contents are not official European Commission data, the database restructuring is intended to eventually permit more transparent and readable access to information on preferential trade drawing on importers’ customs declarations screened to remove obvious anomalies (*e.g.* to correct for developed country imports incorrectly declared as preferential imports) [European Commission correspondence with the OECD Secretariat, 22 June 2004].

⁴ Aggregate data on imports under GSP are published in the Official Gazette of Japan, but detailed information on preferential imports suitable for the present study are not available [correspondence from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the OECD Secretariat, 5 March 2004].

⁵ The “best available tariff rates” are as indicated in the Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

Australian preferential arrangements. This provides some information on those countries or sectors that may face particular hardships from preference erosion associated with future multilateral trade agreements. The review is split into three subsections. The first subsection provides an overview of the evidence on the impacts of preferences. The second subsection touches on conclusions from the literature on rules of origin (ROOs), which sometimes point to ROOs as a factor constraining the ability to benefit from preferential arrangements. In view of the particular emphasis in preference initiatives on targeting the least developed countries (LDCs), the final sub section of the review considers several recent references on this issue.

Framing the discussion

7. Before proceeding, it is useful to describe the measures that are commonly employed in the literature to provide information on the extent of preferential access. In particular, the literature highlights three dimensions of preferential programmes and the associated trade flows: coverage, utilisation and utility. Inama (2003) provides an overview of these dimensions, although there is some variation in the way these concepts are applied by various authors. Inama defines product coverage as “the ratio between imports that are covered by a preferential trade arrangement and total dutiable imports from beneficiary countries.” This gives an indication of the extent of eligibility for preferences. The utilisation rate, per Inama, is “the ratio between imports actually receiving preference and covered imports.” This gives an indication of the take up by importers of the offer of preferential access. Inama defines the utility rate as “the ratio of imports actually receiving preference and all dutiable imports (covered or not) {...}”. This gives an indication of the importance of preferences in relation to all trade subject to duties. (NB, in order to consider the importance of preferences more broadly, the statistical and CGE analyses presented in sections III and IV of the present paper consider preferences in relation to total imports, *i.e.* not limited to dutiable imports.)

8. Candau *et al.* (2004) provide an example of the application of the coverage, utilisation and utility concepts in the case of European Union (EU) trade preference programmes. They point out that an assessment of a single programme based on these concepts might risk understating the importance of preferential access to a given exporter. This is because an exporter may have access to multiple preference programmes (and, indeed, may choose to utilise programmes based on considerations beyond simply the one offering best preference margins). Cumulatively these programmes may provide extensive preferential access even where take up for one or the other programme is modest. For example, a recent OECD study by Bureau and Gallezot (2004) focuses on agricultural and food products and provides a detailed examination of utilisation rates under the United States and EU preferential agreements. Whereas the utilisation of certain programmes can be quite limited for certain products and countries, the authors found that if all the preferential schemes are taken as a whole, the rate of utilisation across eligible imports reaches 89% in the European Union and 88% in the United States. At the same time, for certain countries (especially some LDCs), the authors found that utilisation rates can be quite high but the trade flows concerned can be relatively small.

9. A number of recent empirical studies on non-reciprocal tariff preferences are not favourable in their assessments. While many of these studies focus on just a few preference programmes (or even a single programme), they also provide insights that are relevant more generally. There are broad concerns that preferences can encourage specialisation in activities where countries are not competitive in the long term and that preferences can create vested interests opposed to multilateral trade liberalisation [OECD (2001)].⁶ The literature also includes a number of studies underscoring the constraints on the potential of

⁶ *E.g.* Hedi Bchir *et al.* (2004) model the impacts of preference erosion on Sub-Saharan Africa under a scenario of liberalisation in non-agricultural goods. They find that, as a result of preference erosion (in particular for textiles and clothing in the EU and US market) and of the relative price decline of their main export products (primary and agricultural products), Sub-Saharan countries risk to see welfare losses under

some preferential schemes due to limitations on the range of eligible products, the exclusion of some potential beneficiary countries, or the conditions of usage. For example, in some cases ROOs have discouraged utilisation of preferences. In others, graduation of GSP beneficiaries and/or products has reduced access to preferences for some countries. Such constraints have limited the potential impacts of preferences for developing countries, both positive impacts and the risks of losses from future preference erosion (*i.e.* to the extent that developing countries do not rely on preferences). Several studies point to the high shares of products already entering Quad markets on an MFN duty-free or low tariff rate basis. At the same time, even where preferences are utilised, it may be that the exporting country is not able to capture a substantial share of the price advantage conferred by the tariff breaks.

10. Nevertheless, there are cases where preferences are heavily utilised and beneficiaries exhibit a considerable preference reliance (*e.g.* in relation to their total exports). For these countries, erosion of preferences could entail a reorientation of trade that may negatively affect the corresponding sectors or even the economy more broadly. In a number of such cases, the preferential trade flows are focused over a small range of products or beneficiary countries.

Benefits from preferences?

11. This section of the literature review highlights recent studies providing insights into the extent of benefits under specific programmes. Studies focused more specifically on rules of origin or the least developed countries (LDCs) are treated, respectively, in the two following sections. (Naturally, there is some overlap in the content of the studies across these three sections.)

12. Mattoo *et al.* (2002) consider the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which was signed into law on 18 May 2000 to provide improved access for African exports to the U.S. market (subject to certain conditions). The authors give particular attention to the apparel sector, noting the concentration of potential benefits, impact of restrictive ROOs, and exclusion of certain products. Whereas US GSP covered only 17% of Sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA) exports in 2000, AGOA could increase the share covered by preferences to 72%. Overall, AGOA is found to boost real trade opportunities for Africa, with non-oil exports potentially being raised by 8 to 11 percent, even under conservative estimates of supply response. A large portion of the AGOA-related trade flows, however, will consist of petroleum products, which faced low tariffs prior to AGOA. The main additional benefits relate to preferences for apparel as well as some footwear, watches and agricultural products. Some of the latter are, however, subject to high out-of-quota tariffs. Almost 1100 tariff lines remain excluded from AGOA, with almost 900 lines facing tariffs of about 11% on average including a number of lines of potential export interest for Africa.⁷ The authors estimate that the potential benefits in the apparel sector might have been up to five times larger if access had been duty free, quota free and with ROOs requiring only assembly in the beneficiary countries (*i.e.* an increase of up to USD 500 million instead of USD 100 – 140 million).

13. Stevens and Kennan (2000) consider the concentration of benefits under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (signed in June 2000) preferences for African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP). The authors focus on products where utilisation of preferences evidently conferred an effective competitive advantage on the ACP-beneficiary exporters. Starting from an assessment of existing trade patterns (on the basis of trade data from 1997), they find just 12 main product groups where: the preferences conferred a competitive advantage to the ACP countries, there existed competitors, and some or all of the competitors

such a liberalisation scenario. The more ambitious the liberalisation at the world level, the more pronounced the impact. In some cases, the welfare loss can be large, especially where the exporting country has a high degree of preference-induced over-specialisation.

⁷ In this analysis of tariff lines, Mattoo *et al.* appear to be referring to tariff lines at the HS 8-digit level.

faced a tariff of 5% or more.⁸ The authors conclude that the number of products in which there was significant, direct competition between ACP and non-ACP countries was quite limited. Many of the non-ACP competitors were developed countries or developing states that have their own preferential access to the EU market. About 30 countries competed with the ACP countries to a significant degree on any of these products and, of these, only 13 exported to the European Union on the basis of standard GSP access, which was less advantageous than the ACP preferences.⁹

14. Brenton and Ikezuki (2004) point to differentiation and concentration in the role played by AGOA across eligible countries. They find that AGOA added 1790 tariff lines to the 3635 lines already liberalized under the GSP for non-LDCs, with the special provisions for clothing preferences adding a further 557 lines for the countries that qualify.¹⁰ For those LDCs that are not eligible for clothing benefits, AGOA liberalised only a further 225 lines beyond the previous arrangements. For the LDCs without clothing benefits, 23 percent of dutiable lines remain excluded from preferences, while for non-LDCs with clothing benefits 16 percent of dutiable lines remain without preferences. Therefore, in terms of the number of tariff lines liberalized, the authors consider the principal impact of AGOA as falling on the non-LDCs. For AGOA beneficiaries that are not eligible for clothing benefits, the authors find the value of the preferences to be very small. Indeed, with the exception of clothing, most of the products liberalized under AGOA had already been liberalized under the GSP provisions for the LDCs. There were 9 AGOA beneficiaries for whom less than 5% of exports were eligible for AGOA or GSP preferences and a further 14 for whom the corresponding amount was less than 50%. For 16 countries, the share was more than 50%; for 5 within this group, the share was more than 90%. The average rate of utilization for AGOA eligible countries in 2002 was over 80%. Nevertheless, there were sixteen countries that utilized less than 50% of the available preferences.

15. Brenton and Ikezuki (2004) also point to differentiation between the United States and EU preferences. They compare for AGOA beneficiaries the share of exports to the United States eligible for preferences and the share of exports to the European Union eligible for preferences. The low correlation shows that exports of developing countries are often subject to different market access conditions in different OECD markets. This implies difficulties for firms in developing countries. That is, the segmented nature of preferential access to developed country markets limits the value of preferences.¹¹

⁸ Beef, sugar and rum were governed by special protocols and, hence, are excluded from this analysis. The remaining products groups consist of 5 at the HS-4 digit level and 11 at the HS-6 digit level. The authors further group textile products together in one category and the apparel products in another. On this basis, they consider there to be 12 main groups that meet the criteria described in the text above.

⁹ Among the latter group of ACP-competing countries, the developing countries were (in declining order of the number of products on which they compete significantly with the ACP): China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Argentina, Chile, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Uruguay. The Russian Federation, an economy in transition, also competed on two products.

¹⁰ Although Brenton and Ikezuki do not mention the level of tariff line aggregation in their text, based on the order of magnitude of the numbers it can be inferred that they are probably referring to HS 8-digit tariff lines.

¹¹ In a more recent study, Brenton and Ikezuki (2005) consider options for improvement of the effectiveness of trade preferences in agriculture. Whereas agricultural preferences have provided large transfers to a small number of countries, they have failed to stimulate exports for a broader range of products. The authors note that reform is needed to enhance the effectiveness of agricultural preference schemes (*e.g.* through complementary domestic policies in developing countries and improvements in the provisions for market access), while taking care to avoid interference with the pro-development process of multilateral trade liberalisation.

16. Davenport (2002) considers the implications of the reforms of the EU GSP preferences implemented on 1 January 2002 for the competing exports of ACP beneficiaries. This assessment covers the standard GSP programme, the three incentives under GSP special schemes (for environment, labour and combating production and trafficking of illegal drugs), and the expanded preferences for LDCs under the so-called Everything But Arms initiative (EBA, which entered into force earlier, on 5 March 2001). He finds that the new standard GSP provisions led to some erosion of ACP tariff-margins (*e.g.* for his sample of ACP-eligible products the average erosion is 0.5%), but concludes that the GSP expansion cannot be regarded as a major threat to the value of ACP preferences. The special schemes for environment and labour are also seen as having limited potential to create problems for ACP exporters. With respect to the scheme concerning combat against illegal drugs, the author concludes that the addition of Pakistan to the list of countries eligible for improved access to the EU market could pose problems for some ACP textile and apparel exporters. Concerning the EBA, he notes that for most goods supply-side constraints in the LDCs would limit the impact on ACP exporters (at least with respect to the time frame under consideration in the paper, from 2002 to 2004).¹²

17. Inama (2003) points to differentiation in the interests among groups of developing countries. He suggests that the introduction of graduation in GSP schemes has reduced the value of preferences since the late 1980s. Indeed, this can motivate the affected developing countries to pay more attention to WTO multilateral market access negotiations than to preference erosion. For the remaining countries (those not affected by graduation), preferences have been improved through such means as the various LDC initiatives. This evolution has contributed to polarizing the positions of different groups of developing countries.

18. Özden and Sharma (2004) present an assessment of the United States Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) taking into account price developments. Focusing on a sample of beneficiaries during the period 1989 to 2002, the authors estimate that for an average preference margin of 13%, the beneficiaries experienced an increase of about 8.5% in the relative prices received. (The net benefits to exporters were lower as they had to allow for the additional costs of compliance with ROOs.) The authors note that larger exporters and those specialising in higher value products were generally better able to capture a larger portion of the rents from preferences.¹³ Moreover, they find that the ability of Caribbean producers to benefit from CBI and CBTPA preferences depended partly on the impact of textile and apparel quotas on third parties¹⁴ and the removal of these quotas in 2005 may drastically reduce the benefits accruing to Caribbean countries.

19. Stevens and Kennan (2004) highlight the importance of existing duty-free MFN access in contributing to a low share of imports to the European Union from SSA that enter under preferential programmes. They point out that across tariff lines for which there were EU imports from Africa in 2000 valued at greater than USD 1 million, the proportion of tariff lines facing “zero” MFN tariffs was 27%, but that in terms of value these items accounted for 69% of EU imports from Africa. Thus, according to the

¹² The European Commission, in a submission to the OECD Secretariat, responds that EBA is intended to be a predictable and stable preference measure that is meant to foster investment and diversification, thereby contributing to the development of supply capacity in LDCs.

¹³ Özden and Sharma (2004) observe substantial variation across countries and over time in terms of benefits from the Caribbean trade preferences. For the programmes covered by the study, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Guatemala and Costa Rica captured relatively high shares of the tariff rents, whereas El Salvador captured a lower share and Jamaica and Nicaragua hardly benefited. The variation across years is related to the implementation of NAFTA and the amendment of the CBI through the CBTPA, with the former having a negative and the latter having a positive impact.

¹⁴ This refers to quantitative restrictions implemented under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement and subsequent Agreement on Textiles and Clothing.

authors, the most important reason why most EU imports from Africa may not receive preferences is that they already receive duty-free MFN treatment. For all of the lines with substantial trade (as specified above) but without MFN duty-free access, at least one type of EU preference is available in principle.¹⁵ In some cases, more than one type of EU preference was available. (Indeed, with respect to GSP, one reason for low utilisation is that more favourable treatment was available via other EU preferential schemes such as ACP.) Nevertheless, the share of actual imports on these lines that receive preferential tariff treatment is substantially less than 100%. According to the authors one reason is that, particularly in the case of clothing, “unreasonably onerous rules of origin” contribute to reduce the share of imports entering under preferences (*i.e.* the goods do not satisfy the programme requirements). On the other hand, drawing on several case studies, Stevens and Kennan conclude that the problem of failure to claim preferences is relatively trivial.

20. The potential scope for increased exports from developing countries to Japan through extended preferential treatment is shown in two studies. Ianchovichina *et al.* (2001) first consider a scenario of expanded, unrestricted duty-free preferential access for SSA countries to the Quad countries. They find that this would yield real gains for SSA, raising incomes by about 1%. Much of the gain would come from increased access to Japan and the EU markets, especially for agricultural exports.¹⁶ Hoekman *et al.* (2001) estimate that if Japan were to extend full duty free access to all developing countries, their total exports to Japan would increase by 20%. The sectors with greatest potential benefits are primarily those currently subject to tariff peaks and lacking high preference margins, such as footwear and food or agricultural products, especially sugar, cereals, meat and dairy products. In the case of cereals, however, the potential for increased LDC exports is limited as these countries are not significant exporters of these commodities.

21. Ianchovichina *et al.* (2001), however, consider a second scenario whereby the relative advantage of the hypothetical duty-free, quota-free access to Quad countries for SSA countries is reduced by a subsequent 25% MFN tariff cut. Under such a scenario, SSA exports would shift. The SSA exports to Japan, in particular, would decline significantly due to the erosion of the hypothetical preferential access. Overall, the second scenario would reduce by 30 percent the welfare gains SSA obtains from the hypothetical unrestricted access to the Quad; much of the loss would come from declines in the terms of trade as exports from SSA shift to lower price markets (as opposed to declines in overall exports).

22. Alexandraki and Lankes (2004) identify middle-income developing countries that are potentially vulnerable to export losses from preference erosion. The authors use partial equilibrium simulations, by product, to estimate the impacts of changes in trade-weighted preference margins between each country in question and the Quad countries. They find that vulnerability to preference erosion among this group of developing countries is particularly concentrated with respect to sugar and banana exports (especially into the European Union and US markets); in many cases the producers are small island economies that may have significant difficulties to adjust. They also find vulnerability to preference erosion among middle-income countries with respect to textiles and clothing, but “to a far lesser extent” than for the other two products. Similarly, a recent Commonwealth Secretariat study (August 2004) found significant value (measured by quota rents) for beneficiary countries in preferences for sugar, bananas, textiles and clothing (as well as beef), and that many preference-dependent economies will suffer multiple economic handicaps to adjusting to a more liberalised trading environment.

¹⁵ In contrast, the other Quad countries extend duty-free MFN access to a greater share of corresponding tariff lines (for the US the figure is 42%, for Japan it is 54% and for Canada it is 65%), but also have a number of such tariff lines with positive MFN tariffs and no applicable preference programme (for the US the figure is 6%, for Japan it is 24% and for Canada it is 7%).

¹⁶ Bureau and Gallezot (2004) note that the European market already absorbs almost 72% of the exports of agricultural and food products from Africa. The SSA countries generally exhibit high utilisation rates for the preferences available for these products.

23. Onguglo and Ito (2001) focus on the challenge for Pacific Island countries (PICs) as they seek to diversify and expand their exports. Although not all of these countries are members of the WTO, the authors note that the bulk of PIC exports benefit from some sort of preferential access in their destination markets. The PICs utilise, in particular, preferences under GSP, ACP and SPARTECA.¹⁷ Given the extensive dependence of PIC exports on preferential market access, the authors note that these countries will need to monitor the risks of preference erosion from future multilateral accords or from competitors gaining preferential access through regional accords of which the PICs are not members. This underscores the importance for the PICs of reducing vulnerability through export diversification. While pursuing their interests in multinational negotiations, the PICs may wish to explore possibilities to more fully utilise or expand regional preferences.

Rules of origin

24. Rules of origin are employed under preferential tariff schemes in order to require a minimum level of local content in products imported from eligible suppliers. They help to ensure that the products imported under the preferences are not merely transhipped from non-eligible countries via the eligible suppliers with little or no local value added. That is, ROOs can play an important role in ensuring the intended beneficiary countries actually reap the benefits from preferential programmes. Where developed country imports from beneficiary countries are indeed stimulated due to preferences, ROOs can work to boost local productive activity. On the other hand, as Inama (2003) suggests, where preferences are underutilised, tight rules of origin are often the main reason. (Annex 3 of the present paper provides an overview of selected features of the rules of origin for the preferential programmes of the Quad countries and Australia.)

25. Much of the recent literature focuses on the ROOs under EU and US preference schemes that benefit low income countries. Brenton and Ikezuki (2004) provide an example, underscoring trade expansion under the US AGOA preferences. They point out that a key factor driving the growth of clothing exports from Africa to the United States, a main source of benefits under AGOA, has been the relatively liberal rules of origin available to selected countries. In considering the potential of the AGOA preferences, Mattoo *et al.* (2002) point out that although ROOs have restrictive effects and inhibit export growth from its full potential under preferences, they also may have possibly favourable consequences. Without ROOs, Africa could become a staging post for transshipping goods made outside Africa. With the ROOs in place, there is a potential for substantial value to be added in Africa. In total, apparel exports were about 27% higher in 2001, the first year of AGOA being in effect, than in 2000. The most impressive gains were recorded by LDCs such as Madagascar, Lesotho and Swaziland, as well as Kenya (which is not a LDC), whereas Mauritius and South Africa showed more modest growth.¹⁸ On the other hand, it is difficult to calibrate the rules of origin and it may be that in some cases too much local value-added is being required, rendering the programme uneconomic in those cases. Thus, AGOA may fall short from its full potential.

26. Stevens and Kennan (2004) provide an example of this, in their comparison of AGOA and ACP clothing preferences in light of the respective ROOs. Drawing on a five country case study, they point out that in 2002 more than 50% of South African clothing exports to the United States did not receive AGOA

¹⁷ These programmes are described in Annex 3.

¹⁸ Mattoo *et al.* cite possible explanations for the disproportionate gains under AGOA for LDCs and Kenya, as opposed to more industrialised countries such as South Africa and Mauritius. The latter did not benefit from certain AGOA textile and apparel provisions and trade may have shifted away from South Africa and Mauritius as a consequence of the ROOs imposed (which changed their attractiveness as a sourcing supply in comparison with the LDCs).

preferences.¹⁹ The authors note that this is not because of a failure to claim preferences, but rather because producers choose to source their cloth and yarn from third countries rather than domestically. Apparently, exporters find it more profitable to source these inputs based on business cost considerations rather than to source in accordance with the AGOA ROOs. Moreover, given the limited response of South African exporters to the incentives to comply with AGOA ROOs, the authors argue that these rules are unlikely to foster “industrial deepening and vertical integration” in South Africa. On the other hand, AGOA exports from LDCs were boosted in part thanks to the relatively liberal ROOs offered to LDCs with respect to certain products.

27. Brenton and Manchin (2002) argue that under EU preferences the degree of improved market access is less in practice than on paper due to the restrictive nature of the ROO requirements. They suggest that the restrictiveness of European ROOs, which are similar throughout all preferential trade agreements, is due to the fact that the annexes contain supplementary and often complex requirements in addition to the general change-of-tariff-heading rule. Stevens and Kennan (2004) point to Lesotho as a clear-cut case where EU ROOs rules have impeded exports from ACP eligible countries; exports from Lesotho to the European Union slumped when a derogation from the rules expired in 1996. In a similar vein, Candau *et al.* (2004) find that utilisation of EU GSP (including, in particular, EBA) appears “weak” for textile and apparel products and they suggest that restrictive ROO are “the main suspects” for this situation.

28. Focusing on EU agricultural imports, Gallezot (2003) examines declarations by importers to consider the extent to which they prefer to use MFN in cases where they could make use of preferences.²⁰ He points to tariff headings covered by preferences that, with a 100% take-up rate would account for 36% of EU imports, but in reality seem to account for only 24%. Looking only at imports where MFN duties are greater than zero, preferential imports account for a third of the European Union’s agricultural and agri-food imports and 42% of developing countries’ exports to the European Union. He notes that products covered by preferences may nonetheless be imported under MFN arrangements due to small preferential margins, administrative transaction costs or the inconvenience of complying with rules of origin.

29. Similarly, Candau *et al.* (2004) find that the utilisation of preferences in the European Union is lower when the preferential margin is small, which they view as suggesting that compliance costs are not negligible. Overall, however, they find that underutilisation of preferences does not have a large average impact on the protection faced by exporters shipping into the European market. At the same time, they note that the potential benefits of preferential programmes may be constrained due to compliance costs – especially in cases where the preferential margins are small – or due to ROOs that preclude preference use in cases where there are sourcing constraints, perhaps even in some cases where the preference margins are large.

30. Drawing on data for Mexican exports to the United States in 2001, Carrère and de Melo (2004) considered the cost-raising effect of ROOs under NAFTA. Among the different rules, other things being equal, they find that compliance costs are lowest for a change in tariff classification, somewhat higher for regional value content restrictions, and highest for technical requirements. The authors find that the “lower rate of utilization for final-goods producing sectors under NAFTA (presumably the sectors in which Mexico had a comparative advantage) could be attributed to the battery of ROOs they faced (after controlling for differences in preferential access).” Subject to certain assumptions, they find that

¹⁹ The case study countries and the features they highlight are as follows: Mauritius (an example of a country that developed knitwear exports to the EU, subject to one set of origin rules); Kenya, Lesotho and Botswana (illustrate the Lomé/Cotonou rules on woven clothing and lesser developed countries under AGOA); Mauritius and South Africa (non-lesser developed countries under AGOA).

²⁰ Gallezot (2003) assesses this drawing on information from the submissions on the Single Administrative Documents.

preference margins of about 10% would be required to offset the cost-raising effect of a “typical” regional value content ROO. Generalising from their evidence, they find indications that ROOs may “go a long way towards negating the benefits of preferential market access for Southern partners”.

31. UNCTAD (2003b) highlights the improved preferential market access for LDCs under the European Union’s EBA initiative, providing an early assessment of its impacts on trade flows taking into account rules of origin issues. In one example, the UNCTAD report notes that textiles are covered by EBA, but remain subject to restrictive ROOs. It further concludes that mainly because of the ROO requirements, the utilization rate of the preferences in the area of textiles and clothing by non-ACP LDC beneficiaries was only 56% in 2002, with the result that exports totalling US\$ 1.6 billion entered while being subject to a 10% average MFN rate. In another example, the report considers LDC countries that were also eligible for ACP preferences. These countries were expected to react to the new EBA incentives, but in 2002 the bulk of the preferential trade flow continued to enter under ACP preferences. The report considers that at least part of the low early utilisation of EBA may be due to the different formalities that apply to trade under the ACP and EBA initiatives. There is a sort of path dependency, as firms continue to follow the ACP procedures that they are more familiar with.²¹ In a similar vein, Bureau and Gallezot (2004) also note more generally that “firms need a period of investment or familiarisation during which they can bed in their operating routines with suppliers before they are capable of using preferences.”

The special case of the least developed countries

32. In recent years, many developed countries have deepened their trade preferences for LDCs. Hoekman *et al.* (2003) underscore the tension between deepening preferences for LDCs and MFN-based liberalization, whereby the benefit of the former is eroded by the latter. Preferential schemes can have significant positive effects on specific beneficiaries, but much depends on their supply-side capacity, their ability to reinvest the rents usefully and the nature of the administrative requirements such as ROOs. Overall, such constraints have limited the actual benefit to many LDCs from preferences, leading the authors to suggest that there should be only limited concern with the erosion of current preferences when it comes as a consequence of MFN liberalisation. Indeed, the authors note that one reason it has been possible to expand duty-free access for LDCs is that they account for less than 0.5% of world trade.

33. Cernat *et al.* (2003) highlight the European Union as the most important market for LDC exports (absorbing over 50% of total and around 70% of agricultural exports in 2000). They point out that the EBA added 900 additional agricultural tariff lines to the GSP for LDCs. However, only 3% of existing LDC exports faced a tariff into the European Union before the EBA. Achterbosch *et al.* (2003) also highlight the broad product coverage for LDC exports already available under EU preferences prior to EBA, but note that utilisation rates were quite low (less than 1/3 in 1999, according to one estimate cited by the authors). As the EBA amendment to GSP does little to simplify rules of origin and cumulation of value added, these authors feel that utilisation rates for LDCs are not likely to rise substantially with the exception of the sugar sector and the fruit and vegetable sector. Under EBA the preference margin for LDC fruit and vegetable exports relative to other developing countries under GSP is over 10%; the

²¹ According to the UNCTAD (2003b) report, a different certificate of origin is required depending on which initiative is applicable (ACP or EBA). Since ACP countries have generally exported their products to the EU for the last 20 years using the form for the ACP preferences, it was likely that they would continue to use it even after the entry into force of the EBA. Given that trade data on utilization of trade preferences are recorded according to the customs declaration, the authors consider this to be one important reason for the low utilization of EBA preferences by LDC-ACP countries. The choice of certificate of origin has further implications in that ACP countries exporting under EBA are not granted the more liberal cumulation system available under ACP, whereas countries exporting under ACP may miss out on the additional liberalization granted under EBA (*e.g.* with respect to certain agricultural products).

preference over ACP countries is 2%. The authors further consider studies on possible removal of Quad country tariff and non-tariff barriers to LDC trade. They conclude that while there is potential for trade creation and trade diversion with possible negative effects on producers in the Quad and other developing countries, the weight of LDCs in global trade is too small for substantial losses to accrue to their competitors.

34. Hoekman *et al.* (2003) question the notion of targeting LDCs from a poverty reduction point of view. Limiting preferences to LDCs or a region like Sub-Saharan Africa ignores the high number of poor people living in non-LDCs like China and India (countries that tend to benefit only from standard GSP,²² which offers lower preference margins than other preferential programmes). However, extension of preferential duty-free access to the full range of developing countries would be very difficult politically. As an alternative, MFN liberalization would offer several advantages. Increased MFN-based market access could be used to address tariff peaks and escalation in a cross cutting fashion, as well as – as part of an overall package -- such issues as agricultural subsidies. Negotiation of an MFN-tariff reduction would require a willingness on the part of developing countries to engage in reciprocity, which is in their own interest, for much of the benefit from trade policy reforms is generated by a country's own liberalisation. In the authors' view, MFN liberalization offers greater prospects for sustainable gains than the alternative of seeking expanded preferences.

35. UNCTAD (2003b) reports that as of 2001, more than a quarter of Quad imports from all LDC "effective beneficiaries" (covered by Quad LDC initiatives) were not covered by any preferential initiative; the non-eligible products concerned mostly textiles and garments. At the same time, the report acknowledged the broad LDC product coverage provided by the European Union's EBA initiative (effective from 5 March 2001) and noted that "improvements" introduced in the GSP programmes of Canada and Japan in 2003 would close most of the gaps in LDC product coverage in those countries. However, out of the potential coverage in 2001, the report found that only a fraction of Quad imports from LDCs actually received trade preferences at the time of customs clearance in the preference giving countries; the utility rate (defined as the share of total dutiable imports actually receiving preferences) was reported as 42% in 2001. Where products were covered but preferences were not utilised, the authors suggest that ROOs and related administrative procedures were the main reason for low utilization.

- In the case of Canada, an extension of product coverage in 2000 led to very limited changes as textiles and clothing products remained excluded. These accounted for 38% of total LDC exports to Canada. Then from 1 January 2003 duty- and quota-free access was extended to imports from all LDCs except Myanmar with the exception of only few agricultural products. The initiative includes textiles and clothing, for which ROOs were modified, introducing an innovative cumulation system allowing inputs from all beneficiary countries. Before the extension to textiles and clothing, excluded products were 93% of total dutiable LDC imports. In 2003, they were expected to go down almost to zero.
- In the case of the European Union, the Everything But Arms initiative of 2001 improved and consolidated preferential market access for LDCs beyond the former ACP and GSP preferences for LDCs. The EBA grants duty-free and quota-free market access for all types of exports from LDCs, with the exception of arms and ammunition, and phased-in liberalisation (subject to increasing tariff quotas) for bananas, rice and sugar. Textiles and apparel products from LDCs are covered and granted duty-free access. However, the authors consider that the continued application of existing GSP ROOs under EBA leaves these products "subject to strict rules of origin impeding the utilization of the most competitive inputs and suppliers". Under the pre-EBA GSP, half of (non-ACP) LDC exports entered under MFN despite a

²²

Imports from China are not eligible for the US GSP scheme.

potential coverage rate close to 100%. In 2002, trade flows from Asian LDCs increased and the utilization rate improved to 57%.

- In the case of Japan, a breakdown of coverage and utilization by sectors indicates that the major benefits in 2001 can be found in octopus from Mauritania, cathodes copper from Zambia, footwear from Cambodia and Bangladesh and leather products from Bangladesh. Cambodia and Bangladesh accounted for over 50% of the total amount of received preferences. In 2003, 200 new products were added with substantial benefits expected for prawn exports from Myanmar, Bangladesh and Mozambique (although the preferential margin is limited given that the MFN rate is 1%), fish fillets from Tanzania and jellyfish from Myanmar.
- In the case of the United States, prior to enhancements introduced in 1997, coverage of LDC exports by the GSP programme for LDCs was only 1.8%. By the time of the UNCTAD study, the coverage rate had risen to 44%, with an utilisation rate of over 90%. A substantial portion of this improvement can be attributed to the expanded coverage of petroleum. Textiles, clothing, footwear and some other products of interest to LDCs are excluded from the scheme and most LDC exports would continue to face MFN rates in the absence of other measures. A key additional measure benefiting African LDCs is the AGOA programme, which covers petroleum and textile products (the latter subject to certain conditions). The UNCTAD study points to a striking feature in the rise of the utilization rate for chapters 61 and 62 between 2001 and 2002 from 55% to more than 90%, indicating a learning-by-doing effect.

36. Australia revised its preferential treatment in July 2003 to extend duty-free and quota-free treatment to all products of LDC origin imported from LDCs. Using the GTAP model, Zhang and Verikios (2003) considered the potential impacts of such a policy. They concluded that given existing patterns of trade and tariffs, the overall effects on the Australian economy were likely to be small. This is due to the small share of Australian imports coming from LDCs and the small impacts the tariff cuts were estimated to have on domestic prices. Similarly, the effects on other non-LDC suppliers of imports to Australia were estimated to be modest. The model revealed that some countries competing with LDCs (such as China) may not lose in terms of real GDP from the change in policy, because they are able to boost their exports of intermediate inputs to the exporting sectors in LDCs. On the other hand, the model indicated that LDCs generally benefit from the new policy, with the major LDC clothing exporters (*e.g.* Bangladesh or Cambodia) in particular showing gains.

37. Bangladesh, a LDC, has particularly benefited from preferential market access in terms of generous quota access and tariff preferences for apparel. Ready-made garment exports grew steadily between 1990 and 2001 before flattening, and they still accounted for more than 2/3 of Bangladeshi exports in 2003. A study by Mlachila and Yang (2004) highlights the impact of the global phase out of quantitative restrictions on apparel trade under the WTO's Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. They point out that the large rents associated with the generous quotas (and government assistance for the sector) may have weakened incentives for productivity enhancement in the Bangladeshi apparel industry. The result that the sector's competitive position may be weaker than otherwise would have been the case. Bangladesh is vulnerable in this regard and the situation presents a real challenge to policymakers if they wish to avoid economic losses in the post-ATC trading environment. The authors suggest that the nation may be able to overcome these challenges by addressing various structural constraints (*e.g.* related to infrastructure, trade facilitation or governance issues).

III. Preference Reliance: A Statistical Review

38. The extent of a developing country's reliance on tariff preferences provides an indication of the potential for preference erosion to have an impact. Therefore, this statistical review of preference reliance *focuses on tariff lines for which there were actually imports in 2002 from developing countries into Australia and the Quad countries.*²³ The primary emphasis is on identification of developing countries and sectors making particular use of preferences. Consideration of countries and sectors that are most reliant on preferences may provide an indication of those who may suffer from adjustment or other costs in the event of substantial erosion of preferences.

39. Differences in data sources, formats and levels of aggregation mean that particular care is required in making any comparisons between the programmes of different countries on the basis of these statistics. The frame of reference in this assessment is thus shifted away from comparisons between Quad countries in the details of their schemes. Rather, the main references concern the extent of concessions across the preferential tariff programmes within each individual Quad country and on the exporting countries and sectors that rely on these nonreciprocal arrangements. This assessment proceeds along several dimensions taking into account the basic structure of preferential schemes, the overall usage of these schemes by individual beneficiaries, and the top exporters by sector.

40. For Australia, Canada and the United States, the statistical review is based on data from official government sources for preferential trade flows taking into account the tariff classification at time of import. For the European Union and Japan, the statistical review of preferential trade was complicated by the present non-availability of detailed and consistent data from official government sources on actual trade flows taking into account whether the goods were classified as preferential at the time of import. Consequently, for the purposes of this review, preferential trade flows were inferred for the European Union and Japan using TRAINS tariff and trade data accessed via the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) system developed by UNCTAD and the World Bank. At the level of product group (the 6 digit level of the Harmonised System, HS), this database provides indicators for the average MFN tariff rates and the average effectively applied tariff rates taking into account the available preferential tariffs rates. However, the TRAINS database does not provide data on the actual type of tariff treatment that imports received. In order to provide an estimate of the potential preferential trade flows from developing countries into the European Union and Japan, the OECD Secretariat assumed that imports entered at the best available rate. In cases where the preference margin was zero, it was assumed the imports entered at the MFN rate. (A more detailed discussion of the methods applied in the statistical review of preferential trade can be found in Annex 2.)

41. It is anticipated that the method employed for inferring preferential import flows for the European Union and Japan will result in an overestimation of their preferential import flows, because in reality not all available preferences are claimed. In some cases, for example, suppliers or importers may fail to request preferential treatment or may not complete the necessary administrative requirements. For the United States, a trial comparison of the two methods (one using TRAINS data and the other using US national data) provided an indication of the extent of overestimation of preferential flows through the TRAINS data. This overestimation ranged from zero to 35% for most of the sectors. In the case of textiles and apparel, the "inferred" method using TRAINS data underestimated the preferential flows, which may have been driven by preferential quota treatment even in cases where the MFN and preferential tariff treatments were equal.

²³

In view of the volume of information and associated computations, the statistical review is focused on a single recent year. This approach was chosen in order to provide greater detail in terms of preference availability and utilisation with respect to beneficiary countries and product groups.

42. The tariff schemes of Australia and the Quad countries offer preferences to developing countries that are readily evident from an examination of some basic parameters presented in Tables 1 to 5. In each case, the tariff rate indicators (average, minimum and maximum) refer only to lines for which there was trade in 2002.²⁴ Moreover, where comparisons are made between preferential tariff schemes and MFN tariffs, the indicators are calculated for the same lines (*e.g.* the simple average tariff for GSP is compared against the simple average MFN tariff for the corresponding lines). For four of the five countries, these tables include the full range of preferential access as of 2002. The exception is the European Union, which has many preferential initiatives including a number of country-specific arrangements. Consequently, the European Union table includes only the main non-reciprocal preference programmes and two illustrative country-specific arrangements. The tables are based on available *ad valorem* rates, but the number of specific or mixed duties is noted. The broad coverage of preferences in these five tables helps to situate the extent of the preferential tariff concessions for developing countries accorded in the tariff schedules of Australia and the Quad countries.

43. For (HS 10-digit) tariff lines with imports from preference-eligible countries into Australia in 2002, the simple average “MFN” tariff rate (*i.e.* maximum general rate) was 6.9% (not shown in the table),²⁵ with a tariff range over these lines from zero to 25%. In order to consider the extent of the tariff concessions, Table 1 presents a comparison of the simple average tariff under each programme and the simple average MFN tariff on the same lines. The “Developing Country” scheme offered the broadest range of preferential access in terms of the range of lines with imports and the number of eligible countries. In cases where the “Developing Country” rate of duty was claimed, the simple average tariff was 5.7%, while the corresponding “MFN” rate was 7.3%. The Developing Country rate was available for 6,056 HS 10-digit lines out of 6,775 with imports from preference-eligible countries. (The “historical” Developing Country rates provide additional access for a group of less developed countries for a limited number of tariff lines.) The Forum Island Country (which refers to selected Pacific island nations) preferential rate of duty offered duty-free access for a group of 608 lines with imports in 2002, which had a corresponding simple average “MFN” rate of 11.5%. Eight other economies (including six developing or emerging economies in Asia) were eligible for special rates, which provided a simple average preferential tariff of 4.6% over nearly 5000 lines, as compared to a corresponding “MFN” rate of 6.2%. As can be seen from the table, across all tariff treatments for the lines with imports, the number of non-*ad valorem* tariffs was quite limited.

²⁴ NB, where import data are tracked according to the tariff classification at the time of import, they generally do not reflect subsequent post-import reclassifications that might occur (*e.g.* due to change or denial of a preference). In the present study, this applies to the import data for Australia, Canada and the United States. In the case of the United States, U.S. International Trade Commission experts evaluate this problem as being relatively limited in scope and in a preliminary assessment concluded that incorporating such changes would imply at most a 1% change from the “as claimed” data recorded in the USITC database.

²⁵ For Australia, the consideration of MFN rates in the context of the present review is complicated by the structure in the Australian trade data system. At the detailed product level for the year 2002 and the countries covered in the analysis, the system does not provide a MFN rate but rather for most lines includes a reference to the “maximum general rate of duty” that applies (*i.e.* this is the rate that is available to all countries and is applicable if no preference or concession is invoked, and so provides a MFN-comparable rate). For a number of lines in the data set supplied to the OECD, this rate is not available (*e.g.* in cases where – for a given tariff line – no imports entered under the maximum general rate from preference-eligible countries). The maximum general rate was not available for 1,142 HS 10-digit lines out of the total 6,775 lines with imports from preference-eligible countries.

44. Canada's simple average MFN tariff rate for the (HS 8-digit) tariff lines with imports receiving MFN treatment in 2002 was 4.2%, with a range over these lines from zero to 26.5% (Table 2).²⁶ The General Preferential Tariff (GPT) rates were available on many more lines than the other Canadian preferential arrangements. On a simple average basis compared to the MFN rates, the main developing country preferences (GPT and Caribbean Countries Tariff, Caribcan) offered a smaller percentage point advantage than the various country-specific tariffs. The Least Developed Country Tariff (LDCT) preference, however, offered the second largest advantage among all the treatments albeit on a relatively small number of lines. Under the Canadian tariff scheme, few MFN lines have specific tariffs and the proportion of specific tariffs lines for the various preferential programmes range from small under GPT to non-existent under Caribcan.

45. For the European Union (Table 3), the tabulations employed a special procedure drawing on the TRAINS database and inferred preferential trade flows (described above). On this basis, the simple average MFN tariff rate for the (HS 6-digit) lines with imports from preference-eligible countries in 2002 was 4.7%. The difference between the simple average GSP and MFN tariff rates on comparable tariff lines was 3 percentage points, while for both the EBA and ACP programmes the difference was close to 6 percentage points. The three preferential programmes (GSP, EBA and ACP) cover substantial shares of the tariff lines. Increasingly, the European Union preferential trade arrangements for developing countries are embodied in bilateral preferences.²⁷ The OECD trade preferences database developed in conjunction with the research for this paper includes tariff data for 20 such agreements with developing countries (excluding agreements with those countries, as of 2002, preparing to accede to the European Union). For illustrative purposes, Table 3 references the agreements with Morocco and South Africa. These two agreements contain relatively few non-*ad valorem* tariffs in comparison with the ACP preferences, but they also cover fewer tariff lines. In terms of the differences between the simple average bilateral and MFN rates for the lines with trade in 2002, these bilateral preferences are more generous than the GSP programme. For both of the bilateral preferences, the simple average tariff (for lines belonging to product groups with trade in 2002) was less than 1%.

46. Table 4 presents similar data for Japan, also based on the special procedure using TRAINS data. In the case of Japan, the simple average MFN rate was 5.0% for HS 6-digit tariff lines with imports entering from preference-eligible countries in 2002. The MFN tariffs ranged from zero to 40%. The difference between the simple average of GSP rates and MFN rates on corresponding HS lines was about 5 percentage points. In the case of the GSP programme for LDCs (GSP-LDC), the difference was about 14 percentage points. The GSP programme offered preferential tariffs in about 2000 of the lines with trade, whereas the GSP-LDC programme was available in just 224 lines with trade in 2002.

47. The United States simple average MFN rate was 4.6% for the tariff lines with imports in 2002 from preference-eligible countries (Table 5). The various preferential arrangements covered a fairly limited number of HS-8 digit lines having imports from developing countries, but in some cases offered large margins. For example, the CBTPA programme and special provisions for selected African countries under AGOA offered simple average margins of about 15 percentage points, due largely to benefits extended to eligible partners with respect to textiles and clothing. Similarly, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act extended a simple average 9 percentage point margin to certain countries for a

²⁶ Tariffs under the British Preferential Tariff (BPT) programme were not included in the national database provided to the Secretariat by the Canadian authorities. The BPT was revoked in 1998, but preferences for 171 tariff lines (primarily textiles) were maintained under the "Remission Order Respecting Imports of Goods Originating in Commonwealth Developing Countries", 10 May 1999, as noted in Memorandum D11-4-25 available as of 27 May 2004 at: <http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/E/pub/cm/d11-4-25/d11-4-25-e.pdf>.

²⁷ These bilateral agreements extend preferential treatment but provide for increasing reciprocity on the part of the developing countries.

limited number of fuel and apparel tariff lines having imports in 2002. The simple average margins available under other non-reciprocal programmes range from about 4 percentage points for GSP to 7.6 percentage points under the basic AGOA programme.

48. Tables 6 to 10 present information on the usage of preferential tariff schemes for imports into Australia and the Quad countries during 2002 (including the inferred usage for EU and Japanese programmes). In all cases, MFN imports account for more than 40% of the value of total imports from the preference-eligible countries. Whereas most imports into Australia and the European Union from preference-eligible countries entered under preferential arrangements, in the case of Canada, Japan and the United States imports under MFN treatment comprised the majority from preference-eligible countries into (accounting for more than 70% of the total in each of these 3 cases). In absolute terms, there are substantial flows under preference programmes for all 5 destination markets, particularly when seen from the perspective of certain developing country exporters.

49. For Australia, Canada and the United States, the OECD preferential trade database permits a breakout of actual trade flows by type of tariff treatment and programme. In the case of the European Union and Japan, data limitations prevent a breakout of the volumes of preferential trade flows by programme. For Australia, by a slim margin, the Developing Country preference represents the single largest treatment category for imports from the preference-eligible countries (or second if one combines the two categories for “no preference claimed”). The special country preference category ranks third among the Australian tariff treatments. The Canadian GPT and US GSP programmes rank second among the various tariff treatments in their respective import markets. In both Canada and the United States, flows under preferences for Caribbean countries rank third among available tariff treatments. Imports under US preferences for Caribbean countries (CBTPA and CBI) amounted to about 2/3 of the comparable US GSP flows. Import flows under Canada’s Caribbean preference amount to less than 2% of the imports under Canada’s GPT programme. In the case of the United States, imports under AGOA and GSP for LDCs rank third and fourth respectively. Flows under the LDCT in Canada are comparatively modest.

50. Tables 11 to 15 present the value of imports into Australia and the Quad countries in 2002, by exporting country and the tariff treatment granted (or inferred as being granted in the case of the European Union and Japan). In order to provide an indication of the utility of preferences, the tables highlight the percentage of imports entering under preferential treatments from each developing economy into each of the 5 developed-country markets. In order to situate the importance of preferences in the context of the each exporter’s overall relationship to the destination market, the percentage is calculated based on total imports from each developing economy into each destination market.²⁸

- With respect to Australia, the biggest non-reciprocal preference users in absolute terms included 16 countries with more than USD 100 million of imports entering under preferences for developing countries.²⁹ However, the list changes substantially when the criterion shifts to reflect preference reliance as a share of total imports from the supplier. Among the 14 economies with more than 2/3 of their total imports into Australia entering under preferential

²⁸ In the literature, utility is generally calculated as the share of dutiable imports in order to highlight the preferential trade as a share of the maximum potential preferential trade. However, in assessing the broad economic implications for developing economies of preference erosion, the present exercise focused on the importance of preferences in overall trade (*i.e.* dutiable and non-dutiable).

²⁹ Imports into Australia from the following countries exceeded USD 100 million in 2002 under the Developing Country preference: Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, China, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Thailand and Vietnam. In addition, Hong Kong (SAR, China), Papua New Guinea, Singapore and Chinese Taipei each exported similarly large amounts under special rates for specific developing countries.

regimes and with the value of those preferential imports greater than USD 10 million, only three are also on the list of biggest Australian trade preference users.³⁰

- In the case of Canada, the biggest non-reciprocal preference users in absolute terms included just six countries with more than USD 100 million of imports receiving preferential treatment in 2002.³¹ However, the list changes completely when the largest users are defined based on preferential treatment as a percent of each economy's total imports into Canada. Among the preference-eligible countries with at least USD 10 million of preferential imports into Canada, Trinidad and Tobago was the only country for which preferential treatment accounted for more than 2/3 of the total.
- As for the European Union in 2002, among countries eligible for non-reciprocal preferences, 85 had inferred preferential export volumes to the European Union exceeding USD 100 million.³² In over half of these cases (46), it was estimated that these countries shipped more than 2/3 of their total imports into the European Union via preferential arrangements. A further 13 countries exported between USD 10 million and USD 100 million to the European Union in 2002 with more than 2/3 of the total inferred as entering under preferential arrangements.³³
- In the case of Japan, in 2002 there were 20 countries inferred as exporting more than USD 100 million under preferential arrangements.³⁴ The list of countries that were inferred to have

³⁰ The list of most preference-reliant in terms of shares in total imports into Australia included: Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, China, Columbia, Egypt, India, Pakistan, Samoa, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Chinese Taipei and Turkey.

³¹ The list of biggest preference users for imports into Canada included: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia. Mexico shipped the largest volume of imports with preferential treatment in Canada, but the bulk of those imports received this treatment under the North American Free Trade Agreement. As an FTA, this type of arrangement is a reciprocal preference and beyond the scope of the present paper.

³² This calculation excluded EU accession countries. The countries with inferred preferential exports to the EU amounting to USD 100 million or more in 2002 included: Albania, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Azerbaijan, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cayman Islands, Chile, China, Columbia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong (SAR, China), India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Netherlands Antilles, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe.

³³ The 59 countries relying on preferential treatment for more than 2/3 of their exports to the EU and with more than USD 10 million in imports into the EU in 2002 included: Albania, Aruba, Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belize, Bermuda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Cayman Islands, China, Columbia, Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Fiji, Gambia, Georgia, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Lao PDR, Liberia, FYR Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands Antilles, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Senegal, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Surinam, Swaziland, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe.

³⁴ Major importers inferred as importing significant amounts into Japan under preferential arrangements include: Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco,

exported more than 2/3 of their total exports under preferential arrangements, with total export volumes above USD 10 million included four countries, none of which were on the list of biggest users of Japanese preferences: Cambodia, Kazakhstan, Latvia and Mauritania.

- As for the United States in 2002, there were 38 non-reciprocal preference users whose preferential imports into the United States in absolute terms amounted to more than USD 100 million.³⁵ As a percentage of total imports into the United States, reliance ranges up to 99% in the case of imports from Lesotho. Non-reciprocal preferential treatment accounted for more than 2/3 of the imports into the United States (valued at more than USD 10 million) from six further economies including: Equatorial Guinea, Haiti, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi and Swaziland.³⁶

51. Tables 11 to 15 highlighted preference-reliant countries in terms of large absolute volumes or high shares of total exports into the five destination markets as of 2002. From these tables, it can be seen that certain large developing countries appear repeatedly as having large volumes of imports entering Australia and the Quad countries under preferential arrangements. Brazil, India and Indonesia each export more than USD 100 million to each of the five destination markets under study here. In addition, China, Israel, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines export similar amounts under preferences to four of the destination markets.³⁷ A few other developing countries export similar amounts to 3 of the 5 destination markets; they include: Chile, Mexico (excluding NAFTA), Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, and Vietnam.

52. When considering the proportion of total imports from each supplier entering the five destination markets under preferential arrangements, the list is much different. With a few exceptions, the countries that supply the most under preferential arrangements into these markets are not among the suppliers most reliant on preferences in terms of shares of their total exports to these destinations. Rather, the group of countries with the highest shares of trade entering the destination markets under preferential arrangements tends to be dominated by medium and small suppliers including a number of countries falling into the LDC or small island categories such as Haiti or Samoa. The exceptions are China and India, which are large preferential suppliers with high shares of preferential trade in their total exports to both Australia and the European Union. Indonesia, as well, exported a large volume and a high preferential share in its total exports into the European Union. Indeed, the European Union stands out among the five destination markets as having the largest number of large suppliers importing under preferences and a large number of countries that rely on preferences for a high share of their imports into the European Union.

53. Tables 16 to 20 present the top imports, by HS 2-digit product group and by supplier, under the non-reciprocal preferential tariff schemes of Australia and the Quad countries. In order to render the

Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, United Arab Emirates and Vietnam. NB, OECD countries are not shown in the table.

³⁵ Major importers importing significant amounts into the US under preferential arrangements include: Angola, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Congo (Democratic Republic), Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Venezuela and Yemen.

³⁶ Imports into the United States from Jordan had a preferential share of 94%, but the bulk of these imports entered the United States under a special preference for the West Bank and Gaza.

³⁷ China and Malaysia are not eligible for the US GSP programme. Israel exports less than USD 100 million to Canada under preferences, although it is eligible for the Canadian GPT programme.

assessment of the many lines of data manageable, this assessment of trade flows focused on the top imported product groups accounting for at least 0.85% of the supplier's total exports and having preference margins greater than 1 percentage point (in the case of the European Union, the focus is on flows accounting for more than 5% of the supplier's total exports). The application of these criteria enabled the analysis to capture the bulk of major preferential trade flows, while reducing the number of lines of data. For Australia, Canada and the United States, the flows are broken out by preferential programme; for the European Union and Japan, it was not possible to make this distinction. By, presenting the trade flows relative to the suppliers' global exports, these tables give a sense of the scale of these flows seen from the perspective of the exporting country. They also provide a sense of the potential vulnerability of a given developing country to erosion of preferences in a specific sector in a given destination market.

54. A review of these tables indicates comparatively little reliance on exports of specific product groups by developing countries under preferences into the Australian, Canadian and Japanese markets. That is, with a couple of exceptions, there is relatively little sectoral concentration in the reliance on preferential exports into these three markets. Some 30% of Samoa's global exports are shipped to Australia under preferences available for electrical machinery, equipment and parts (HS 85) through the Forum Island Country initiative. Nearly 13% of Fiji's global exports consist of apparel and footwear entering Australia under the Forum Island Country preferences. While there are a few developing countries exporting substantial amounts under preferences available in these three destination markets (as shown in tables 11, 12 and 14), the use of these preferences tends to be dominated by big exporters and countries that do not exhibit particular sector-specific reliance on preferences (as shown in tables 16, 17 and 19).

55. With respect to the European Union, there are 458 cases of sector-specific preference reliance identified from the inferred preferential trade flows (*i.e.* cases where a developing country may rely on a preference in a particular sector with an average tariff margin of 1 percentage point or greater and imports into the European Union equal or greater than 0.85% of the supplier's total exports, excluding EU pre-accession countries). From among these cases, Table 18 presents the 126 inferred flows into the European Union that were greater than 5% of the exporter's total exports (including 56 flows greater than 10% of an exporter's total exports). This is a far greater number of cases of sector-specific preference reliance than for the other destination markets covered in this study. The sectors concerned are fairly diverse ranging from knit and non-knit apparel (16 cases for each sector are shown in the table), to fish & crustaceans (14 cases), edible fruit & nuts (10 cases), mineral fuels & oils (8 cases), and ships & boats (5 cases), among others. Similarly, the geographic range of exporters concerned is quite broad, although the largest volume exporters and South American countries are both notably absent from the list.

56. In the case of the United States (Table 20), there are a few more cases where developing countries appeared to exhibit particular reliance on preferential access in specific sectors. Among the 80 cases of preference reliance cited in the table, 16 concerned knit apparel (HS 61), 16 concerned non-knit apparel (HS 62) and 11 concerned natural or cultured pearls or precious stones. The table indicates 12 cases where preferential exports to the United States in a particular sector accounted for more than 10% of global exports for a given developing country. These cases generally concern apparel exports, with one exception (electrical machinery, equipment and parts from St. Kitts and Nevis). They generally relate to preferences for Caribbean and African countries, again with one exception (apparel from Jordan entering under a special preference scheme). In some cases, the concentration of exports of a given country in just one or two sectors is quite striking. This is the case, for example, for the Dominican Republic and Honduras; 36% and 41% of their global exports, respectively, are sent to the United States under CBTPA preferences for apparel product groups HS 61 and HS 62. In the case of Lesotho, imports to the United States of products in the "apparel and clothing accessories" knit and non-knit product groups equated to about 57% and 32% respectively of that country's global exports in 2002 (see Box 1). Those products benefited from substantial preference margins under AGOA of 20 and 17.5 percentage points, respectively.

57. In the case of Canada and the United States, the availability of detailed and consistent data on the tariff schedules and import flows permit an assessment of the utilisation of preferences, by programme, across the preference-eligible tariff lines at the HS 8-digit level. This is shown graphically in Figure 1. For each preferential programme a corresponding panel of the chart presents the imports for each product ranked according to the volume of imports. The clustering of the largest columns in just a small corner of each chart provides a graphic indication of the concentration of imports for each programme under relatively few tariff lines. At least in volume terms, the benefit of these programmes appears to be associated with the improved market access for a limited range of products.

Box 1. AGOA and the Experience of Lesotho

Since becoming eligible for AGOA in October 2000 and for the AGOA textile provisions in April 2001, Lesotho has capitalized on its new access to preferential treatment. Some 99% of all US imports from Lesotho entered with AGOA preferential treatment. US imports from Lesotho grew by 129% between 2000 and 2002, driven by apparel imports that amounted to USD 321 million in 2002 (HS chapters 61 and 62). In that year, Lesotho supplied 40% of all apparel imports receiving AGOA preferential treatment. Lesotho is now the leading supplier of apparel products under the US AGOA programme. These imports were fairly concentrated, with just 6 HS 8-digit lines accounting for 80% of the total apparel imports from Lesotho. The export growth has had a positive impact on economic conditions in the country. According to the IMF, the rate of economic growth rose by about ½ of once percent in the year 2002/2003 "due mainly to strong clothing exports to the United States under the African Growth Opportunities Act".³⁸ At the same time, the IMF lists as one of Lesotho's "daunting medium term problems", "the growth of the textile industry [which] is driven by preferential treatment under AGOA and may not be sustainable as trade preferences by the United States are phased out."

Summing Up


58. This statistical review of preference reliance has presented several notable features of the preference programmes available in Australia and the Quad countries. The review has underscored the availability of preferences to developing countries across a fairly broad range of tariff lines. Nevertheless, in terms of utilisation, effective preferences are sometimes confined to a limited number of tariff lines because of the availability of attractive alternative rates under MFN treatment. In all of the preference-granting countries, MFN trade flows account for a large share of the imports from preference-eligible countries. Indeed, MFN imports are estimated to account for more than 2/3 of the imports from eligible countries into Canada, Japan and the United States, almost ½ of the trade flows from eligible countries into the European Union and about 3/7 of imports from eligible countries into Australia. Also, as shown graphically for the Canadian and American preference programmes, usage of preferential access in terms of value can be concentrated across a relatively small share of the tariff lines for which preferences are available.

59. In absolute terms, the usage of preferences tends to be dominated by a few economically large developing countries. The reliance of these developing economies on preferential access, however, is relatively limited in that they tend to export substantial shares under MFN treatment (with a few exceptions, in particular, with respect to the European Union). Considering the use of trade preferences by product group and relative to each supplier's global exports, the statistical review found few cases of sector-specific reliance by developing economies on Australian, Canadian and Japanese preferences. However, in the case of the European Union and -- to a lesser extent -- the United States, there are a number of developing economies (often smaller suppliers) that rely on preferential access in specific


³⁸ IMF (2004), "IMF Concludes 2003 Article IV Consultation with Lesotho", Public Information Notice No. 04/6, Washington, DC, February 5.

sectors for a significant share of their global exports. Considering only the preferential exports of those developing country-sectors that account for more than 10% of the global exports of the source country, there are 56 cases of sector-specific reliance by developing countries supplying the European Union and 12 cases for developing countries supplying the United States.


Figure 1. Concentration of imports under selected preferential tariff schemes, 2002




Canada LDCT



US GSP for LDCs



US AGOA



Note: In order to accommodate the import values on a useful scale for the charts, the top three exports under AGOA and the top export under US GSP for LDCs were excluded.

Source: Canadian Department of Finance and US International Trade Commission.

IV. CGE Assessment of the Economic Implications of Preference Erosion

Introduction

60. The statistical analysis of preferential tariffs in the markets of Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan and the United States presented in the previous section identified the key features of the preferential schemes including reliance on trade preferences across trading partners and product categories. This review was conducted at a fairly detailed product level and considered preferential tariffs and trade: 1) in absolute terms and 2) in relation to each exporter's economy. The identification of significant preferential trade flows constituted a first step in identification of the potential losers from preference erosion.

61. This section reports on the results of a CGE modelling exercise that considers the overall economic impacts of preference erosion on developing countries. As discussed below, the advantage of assessing the impact of erosion of preferences within a CGE model is that it enables evaluation of economy-wide implications of tariff reform in a multi-country framework. In particular, changes in market access conditions for one product category are linked to developments in other sectors through goods and factors markets. As far as the analysis of preference erosion is concerned, representation of inter-sectoral linkages permits accounting for the reality that while some producers in selected preference-receiving sectors may be affected negatively, the resources that are freed from that sector can be employed in other sectors that may gain better access to world markets or be simply more productive. Additionally, the effects of simultaneous liberalization in multiple destination markets can be assessed more adequately. This is important since the potential negative effects of preference erosion that might be observed in one destination market could well be outweighed by better access to other destination markets (combined with better allocation of domestic resources). A CGE approach provides a consistent analytical framework for evaluating these effects; it can better capture key features of WTO negotiations such as the package nature of agreements that span over multiple product categories and trading partners.

Methodological issues

62. Assessing economic impacts of preference erosion is not a trivial task. Results are likely to depend on the adopted definition of preference erosion as well as on the methodological framework used in the analysis. The commonly accepted conceptualisation of "preference erosion" refers to the decline in the advantage enjoyed by some exporters under preferential trade treatment. It has to be born in mind, however, that preference erosion can occur in a number of distinct ways: as a result of phasing out of a preferential trading arrangement (*e.g.* equalisation of preferential rates with MFN rates), as a result of extension of expanded preferential treatment to other trading partners, or as a consequence of lowering of MFN rates associated with multilateral market access negotiations. This analysis focuses on developing country concerns associated with the economic impacts of preference erosion that may arise following MFN tariff reductions under the Doha Development Agenda and hence concentrates on the latter case.

63. A number of approaches to measuring the benefits from preferential arrangements, or alternatively the losses from their erosion, have been employed in the existing literature. Among the most popular are methods involving simple calculations of the value of benefits based on fixed trade values, estimations of trade creation / trade diversion impacts, or general equilibrium evaluations.

64. In the first of these approaches, the benefit to the preference-receiving country is usually defined as the difference between the MFN rate and the preferential rate multiplied by the value of imports under the given preferential scheme evaluated at world prices. Preference erosion is then calculated as the difference between the value of the preference before and after a multilateral liberalization. An example of such an approach is the assessment of preference erosion in agricultural products by Yamazaki (1996). One

of the obvious limitations of this methodology is that changes in MFN tariffs are likely to induce changes in the volumes traded under both preferential and non-preferential schemes resulting in lower benefit to preference-receiving countries after MFN liberalisation. Disregarding these changes to trade volumes may result in underestimation of the impacts of preference erosion.

65. A number of studies improve upon this approach by modelling the demand and supply schedules in the so-called *partial equilibrium* models. This methodology permits controlling for trade creation/diversion type of effects in response to changes in trade protection measures. A common assumption in this type of analysis is that imports from different sources are imperfect substitutes including substitution between domestic production and imports. In this type of analysis the MFN liberalisation typically results in an increased demand for products imported under MFN treatment and decreased demand for imports entering under preferential rates. Partial equilibrium modelling has recently been employed in the analysis of preference erosion by Subramanian (2003) and Alexandarki and Lankes (2004). The advantage of this approach is its ease of interpretation and the possibility of its relatively straightforward application at the very detailed level of product classification – an advantage over the data-intensive general equilibrium assessments that have to be conducted at a high level of aggregation.

66. While being a considerable improvement over the simplest approach, this methodology has the distinct disadvantage that it assumes away a variety of broader implications of trade liberalisation. In particular, it cannot relate changes in tariffs and trade on one good to those on other goods - *i.e.* it is partial equilibrium. Where a far-reaching reform is under consideration this can be a major handicap and result in biased estimates of the economic value of preferential trading arrangements. While a partial equilibrium approach can typically account for the value of exports that can be lost as a result of eroding preferential margins, it cannot account for the value of alternative uses of resources in other sectors of the economy or for cross-sectoral effects implied by the existence of intermediate products. In addition, terms of trade and balance of payments effects are also typically ignored in partial equilibrium analyses.

67. A computable general equilibrium approach employs detailed information on endowments, economic structures of selected economies as well as policy instruments and integrates them in a multi-country, multi-sector market-clearing framework with sophisticated representation of demand and supply relations. In such a framework an evaluation of an MFN liberalization scenario involves both the effects of substitution between imports and domestic production, imports from preferential to non-preferential sources in the preference-giving country, changes in demand for intermediate inputs, reallocation of productive resources across industrial sectors, terms of trade and balance of payments effects. This approach can therefore better capture some of the costs inherent in preferential trading arrangements such as, for example, preferences-driven concentration of resources in relatively uncompetitive activities. In such a framework, in addition to the potentially negative impact in a particular preference-receiving sector, economy-wide implications of reallocation of productive resources towards other activities are evaluated. This is an important methodological advantage that enables accounting for the ‘package’ nature of multilateral trade agreements where the potential negative effects associated with a particular sector or preferential scheme are analysed in conjunction with other effects. Finally, CGE modelling can account simultaneously for the effects of preferences on the granting and the beneficiary countries.

68. Even though the CGE approach has clear advantages for assessing economic impacts of preference erosion³⁹, very few existing CGE applications address this issue directly. Ianchovichina, Mattoo and Olarreaga (2001) using the GTAP model and version 4 of the GTAP database calculate the impact of a 25 per cent reduction in MFN tariffs by all Quad countries on the exports of 37 sub-Saharan African countries. Bora, Cernat and Turrini (2002), using the GTAP model and version 5 of the GTAP database,

³⁹ This approach also has a number of limitations which have been described in more detail in Bora, Cernat and Turrini (2002), p. 49.

investigate the impact on exports of a scenario where all the Quad countries adopt the EBA scheme. Safadi (2003) in his assessment of the GSP employs the GTAP model and version 5 of the GTAP database to examine the general equilibrium effects of a scenario where the GSP rates are raised to MFN rates. The present study builds on such approaches utilising the newly released version 6 of the GTAP database, which includes additional country coverage and expanded information on existing trade preferences.

Preferential market access in the GTAP framework

69. As pointed out above, because of extensive data requirements, CGE analysis is usually conducted at a relatively high level of aggregation without the possibility of analysis of very specific product categories. The tariff line information on protection measures is aggregated to broad product categories, typically by means of trade weighting. Hence, necessarily, data used in CGE analysis masks the detail present in the underlying tariff-line data.

70. The dataset used for the simulations in this section is version 6.05 of the GTAP database comprising data with a base year of 2001 and covering 57 broad economic sectors and 87 countries (Tables 21 and 22). The distinct advantage of protection data in this database is that it fully integrates the information on bilateral *ad valorem* tariffs (both MFN and preferential), *ad valorem* equivalents of specific tariffs (MFN and preferential), as well as tariff rate quotas from CEPII/ITC Market Access Maps (MAcMaps) database.⁴⁰ The resulting *ad-valorem* equivalent measure of applied protection is thus a comprehensive measure of protection that is consistent across all bilateral trade flows.

71. Due to the level of data aggregation, each bilateral *ad valorem* equivalent measure of applied protection included in the database by necessity combines the information on MFN and preferential market access as well as the actual composition of trade within this product category. Thus, bilateral protection rates for a given product category vary from one country pair to another. To illustrate the structure of protection and the preferential access to the European Union, US, Japan, Australia and Canada for each product category and trading partner, we calculate differences between trade-weighted averages of *ad valorem* rates of protection across all trading partners and the rate applied to imports from a specific trading partner. These equivalent measures of applied protection will be used in the simulations presented in the following sub-sections.

72. The difference between the trade-weighted *ad-valorem* equivalent and bilateral rates provides a better indication of preferential market access as compared to the difference between the official MFN and bilateral rates. As discussed in the statistical review in Section III (above), MFN rates typically apply only to a share of the actual trade flow and corresponding indicators of protection often do not account for the existence of specific duties. The trade-weighted average of *ad valorem* equivalent measures is thus a better indication of the average trade restrictiveness. Tables 23 to 27 present the differences (measured as percentage points) between average and bilateral rates. The positive and negative values shown in the tables reflect, respectively, lower-than-average or higher-than-average restrictiveness of access to a given destination market for each source country and product category. The presented margins provide an indication of the extent of preferential treatment enjoyed in a particular product by beneficiary countries.⁴¹ For example, the European Union offers duty-free access to its market for *Natural resources* – margins are nil across all source countries indicating that none of the partners receives a preferential treatment (Table

⁴⁰ The dataset is documented in detail in Bouët, A., Fontagné, L., Mimouni, M., and F. Von Kirchbach (2002), *Market Access for GTAP: A Bilateral Measure of Merchandise Trade Protection* by GTAP Resource #1045, available at the following web address (confirmed on 8 January 2005): http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/res_display.asp?RecordID=1045.

⁴¹ As indicated above, because of the level of aggregation, these margins may also reflect different structures of trade within aggregated product categories.

23). In contrast, in *Paddy rice* several developing countries benefit from preferential margins reaching up to 36 percentage points. At the same time, several industrialised countries face *ad valorem* rates that are several percentage points higher than the average. Such an approach allows us to identify product categories and source countries that may be vulnerable to erosion of preferential margins.

Preferential access by product categories

73. Drawing on the GTAP database, the Tables (23 to 27) highlight the preferential margins calculated for each of the five preference granting countries as of 2001 (according to the size of their preferential import volumes: the European Union, the United States, Japan, Australia and Canada) arranged by product category and beneficiary. A comprehensive discussion of the map of preferential access ensuing from these data is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, a number of product categories stand out as ones where certain developing countries enjoy significant preferential margins in the five destination markets that are considered here.

Agriculture

74. Large margins between average and bilateral protection measures applied to developing countries' exports are observed in *Paddy rice* and *Processed rice* categories reaching respectively 755 and 834 percentage points in Japan, 36 and 49 percentage points in the European Union, and 4 percentage points in the United States. Australia and Canada afford duty-free access in these product categories to imports from all sources.

75. In *Sugar* these differences range from a high of 244 percentage points in Japan, 62 in the European Union, 25 in the United States to less than 2 percentage points in Australia and Canada. These margins are, however, spread less evenly among the developing countries indicating that there are significant variations in preferential access within this product group. Taking the EU market as an example, Uganda and Mozambique enjoy significant margins of respectively 63 and 41 percentage points while imports from Tanzania, Zambia or Zimbabwe are actually disadvantaged and face rates that are 33 to 53 percentage points higher than the average.⁴²

76. Several developing countries enjoy significant preference margins in *Wheat; Cereal grains; Vegetables, fruits and nuts* in the Japanese market (up to respectively, 183, 39 and 14 percentage points). More moderate preferential margins are enjoyed by developing countries in the EU market (5, 6 and 8 percentage points respectively). In the United States, Canada and Australia most developing countries do not enjoy a great deal of preferential access in these product categories.

77. *Bovine cattle, sheep and goat meat* as well as *Meat products* record quite significant preference margins in Japan (43 and 50 percentage points respectively), the European Union (up to 17 and 6 percentage points respectively), Canada (7 and 51 percentage points). In the United States and Australia margins in these product categories do not exceed 3 percentage points.

78. In *Dairy products* margins are significant across the five destination markets reaching up to 110 percentage points in Canada, 53 percentage points in Japan, and 18 percentage points in the United States. In the European Union and Australia, the margins are 4 and 1 percentage point, respectively.

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Since 2001, the situation has evolved with the introduction of the EU's EBA initiative. Tanzania and Zambia are both eligible for the EBA preferences and now should not be subject to a less favourable treatment than Uganda and Mozambique.

Manufacturing

79. Even though there is considerable variation across the five analyzed destination markets, the preferential margins granted to manufactured products are generally lower than those observed in the agricultural products. An exception is Australia with very low trade barriers in the agricultural sectors and moderate preferential margins granted to several developing countries in a number of manufacturing sectors (Table 26). However, as explained in the next section, the lower observed margins in manufacturing may mask the importance of preferential market access in this sector which accounts for a large and increasing share of exports from most beneficiary countries.⁴³

80. Despite the fact that the observed margins are generally lower in manufacturing, market access in a number of product categories is characterized by the existence of non-negligible preferential margins enjoyed by a number of developing countries. In Japan, Australia and Canada, for example, exports of *Beverages and tobacco products* of several African and South Asian countries benefit from preferential margins reaching up to 15 percentage points (Tables 25 to 27). For *Textiles and Wearing apparel*, preferential margins reach respectively up to 13 and 22 percentage points in Australia, 5 and 14 percentage points in Canada, 4 and 9 percent in the United States, 7 and 10 percent in Japan, and 2 and 3 percentage points in the European Union. For *Leather products* these margins reach up to 13 percentage points in Japan, 12 percentage points in the United States, 10 percentage points in Australia, 9 percentage points in Canada and 3 percentage points in the European Union.

Preferential access by destination and beneficiary countries

81. The analysis presented in the previous sub-section sketches the relative importance of existing preferential trading arrangements across selected product categories as reported in the GTAP database. Such a presentation of the data facilitates identification of certain product categories that may be vulnerable to preference erosion. However, this approach does not fully capture the potential country-level impacts. This is because trade structures differ considerably across preference-receiving countries in each of the destination markets.


82. In order to account for these differences we build on the already calculated product-level margins and calculate average trade-weighted preference margins for each of the beneficiary countries and in each of the analysed preference-granting countries. The product-level margins in destination markets are weighted by the shares of these products in the overall exports of a given beneficiary to each of the analysed markets yielding a measure of an average preference margin enjoyed in a particular preference-granting market. Hence, the country-level margins calculated for each of the five preference-granting countries permit a comparison of vulnerability to preference erosion among beneficiaries (Figures 2 to 6, below). Annex Figures 2 to 6 provide corresponding information on the contributions to these margins by selected product categories.

83. Figure 2 presents the average preference margins enjoyed by beneficiary countries in the EU market; it indicates that a number of Sub-Saharan and North African countries as well as Bangladesh, benefit from positive margins reaching up to 2.6 percentage points. Taking the example of Madagascar, the interpretation of this statistic is that, on average Madagascar's exports enter the EU market under import duties that are 2.6 percentage points lower than those faced on average by other exporters. While any potential negative effects associated with preference erosion resulting from liberalisation by the European Union would be expected to be concentrated in countries enjoying positive preferential margins, several

⁴³ For a discussion of increasing importance of manufacturing in developing countries' trade, see Hertel and Martin (1999).

developing countries which are disadvantaged in terms of access to the EU market (e.g. in South and East Asia) would be expected to benefit from liberalisation undertaken by the European Union.⁴⁴

**Figure 2. EU: average trade-weighted preference margins by beneficiary country, 2001
(percentage points)**



Source: GTAP 6.05 database.

84. In the US market (Figure 3) the calculated preference margins are typically lower than those calculated for the European Union. The most privileged beneficiaries are Canada and Mexico (signatories of NAFTA) with preference margins reaching 1.5 percentage points. A number of developing countries enjoy positive preference margins which, however, typically do not exceed 2 percentage points. Main developing country preference beneficiaries are: Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa, Morocco, Uruguay, Venezuela, India, Singapore as well as composite regions Rest of Middle East and North Africa and the Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa.⁴⁵


⁴⁴ Annex Figure 1 offers a graphical breakdown of contributions to these margins by selected product categories. It indicates that in the case of Madagascar, *Food products nec*, *Wearing apparel*, *Textiles and Vegetables, fruits and nuts* are the four main categories that contribute to the 2.6. percentage point margin. More generally, *Textiles and Wearing Apparel* make up large part of positive preference margins in several countries including Bangladesh, Madagascar, Morocco, Turkey and Tunisia. *Food products nec* are also an important contributing product category for Madagascar, Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique. Vegetables, fruits and nuts as well as the *Rest of Primary Agriculture* similarly belong to important categories.

⁴⁵ While there is no clear pattern of product categories that dominate contributors to these margins (Annex Figure 2), *Primary agriculture nec* contributes substantially to margins in Uganda, Zambia, Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, Vietnam, Morocco, Colombia, India. *Textiles and Wearing apparel* account for the whole

85. In Japan, high positive preferential margins reaching up to 7 percentage points are observed for several developing countries (Figure 4). This reflects the relatively high trade barriers applied to imports from other major OECD economies including the United States, EU, Canada and Australia which at the same time account for a large share of Japan's imports. Among the disadvantaged developing countries are Zimbabwe, Uruguay and Singapore. As indicated in Annex Figure 3, there is a clear pattern of positive significant contributions to developing country preference margins mostly by agricultural and food products.

86. Analysis of access to the Australian market reveals (Figure 5) consistent treatment of developing country exports with relatively high preferential margins - reaching up to 6 percentage points and afforded to developing countries in South and East Asia, Latin America and Africa. Exceptions include Thailand, Vietnam, Brazil and South Africa which on average face barriers that are higher than those faced by other trading partners.⁴⁶ In the Canadian market (Figure 6), exports of a number of African and Latin American countries – in particular – receive preferential treatment with preferential margins reaching up to 2 percentage points in Tanzania, 1.3 in Malawi, 1.1 in Chile and 0.8 in Botswana.⁴⁷

**Figure 3. US: average trade-weighted preference margins by beneficiary country, 2001
(percentage points)**




Source: GTAP 6.05 database.

positive margin in the Rest of Middle East and North Africa. It is noteworthy at the same time that these two categories contribute negatively to margins in a number of developing countries.


⁴⁶ As depicted in the corresponding Annex Figure 5, the main contributors to these preferential developing country margins are manufacturing categories such as Textiles, Wearing apparel, Leather products as well as Other manufacturing.

⁴⁷ As can be seen in Annex Figure 4, *Food products nec* and *Primary agriculture nec* as well as *Meat products* and *Beverages and tobacco products* contribute significantly to these margins across a number of beneficiary countries.

**Figure 4. Japan: average trade-weighted preference margins by beneficiary country, 2001
(percentage points)**




**Figure 5. Australia: average trade-weighted preference margins by beneficiary country, 2001
(percentage points)**



Source: GTAP 6.05 database.

Figure 6. Canada: average trade-weighted preference margins by beneficiary country, 2001 (percentage points)



Source: GTAP 6.05 database.

Simulation results

87. In what follows, we present an evaluation of the economy-wide welfare⁴⁸ implications of the tariff reform in a multi-country multi-sector framework. In this framework, changes in market access conditions for one product category are linked to developments in other sectors through goods and factors markets. Similarly, the effects of a simultaneous liberalization in multiple destination markets are assessed. As noted above, such an integrated approach enables assessment of the effects of preference erosion taking into account the WTO approach to tariff reduction (*i.e.* covering simultaneously multiple markets, tariff lines and product categories). While, in principle, production in selected preference-eligible sectors may be affected negatively, the resources that are freed from a sector that loses its preferential treatment can be employed in other sectors where they may be used more productively. Similarly, the negative effects of preference erosion that may be observed in one destination market may well be outweighed by positive effects resulting from a better market access to other destination markets.

88. In order to illustrate the impact of multilateral liberalisation in the presence of the segmented nature of preferential access to developed country markets where exports of developing countries are often

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The measure of change in welfare is the equivalent variation in income. Equivalent variation in income is the money metric equivalent of the utility change brought about by the price change. At a less abstract level, welfare gains from trade liberalisation can be broken down into two components: (1) the change in efficiency with which countries utilise their resources and (2) the change in its terms of trade (Hertel and Martin, 1999).

subject to different market access conditions in different OECD markets (as discussed in Part III, above), we report the results of three different liberalisation scenarios:

- Unilateral liberalisation by the European Union, the United States, Japan, Australia and Canada,
- Plurilateral liberalisation by all five preference-granting markets collectively,
- Worldwide liberalisation.

89. Across all the three simulation exercises, liberalisation refers to a 50% reduction in measures of applied protection, which are given on a bilateral basis (described in para. 70, above).⁴⁹ The first scenario allows us to illustrate the welfare implications on beneficiary countries of preferential access in each individual preference-granting market. The second scenario is designed to show how differences in the design of preferential schemes could play out when all are treated as one market: some negative effects that would be observed under individual liberalisation scenarios could very well be outweighed by positive effects of liberalisation in other preference-granting and third countries. Finally, we discuss the results of a simulation of a worldwide lowering of market access barriers in order to mimic the multilateral character of the ongoing WTO negotiations. In doing so, we provide a breakdown of contributions to per capita welfare impacts from liberalisations in each of the analysed preference-giving countries.

Simulation 1: unilateral tariff reduction by each of the preference-granting countries


90. Figure 7 presents the welfare impacts of a 50% cut in protection on all merchandise tariffs by the European Union in relation to the average preference margins enjoyed by each of the preference-receiving countries in the initial equilibrium. The results are characterized by a strong negative correlation between the size of the margin and the percentage impact on per capita welfare. In particular, most of the countries enjoying a positive average margin are affected negatively in terms of welfare in this simulation. Negatively affected developing country regions include: Rest of North America (0.35% reduction in per capita welfare), Mozambique and Bangladesh (-0.21), Zambia and Madagascar (-0.14), Morocco and Uganda (-0.11), Tanzania (-0.07), Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa (-0.02) and Venezuela (-0.01). It is noteworthy, however, that for the majority of developing countries liberalisation by the European Union results in positive welfare gains including for countries such as Tunisia or the Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa which gain despite having initially enjoyed significant preferential access to the EU market.

91. Figures 8 to 11 present analogous results for a 50% tariff reduction undertaken unilaterally and individually by the United States, Japan, Canada and Australia (each country in turn). The results for the United States confirm a negative correlation of per capita welfare impacts and the size of the initial preferential margin. Nevertheless, only three developing country regions are affected negatively and the impacts are minimal in terms of per capita welfare losses: -0.02% in the Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, -0.01% in Rest of Middle East and North Africa, and -0.01% in South Africa. Similarly to the EU case, the majority of countries gain from MFN liberalisation by the United States including a number of countries which gain despite having initially enjoyed significant preferential access to the US market (*e.g.* Zambia, India or Singapore).

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The simulations do not include any change in export credits or non-tariff barriers.

Figure 7. Welfare impacts of a 50% reduction in the *ad valorem* equivalent measure of protection by the European Union



92. Simulation results for Japan (Figure 9) indicate a large number of cases of negligible welfare impacts across the range of initial preferential margins that are clustered around the vertical axis. These results are driven by the relatively small shares of Japan in exports of several countries. As in the European Union and the US cases, a number of countries with initially positive preferential margins benefit from MFN liberalisation (e.g. Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia and China). Nevertheless, a number of countries that currently enjoy preferential treatment in the Japanese market are affected negatively. These include: Malawi and the Rest of North America (-0.04), Mozambique and Madagascar (-0.02), and Bangladesh, Peru, Rest of SACU, Tanzania and Zambia (-0.01).

93. The simulation of liberalisation by Australia (Figure 10) shows a number of cases with positive impacts (Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Rest of Oceania) as well as negative, albeit marginal, impacts in Singapore (-0.02) and the Rest of North America, Botswana, rest of SACU, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe (each by -0.01). The simulation of liberalisation by Canada indicates that most developing countries would not be affected or would benefit. Marginal negative impacts are recorded in the Rest of North America (-0.03), Malawi (-0.01) and the Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa (-0.01).

Figure 8. Welfare impacts of a 50% reduction in the *ad valorem* equivalent measure of protection by the United States




Figure 9. Welfare impacts of a 50% reduction in the *ad valorem* equivalent measure of protection by Japan




Figure 10. Welfare impacts of a 50% reduction in the *ad valorem* equivalent measure of protection by Australia





Figure 11. Welfare impacts of a 50% reduction in the *ad valorem* equivalent measure of protection by Canada




Simulation 2: simultaneous 50% liberalisation by the European Union, United States, Japan, Canada and Australia

94. Figure 12 presents the results of a tariff liberalisation scenario where all five preference-granting countries simultaneously engage in a 50% reduction of *ad valorem* measures of protection.⁵⁰ The results are broken down by the market taking the liberalisation action and by trading partner. It is noteworthy that such a scenario is welfare improving for most developing countries in our sample.

95. Interestingly, in several cases the welfare losses that may have occurred under one of the unilateral liberalisation scenarios are outweighed by gains from liberalisation by other preference giving countries. Such are the cases of Bangladesh and Madagascar that experience non-negligible welfare losses as a result of liberalisation by the European Union (and to a lesser extent Japan) but at the same time benefit significantly from the liberalisation by the United States. Malawi that would have lost from an individual liberalisation by Japan is more than compensated by liberalisations in the European Union and the United States.

Figure 12. Per capita welfare gains from a simultaneous 50% reduction in the *ad valorem* equivalent measure of protection by the European Union, the United States, Japan, Canada and Australia



96. Eight developing country regions experience a negative impact on per capita welfare including the Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa (-0.01 per cent), Tanzania (-0.08), Morocco (-0.09), Uganda (-0.11), Zambia (-0.14), Mozambique (-0.21) and the Rest of North America (-0.41). In most of these cases, the negative impacts are in large part attributed to liberalisation in the European Union market. A closer inspection of these cases makes clear that the negative results are associated with the positive preferential

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
Detailed results are presented in Table 28.

margins enjoyed by these countries in each of five destination markets in the initial equilibrium (*i.e.* pre-reform). In these cases the welfare losses that may have occurred under one of the unilateral liberalisation scenarios are deepened, not outweighed, by liberalisation by other preference giving countries.

Simulation 3: Worldwide liberalisation

97. Figure 13 presents the results of a tariff liberalisation scenario where all regions, including other OECD and developing countries, engage in a 50 per cent reduction of *ad valorem* measures of protection.⁵¹ The welfare results are noticeably larger as compared to the previously considered scenario with the largest per capita gain of 2.6 per cent accruing to Vietnam. Overall, most developing countries gain significantly more as compared with the liberalisation conducted just by the European Union, United States, Japan, Canada and Australia. In some cases such as for example Morocco, Bangladesh or Zambia, the inclusion of the remaining regions into the liberalisation further counterbalances the potential negative effects of liberalisation in selected preference-granting countries. However, in some countries, such as Tanzania or Uganda, the negative results associated primarily with liberalisation by the European Union are further deepened in the worldwide liberalisation scenario.

Figure 13. Per capita welfare gains from a simultaneous 50% reduction by all regions



Summing Up

98. Preferential margins calculated at the individual product level indicate substantial trade advantages accruing to a number of developing countries exporters in several product categories and

⁵¹ Detailed results are presented in Table 29.

preference-granting countries. However, average export-share-weighted preferential margins calculated across the entire range of product categories for each of the beneficiaries indicate that, at the country level, the significance of preferential schemes is lower than what may have been judged from the size of the product-level margins. This is an implication of the trade structures of most developing countries that are diversified enough to result in single digit average exports-weighted margins.

99. The large differences between the calculated product- and beneficiary-level preferential margins suggest that while significant reallocation of productive resources may be required across product categories, the country-level impacts are likely to be mitigated.

100. Simulations of liberalisation scenarios by each of the five analysed preference-giving countries individually indicate a negative correlation between the size of the initial preferential margin and the liberalisation-related welfare gain. Nevertheless, since there is a significant differentiation in sectoral and regional emphasis of preferential schemes across preference-granting countries, the results of a simultaneous liberalisation by the five preference-giving countries show that the welfare losses that may have occurred under one of the unilateral liberalisation scenarios are in a number of cases outweighed by gains from liberalisation by other preference-giving countries. Bangladesh and Madagascar, for example, experience non-negligible welfare losses as a result of liberalisation by the European Union but at the same time benefit significantly from the liberalisation by the United States. Malawi that would have lost from a unilateral liberalisation by Japan is more than compensated by liberalisation in the European Union and the United States. These results emphasize that any potential losses associated with preference erosion will be mitigated in the multilateral approach.⁵²

101. The analysis of protection data in the GTAP database indicates that due to the combination of high shares of the European Union in exports of several beneficiary countries and the calculated preferential margins, the preferential schemes of the European Union have a more significant impact on beneficiaries than those of the United States, Japan, Canada or Australia. As a flip side of this coin, an MFN liberalisation by the European Union may be associated with more sizeable negative welfare impacts in a number of developing countries, predominantly in Africa.

102. Overall, for the majority of developing regions, liberalisation by preference-granting countries as modelled in the present analysis results in positive welfare gains. This conclusion applies to a number of developing countries that gain despite having initially enjoyed substantial positive preferential margins in access to the developed-country markets. This finding from the CGE analysis contrasts with other analysis conducted using a partial equilibrium framework that does not take into account offsetting gains from liberalisation in other areas. (It should be noted, however, that the CGE modelling experiments employ a fairly high level of regional aggregation and therefore do not provide detailed information on outcomes for some of the individual countries identified as potentially vulnerable in the statistical analysis above and in such studies as those by Alexandraki and Lankes (2004) and Subramanian (2004).)

V. Conclusions

103. The risk of negative direct economic impacts from preference erosion is associated with the potential loss of a non-reciprocally granted tariff advantage upon which a developing country depends. Such dependence would entail substantial shares of real trade entering under preferential programmes

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Similarly, a recent World Bank study [World Bank (2004)] underscores the importance of multilateral liberalisation in assisting most developing countries to improve their market access and reduce the discrimination they face from the prevailing web of regional trade agreements. At the same time, the report acknowledges that for some, generally smaller, developing countries there are risks of net losses from preference erosion.

which confer non-negligible tariff advantages. This does occur, but it is less frequent than the aggregate numbers might suggest. There are a number of reasons for the limited dependence on preferential tariff schemes. First of all, substantial shares of imports from developing countries enter Australia and the Quad countries via duty-free or low MFN tariff rates. Secondly, large shares of imports under preferential programmes enter some countries under a rather limited number of tariff lines. Thirdly, imports under the preferential programmes are often dominated by a few large developing countries such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Thailand or South Africa, among others. Fourthly, the literature suggests that constraints built into the preferential programmes limit their utility due to exclusion of products of particular interest or problems associated with satisfaction of the programme conditions (*e.g.* ROOs).

104. On the other hand, the statistical review has highlighted examples of countries that have successfully exploited the preferential arrangements. In particular, the statistical review identifies a number of smaller developing countries for which preferential programmes are playing a significant role with respect to exports of individual products. In these cases, specific product groups are exported under preferential tariffs and account for significant shares of the overall trade of the countries concerned. For example, this is the case for several countries exporting under US apparel preferences and for a broader range of countries exporting a variety of products under EU preferences, a point that is underscored in the subsequent CGE analysis. Preference erosion resulting from MFN tariff liberalisation will remain a concern only to the extent that preferential tariff margins give these (generally smaller) preference-dependent developing countries a significant market access advantage.

105. A full economic assessment of the risks of preference erosion depends on consideration of the multiple trade-offs under MFN tariff liberalisation, including indirect impacts that are not evident from a simple review of reliance on preferences (such as the associated reallocation of resources and terms of trade effects).⁵³ CGE analysis is employed here to shed light on the economic implications of such liberalisation. Separate simulations of individual, unilateral liberalisation by each of the five preference-granting countries indicate that for beneficiary countries there is a negative correlation between the size of the initial effective preferential margin and the liberalisation-related welfare gain (with some exceptions). However, the story changes under multi-country liberalisation scenarios. Due to the significant differentiation in sectoral and regional emphasis of preferential schemes across preference-granting countries, a simultaneous liberalisation by all five preference-granting countries may help to offset potential losses in a single market. That is, a multi-country scenario may open new opportunities in alternative markets for an exporting country. The outcomes are further enhanced under a global liberalisation that also includes developing country participation. These results emphasize the potential for broad gains under multilateral approaches.

106. Due to a combination of the high EU shares in the total exports of several beneficiary countries and the substantial size of EU preference margins in certain sectors, the preference schemes of the European Union have a more significant impact on beneficiaries than those in the United States, Japan, Canada or Australia. Consequently, an MFN liberalisation by the European Union may be associated with negative welfare impacts in a limited number of particularly preference-dependent or resource-constrained economies. Nevertheless, it appears that, globally and for a majority of developing regions, liberalisation by preference-granting countries will result in positive welfare gains.

⁵³

In this context, an important point to note is that a reduction in preference margins does not necessarily lead to a proportional reduction in benefit. For example, a preference may be very useful if the margin is 6% or greater, but not useful at all if the margin is reduced to say 4% (because the costs of compliance exceed the benefit at 4%). Alternatively, it may be that there are economies of scale in compliance and that some producers could still benefit, even at 4%.

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GLOSSARY

ACP	Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (EU)
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act (USA)
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ATPA	Andean Trade Preference Act (USA)
ATPDEA	Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (USA)
CACM	Central American Common Market
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CBI	Caribbean Basin Initiative (USA)
CBERA	Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (USA)
CBTPA	Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (USA)
CGE model	Computable general equilibrium model
CNL	Competitive Need Limitation
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
DDA	Doha Development Agenda
EBA	Everything But Arms Initiative (EU)
EU	European Union
FICs	Forum Island Countries
GDP	Gross domestic product
GSP	Generalised System of Preferences
GPT	General Preferential Tariff (Canada)
GTAP	Global Trade Analysis Project
HS	Harmonised System (Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LDBC	Less Developed Beneficiary Country
LDC	Least Developed Country
LDCT	Least Developed Country Tariff (Canada)
MFN	Most Favoured Nation
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement

OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Quad countries	Canada, European Union (EU member countries, taken as a group), Japan and the United States
ROO	Rules of Origin
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
TRQ	Tariff Rate Quota
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UR	Uruguay Round
US ITC	United States International Trade Commission
WB	World Bank
WITS	World Integrated Trade Solution
WTO	World Trade Organisation

ANNEX 1. PROJECT OVERVIEW

TRADE PREFERENCE EROSION: POTENTIAL ECONOMIC IMPACTS

Objective

The specific objective of this OECD project is to consider selected major non-reciprocal preference programmes of Australia and the Quad countries (Canada, the European Union, Japan and the United States) with a view to: 1) identification of which developing country trade partners are most vulnerable to the problems of preference erosion, 2) analysis of sectors or products that may be most affected, and 3) assessment of possible first round economic impacts of erosion according to selected scenarios.

Analytical Scope

The analytical scope of the project includes two principal exercises:

- **A statistical review** of preferential tariffs and imports permits examination of actual tariffs, import volumes and utilisation rates by preference scheme. It also permits examination of the structure of tariffs and the overall import volumes for the European Union and Japan. The main purpose of the statistical review is to identify the key features of the preferential schemes as they apply to tariff lines where trade actually occurs. This review can be conducted at a fairly detailed product level and considered preferential tariffs and trade: 1) in absolute terms and 2) in relation to each exporter's economy. The identification of significant preferential trade flows constituted a first step in identification of the potential losers from preference erosion. These results contribute insights for use in the later phases of the project.
- **CGE modelling experiments** permit consideration of the overall economic impacts of preference erosion on developing countries. The advantage of such modelling experiments is that they provide indications of the possible interaction of the declining preference margins with other variables and permit consideration of the overall effect on welfare. (Partial equilibrium approaches miss the trade-offs available under multi-country, multi-sector liberalisation scenarios.) The experiments focus on the impacts of selected tariff liberalisation scenarios including MFN tariff liberalisation.

Country Coverage and Data Sources

- The **country coverage** of the project encompasses preferences granted by Australia and the Quad countries and the developing countries that are eligible to receive them. Major non-reciprocal preferential tariff schemes of Australia and the Quad countries are covered in the analysis, subject to the availability of data. Free trade areas and other reciprocal initiatives have generally not been included in the analysis.
- The **core trade data** for the analysis generally refer to trade during 2002. The data have been organised in a substantial analytical database covering selected OECD Member countries and containing information on merchandise imports by product, country of origin, available tariff rates and, where possible, also including information on imports according to

the types of duty rates actually applied. Where possible, the trade data cover all duty lines for which trade was reported and take into account all major preference schemes:

- At the present time, the OECD Secretariat has access to import data and tariff rates by preference scheme at a detailed product level for Australia (HS 10-digit), Canada (HS 8 digit) and the United States (HS 8-digit) provided by national sources.⁵⁴
 - For the European Union and Japan, import data are only available at a somewhat more aggregate level (by HS 6 digit); information on the likely applied tariff rates is available, but not on the actual use of preferential measures by product. In both cases, import data and tariff rate data (including preferential rates) were drawn from Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) accessed via the World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) software jointly developed by the World Bank (WB) and UNCTAD.⁵⁵ WITS-accessible data provide information on the available tariff rates, effectively applied tariff rates and on duty-free and dutiable import values. WITS does not provide information on imports by preference scheme. Therefore, the European Union and Japan preferential imports have been inferred based on specific criteria.
- A review of the most recent literature relevant to preferences and preference erosion concerns was conducted in order to present the context for the analysis.

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Data for Australia were provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Data for Canada were provided to the OECD by the Department of Finance. Data for the United States were drawn from the web site of the U.S. International Trade Commission (<http://www.usitc.gov/>) during April 2004.

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TRAINS data used in this study were downloaded via WITS in April 2004. Information on the WITS database is available at the following location: <http://wits.worldbank.org/witsweb/default.aspx>.

ANNEX 2. PREFERENTIAL TRADE DATABASE DEVELOPMENT

Data types and sources

Countries	Type of data	Source of data
Australia	- Table on imports by product (HS 10) & partner (all partners). Fields available: product code; country of origin; nature of entry (goods cleared directly for home consumption, goods cleared from bonded warehouses for home consumption); nature of tariff (confidential, government, normal, quota, concessional); preference code (developing country preferential rate of duty was claimed – historical, confidential, Forum Island Country (FIC) preferential rate of duty was claimed, special rate for the specific country was claimed, developing country preferential rate of duty was claimed, special rate that applied was not claimed, general rate of duty was used, no preferential rate of duty was claimed); statutory rate; treatment code (65 treatment codes are available, of which the most frequent is "no treatment code", but also including such categories as goods granted a tariff concession order, goods re-imported - unaltered - after being exported on a permanent basis, among others); duty (AUS\$'000); customs value (AUS\$'000). - No table on tariffs was available.	Australian Bureau of Statistics
Canada	- Table on imports by product (HS 8) & partner (selected partners having access to preferential schemes). Fields available: product code; partner name; dutiable imports; total imports; preference accorded. - Table on tariffs by product (HS 8) & tariff scheme. Fields available: product code; preference scheme; <i>ad valorem</i> tariff (%); specific duties.	Department of Finance, Canada
European Union	- Table on imports by product (HS 6) and partner (all partners), in USD'000s. Fields available: product code; partner name; dutiable imports; total imports; average tariff calculated by UNCTAD/WB based on available <i>ad valorem</i> rates. - Table on tariffs by product (HS 10) & tariff scheme. Fields available: product code; preference scheme, <i>ad valorem</i> tariff and specific duties.	TRAINS data extracted via WITS (UNCTAD/World Bank), April 2004.
Japan	- Table on imports by product (HS 6) & partner (all partners), in USD'000s. Fields available: product code; partner name; dutiable imports; total imports; average tariff calculated by UNCTAD/WB based on available <i>ad valorem</i> rates. - Table on tariffs by products (HS 9) by tariff schemes, in % and specific duties (non <i>ad valorem</i>). Fields available: product code, preference scheme, <i>ad valorem</i> tariff and specific duties.	TRAINS data extracted via WITS (UNCTAD/World Bank), April 2004.
United States	- Table on imports by product (HS 8) & partner (selected partners having access to preferential schemes), in USD. Fields available: product code; partner name; total imports; preference accorded. - Table on tariffs by product (HS 8) & tariff scheme. Fields available: product code, preference scheme, <i>ad valorem</i> tariff (%) and specific duties.	Imports and tariffs extracted from US ITC website, April 2004.

Annex 2. Preferential Trade Database Development (continued)

Database development approach and adjustments. In order to obtain estimates of imports by partner, product, preferential scheme and associated tariff, an MS Access database was constructed. This database made it possible to match information from the import tables with the corresponding information from the tariff tables. Taking into account the specific characteristics of the data sets for each country, the Secretariat employed 4 different methodologies, involving a certain amount of estimation and adjustment.

Countries	Methodology	Adjustments
Australia	Tariff and import data were readily matched (HS 10 digit level).	None. However, specific & "not available" duties were blanked out: 98.9% of import lines (representing 99.3% of total import value) had an ad valorem tariff assigned.
Canada	Tariff and import data were readily matched (HS 8 digit level).	None. However, specific & "not available" duties were blanked out: 98.3% of import lines (representing 98.5% of total import value) had a tariff assigned.
European Union	For each import line at the HS 6-digit level, the average tariff rate (given by the AHS variable, which takes into account the best available tariff rate) was compared with the average MFN rate (given by the MFN variable). In cases with a "non-zero" difference between AHS and MFN rates, imports were considered to enter under "preferential treatment"; in cases with no difference between AHS & MFN, imports were considered to enter under MFN.	When assigning trade flows to one of the 2 categories (MFN/Preferential), the Secretariat attributed "preferential treatment" systematically to import flows in cases where no tariff information was available. For 3,502 lines (spread over 22 chapters and representing USD 1.1 billion of imports), import flows were attributed to preferential treatment even though no information on the actual tariff was available. (The absence of tariff information for an entry at the 6 digit level was due to the EU's application of only non-ad valorem tariffs for the products concerned.) Due to technical and time constraints, these lines have not been adjusted. They represent less than 2% of total imports.
Japan	Same as the method for the European Union.	When assigning trade flows to one of the 2 categories (MFN/Preferential), the Secretariat attributed "preferential treatment" systematically to import flows in cases where no tariff information was available. For 235 lines (spread over 9 chapters and representing USD 441 million of imports), import flows were attributed to preferential treatment although no information on the actual tariff was available. (The absence of tariff information for an entry at the 6 digit level was due to the Japan's application of only non-ad valorem tariffs for the products concerned.) Due to technical and time constraints, these lines have not been adjusted. They represent less than 1% of total imports.

Annex 2. Preferential Trade Database Development (continued)

United States	Tariff and import data were readily matched (HS 8 digit level). The United States import data are for "general imports" according to "general customs value".	- Some "not applicable" or "not available" tariff entries from the original data set were designated as "duty free" or blanked out based on consultations with US ITC experts. - Among AGOA imports, for selected countries*, chapters 61, 62, 65 receive special duty free treatment; these cases were handled separately from the other products (for which AGOA treatment was available for all eligible countries). - In 2002, certain imports from chapters 27 and 64 under the Andean Act were eligible for ATPDEA preferences and were handled separately. (*Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia.)
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ANNEX 3. GENERALIZED AND SELECTED REGIONAL PREFERENCE SCHEMES OF THE QUAD COUNTRIES

Country / preference scheme	Dates	Eligible economies	Scope of tariff and non-tariff preferences	Special provisions	Exemptions / Restrictions
AUSTRALIA					
Total merchandise imports 2002: USD 72.7 billion ¹					
PACTRA (PNG & Australia Trade Commercial Relations Agreement) It should be noted that PNG was included in the FIC countries by Australian Customs notice n° 2003/50 –	Originally 01/02/1977 Amended by Understanding of May 1982 Replaced by PACTRA II 20/02/1991	Papua New Guinea	<i>Type of preference:</i> Duty-free entry <i>Coverage:</i> The general principle is free entry, unless a rate is specified.		<i>Rules of origin:</i> Same criteria as in SPARTECA, with the 50% rule and the last process of manufacture performed in the qualifying area, which is: PNG, FIC, NZ and Australia • The 50% requirement can be made 48% if the 50% could not be reached because of an unforeseen circumstance.
SPARTECA (South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement) + SPARTECA TCF Provisions (considered as a Tariff Concession rather than	Instated 01/01/1981 Amended 14/09/1989 SPARTECA TCF introduced on 01/03/2001	Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa.	<i>Type of preference:</i> Duty-free access to Australian and NZ markets and unrestricted entry <i>Coverage:</i> The principle is a free entry, unless a special rate is applied. In practice, duty free concerns most products. (there are four schedules determining the eligible products –	Special treatment and assistance to be extended to the Smaller Island Countries (SICs) viz Cook Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, Niue, Tuvalu and Western Samoa	<i>Rules of Origin</i> A distinction is made between Unmanufactured Raw products , which are entitled to preferential rates of duty without further conditions; and Goods partly Manufactured in FIC countries and partly in third countries). The preferential rate is applied under the following conditions: a) the last process of manufacture must be performed by the manufacturer in a FIC; and

preferential trade agreement).			conditions may vary according to the schedule). The SPARTECA (TCF Provisions) Scheme was developed as an adjunct to SPARTECA and provides duty free entry for certain textiles, clothing and footwear products manufactured in FICs. It is used when these products do not meet the value-added or local area content requirements for duty free entry under SPARTECA.	b) their allowable factory cost is not less than the specified percentage of their total factory cost. The specified percentage is normally 50% but the CEO can decide on another percentage if he thinks it appropriate. • This requirement of 50% is a value added test and is based on the formula: $\frac{\text{Qualifying Expenditure (Q/E)}}{\text{Factory Cost (F/C)}} = \%$ Q/E = Qualifying expenditure on materials + qualifying labour and overheads (includes inner containers). F/C = Total expenditure on materials + qualifying labour and overheads (includes inner containers). • Regional cumulation permitted (within FIC countries or with Australia and New Zealand). • Some exemptions are possible for health, security, prevention of disorder, intellectual protection issues,... • Actions such as safeguards and Anti-dumping measures remain possible. • The 50% requirement can be made 48% if the 50% could not be reached because of an unforeseen circumstance.
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LDCs and countries treated as LDCs (as listed in Part 2 of Schedule 1 of Customs Tariff Act)	Customs Tariff Act 1995 Modified for Duty Free: 01/07/2003	Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa), Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Union of Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia, Timor Leste	Type of preference: Duty and quota-free access for all products originating in LDCs. Coverage There are no exclusions nor are there any phase-out periods for the removal of tariffs and quotas. Excise-equivalent duties, goods and services tax, dumping duties and other taxes and levies remain payable.	If good doesn't qualify for LDC duty-free entry due to the non-respect of a Rule of Origin, it can be eligible for another preference country (if it meets this country's RoO).	<u>Rule of origin</u> A distinction is made between Unmanufactured Raw products, which are entitled to preferential rates of duty without further conditions; and Goods partly Manufactured in LDC countries and partly in third countries). The preferential rate is applied at the following conditions: a) the last process of manufacture must be performed in an LDC; and b) The allowable factory cost of the goods is not less than 50% of the total factory cost of the goods. • Qualifying Area: Materials from all DC (part 3 and 4 of Schedule 1), FIC and Australia can count as local but materials originating in LDCs is limited to 25% of the total factory cost of the goods.
Developing countries - DC (as listed in Part 3 of Schedule 1 of Customs Tariff Act) "Historical"	Customs Tariff Act 1995	Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Palau, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe,	Type of preference: Generally, a five percentage point margin of preference, but it varies.		<u>Rule of Origin:</u> A distinction is made between Unmanufactured Raw products, which are entitled to preferential rates of duty without further conditions; and Goods partly Manufactured in FIC countries and partly in third countries). The preferential rate is applied under the following conditions: a) the last process of manufacture must be performed in FIC, and

Developing Countries - DCT (as listed in Part 5 of Schedule 1, Customs Tariff Act)	Customs Tariff Act 1995 Amended by Australian Customs Notice 2003/55 30/07/2003	Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al Qaiwain, Fujairah, Ras al Khaimah), Uruguay, Venezuela, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Zimbabwe, Anguilla, Bermuda, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Johnston Island, Macao, Midway Islands, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, St Helena, St Pierre and Miquelon, Taiwan Province, Territories administered by the Palestinian Authority, Turks and Caicos Islands, Virgin Islands of the United States, Wake Island.	Hong-Kong, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan Province	<i>Type of preference:</i> Generally, a five percentage point margin of preference but it varies. If no DCT tariff appears on the schedules, then DCS tariff apply. <i>Rule of Origin:</i> A distinction is made between Unmanufactured Raw products, which are entitled to preferential rates of duty without further conditions; and Goods partly Manufactured in FIC countries and partly in third countries). The preferential rate is applied at the following conditions: a) the last process of manufacture must be performed in that country & b) Having regard to their qualifying area, their allowable cost is at least 50% of their total factory cost • Qualifying Area: DC, Australia, NZ, FIC
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Canada				
Total merchandise imports 2002: USD 227.6 billion				
GPT (General Preferential Tariff)	Brought into effect 01/07/1974 Last renewed 2004, effective until 2014	Algeria, American Samoa, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Ascension, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, Brunei, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Caroline Islands, Cayman Islands, Chile, China, Christmas Island, Cocos Islands, Colombia, Congo (Brazza-ile), Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Falkland Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, French Southern and Antarctic Territories, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guam, Guate-ala, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Macao, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mariana Islands, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montserrat, Morocco, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Niue, Norfolk Island, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Pitcairn, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa,	Type of preference: Reductions from the MFN rate or duty-free access Coverage: Selected agricultural and industrial products	Excluded items: Some agricultural products, refined sugar, most textiles, apparel and footwear. Rules of origin: • 60% local content • Cumulation from any other GPT beneficiary country or Canada • Direct shipment required Safeguard measures

		Spanish North Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Helena, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tadjikistan, Thailand, Tokelau, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tristan da Cunha, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Turks and Caicos Islands, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, United Arab Emirates, US Virgin Islands, Zimbabwe +LDCs			
LDCT (Least Developed Country Tariff)	In present form since 01/01/2003	(See note at bottom of table.) Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Western Samoa, Yemen, Zambia	Type of preference: Duty- and quota-free access for 48 LDCs Coverage: Almost all products (see excluded items) since extension on 01/01/2003		Excluded items: Agricultural products like dairy products, poultry and eggs Excluded country: Burma Rules of origin: • 40% local content • Cumulation from any other LDCT or GPT beneficiary country or Canada • Specific rules of origin for textiles and apparel • Direct shipment required Safeguard measures
CARIBCAN	Introduced 1986 Renewed in 1996 until 2007	Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica,	Type of preference: Duty-free access for qualifying goods for most Commonwealth Caribbean States		Excluded items: Some agricultural products, textiles, apparel and footwear Rules of origin:

		Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands	Coverage: Similar to GPT; slightly broader for agricultural goods		• 60% local content • Cumulation from any other beneficiary country or Canada • Direct shipment required
Commonwealth Developing Countries Remission Order	Effective 01/01/1998	Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Ascension, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Botswana, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, Brunei, Cayman Islands, Christmas Island, Cocos Islands, Cook Islands, Cyprus, Dominica, Falkland Islands, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Montserrat, Namibia, Nauru, Nigeria, Norfolk Island, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Pitcairn, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Helena, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tokelau, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tristan Da Cunha, Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Western Samoa, Zambia, Zimbabwe	<i>Type of preference:</i> Duty-free access or preferential duty rate <i>Coverage:</i> 171 tariff lines, mostly textile products This treatment continues to provide preferences equivalent to the former British Preferential Tariff (BPT), which was revoked on 01/01/1998		<i>Rules of origin:</i> • 50% local content • Cumulation is allowed among Commonwealth countries • Direct shipment required

European Union					
Total merchandise imports 2002: USD 931.3 billion (2001: 1,027.9 billion €, shown here for comparison with programme-specific imports presented below)					
GSP	Initialized 1971	Algeria, American Samoa, Anguilla, Antarctica, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Aruba, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bermuda, Botswana, Bouvet Island, Brazil, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, Brunei, Cameroon, Cayman Islands, Chile, China, Christmas Islands, Cocos Islands, Congo (Brazzaville), Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Dominica, Dominican Republic, East Timor, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Falklands Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, French Southern territories, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Gibraltar, Greenland, Grenada, Guam, Guatemala, Guyana, Heard Island and McDonald Islands, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Macao, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montserrat, Morocco, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Niue Island, Norfolk Island, Northern Mariana Islands, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Pitcairn, Qatar,	Type of preference: Duty-free access for non-sensitive products; Reduced duty rates for sensitive products by applying a flat rate reduction of 3.5 percentage points to the MFN duty in the case of ad valorem duties; or a 30% reduction to the MFN duty in the case of specific duties. 20% reduction for textiles and clothing.	Special incentive arrangements in form of supplementary duty reductions to encourage the protection of workers' rights, intellectual property rights and the environment Specific arrangements entailing the complete suspension of MFN duties to applicable industrial and agricultural products are established for Andean Pact countries, Central America and Pakistan. 2001 "Everything But Arms" amendment	Exceptions: Duty reduction for textiles and clothing (HS 50-63) 20% For ethyl alcohol 15% Rules of origin: • Origin criteria: Products must originate in a beneficiary country, i.e. have to be either wholly obtained or undergone sufficient working or processing in that country (change of HS heading) • Direct consignment conditions • Documentary evidence • Cumulation permitted among members of the Andean Group, ASEAN, CACM and SAARC • Product-specific requirements Suspension of benefits: Preferences may be temporarily withdrawn in certain circumstances such as: • Fraud and failure to provide administrative cooperation • Unfair trading practices on the part of a beneficiary • Practice of any form of slavery or forced labor • Inadequate controls on export or transit of drugs or money laundering • Failure to comply with obligations entered into in the Uruguay Round concerning market access
Value of GSP preferential imports 2001: 44,534 mill € ³	Current scheme 01/01/2002 until 31/12/2004				

		Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, South Africa, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, Sri Lanka, St. Helena, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Pierre and Miquelon, St. Vincent and Northern Grenadines, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tokelau Islands, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Turks and Caicos Islands, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States Minor outlying Islands, Uruguay, US Virgin Islands, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Wallis and Futuna, Zimbabwe			<i>Graduation criteria:</i> - Country-sector graduation: Development index and either level of imports (lion's share clause, 25% of imports from all countries in a sector) or sector specialization index exceeded - Country graduation: 'High income' country according to World Bank and advanced development index for three consecutive years
GSP for LDCs EBA ("Everything but Arms" initiative)	Entered into force 05/03/2001 Unlimited period of time	+ LDCs Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Benin, Bhutan, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia	<i>Type of preference:</i> Unrestricted duty-free market access to all products originating in least developed beneficiary countries, excluding arms. The liberalization for three sensitive products, bananas, rice and sugar, is carried out over transitional periods.	For LDCs that are eligible both for the EBA and the preferential treatment of the Cotonou Agreement, the EBA is a more favourable scheme in terms of tariff treatment and product coverage	<i>Exceptions:</i> Bananas: full liberalization until 01/01/2006 by reducing the full tariff by 20% per year Rice: duties phased out between 01/09/2006 and 01/09/2009 Sugar: duties phased out between 01/07/2006 and 01/07/2009 Duty-free access within the limits of a growing quota in the interim period for both rice and sugar <i>Excluded country:</i> Myanmar <i>Rules of origin:</i> See GSP. ACP LDCs moving into EBA may lose ACP cumulation. <i>Graduation:</i> See GSP

ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific States) Value of ACP preferential imports 2001: 8,320 mill €	The first Yaoundé Convention in 1963 was followed by another, & then 4 successive Lomé Conventions, the last one expiring on 29/02/2000. The Cotonou Partnership Agreement was signed on 23/6/2000. The WTO waiver for this expires on 1/1/2008.	Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoro Islands, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Marshall Island, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Tanzania, Timor Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Zambia, Zimbabwe	Type of preference: Duty-free access Coverage: All manufactured and processed products and all agricultural products falling within HS chapters 1-24 are covered. 80 % of ACP agricultural exports to the European Union enter duty free.	Commodity protocols for sugar, bananas, bovine meat The Agreement provides for the negotiation of new trading arrangements with a view to liberalising trade between the two parties, putting an end to the current system of non-reciprocal trade preferences. Nonetheless, the current system will remain in force for a preparatory period up to 2008 (the date envisaged for the entry into force of the new arrangements) with a transitional period of at least 12 years. Negotiations on the new Econo-mic Partnership Agreements (EPA) started in 2002.	Exceptions: Some agricultural products like citrus fruits, tobacco and leguminous vegetables covered by the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) continue to be subject to relatively high tariff rates and TRQs. <i>Rules of origin:</i> • Cumulation permitted among other ACP countries, the European Union and certain neighbouring non-ACP countries. • Product-specific requirements, that specify the necessary transformation for non-ACP inputs in order to satisfy the origin requirements • Some exceptions to the transformation requirements are permitted, provided that non-ACP content does not exceed 15% of the ex-factory price, and subject to certain conditions <i>Safeguard clause</i>
Euro – Mediterranean Partnership Value of imports from 12 partner	Barcelona Declaration November 1995	Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey		One of the aims of the Barcelona Declaration is to establish by 2010 a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area through the	

countries 2001: 68.109 mill €				conclusion of Association Agreements between the European Union and its Mediterranean partners.	
Japan					
Total merchandise imports 2002: USD 336.4					
GSP	Instated 01/08/1971 Extended until 31/03/2014	Albania, Algeria, American Samoa, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, British Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla, China (except Hong Kong and Macao), Chile, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Falkland Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Macedonia, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montserrat, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Niue, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, St. Kitts and Nevis,	<i>Type of preference:</i> Preferential tariff rates or duty-free access <i>Coverage:</i> MFN tariff reductions for selected agricultural and fishery products without import ceilings. Duty-free treatment for most industrial products; 20-100% reduction on the MFN rate for selected items (certain chemicals, products of wood, leather, silk and wool). For the latter group of products, ceilings are calculated in each fiscal year.		<i>Excluded items:</i> Rice, cane and beet sugar, certain fish products, corals, vegetables, fruits, nuts, tea, jojoba oil, petroleum oils, gelatine and derivatives, leather apparel and accessories, furskins and articles thereof, laminated wood, silk, certain footwear and watch parts <i>Rules of origin:</i> • Products must originate in a beneficiary country, i.e. have to be either wholly obtained or undergone sufficient working or processing in that country; • Japanese goods may be added • Direct consignment conditions • Documentary evidence • Cumulation permitted among Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam <i>Eligibility criteria:</i> Economy must be in the process of development, must have its own tariff and trade system, must wish to receive a special benefit with regard to customs duty, and must be prescribed by a Cabinet Order as a country or territory to which such benefit may appropriately be

		St. Helena, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tokelau, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Turks and Caicos Islands, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe +LDCs (See note at bottom of table.)			extended. <i>Graduation criteria:</i> - Product graduation: 'High income' country according to World Bank; exports of the beneficiary's product to Japan exceed 25% of world exports of the product to Japan; exports of the beneficiary's product are worth more than one billion yen - Full graduation: 'High income' country during 3 years <i>Safeguard measures</i>
GSP for LDCs	GSP expanded 01/04/2000; latest improve-ment 2003	Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Kinshasa), Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia	<i>Type of preference:</i> Duty- and quota-free entry with no ceilings for all LDCs <i>Coverage:</i> Almost all industrial products covered. New list of agricultural and fishery products for the exclusive benefit of LDCs added to GSP, including certain smoked fish; unworked coral; dried mushrooms; other vegetables than bamboo shoots and potatoes, excluding sweet corn; sweet almonds; certain fruits; black tea; jojoba oil; other insect waxes than beeswax. In total, around 500 agricultural items covered.		<i>Excluded items:</i> Rice, cane and beet sugar, petroleum oils, gelatine and derivatives, leather apparel and accessories, furskins and articles thereof, laminated wood, silk, watch parts <i>Rules of origin:</i> See GSP <i>Graduation:</i> See GSP <i>Safeguard measures</i>

USA				
Total merchandise imports 2002: USD 1202.5 billion				
GSP (Generalized System of Preferences)	Instated 01/01/1976 Last renewal 06/08/2002 Expiration 31/12/2006	Albania, Algeria, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Botswana, British Virgin Islands, British Indian Ocean Territories, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Christmas Islands, Cocos Island, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Falkland Is, Fiji, Gabon, Gaza Strip, Georgia, Ghana, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Heard and McDonald Islands, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Macedonia, Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Montserrat, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Niue, Norfolk Island, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Pitcairn Island, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St Helena, St Kitts-Nevis, St Lucia Islands, St Vincent & Grenadines, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Tokelau, Tonga, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turks & Caicos Islands, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Wallis & Futuna, West Bank, Western Sahara, Zimbabwe	<i>Type of preference:</i> Duty-free treatment of eligible articles from beneficiary countries meeting rules of origin <i>Coverage:</i> Approximately 4,600 items covered; Including most dutiable manufactures and semi-manufactures; selected agricultural, fishery and primary industrial products	<i>Excluded items:</i> Most textiles (except handmade), watches, footwear, handbags, luggage, flat goods, work gloves and other leather wearing apparel Articles determined to be "import sensitive"; specifically steel, glass and electronic articles <i>Rules of origin:</i> • 35% value-added local content • Regional cumulation permitted to members of Andean Pact, ASEAN except Brunei and Singapore, CARICOM, SADC and WAEMU • The merchandise must have been substantially transformed in the beneficiary country • Direct shipping requirement <i>Competitive-need limitations (CNLs):</i> Ceilings on the total value and percentage of products and product categories that may be imported into the United States; intended to prevent the extension of preferential treatment to countries that are already competitive in the production of an item. <i>Graduation criteria:</i> President must determine that countries achieved sufficiently high levels of income and development, i.e. that they fall under the definition of high-income countries of the World Bank. The country's practices relating to trade,
Value of GSP preferential imports 2002: USD 17,442 million				

		+ LDCs (See note at bottom of table.)			investment and workers' rights are also taken into account. <i>Suspension of benefits:</i> Benefits can be reduced, suspended or terminated as a consequence of disputes about workers rights or protection of IPRs <i>Excluded items of special interest to LDCs:</i> Textiles and apparel, footwear, hides, skins, wood and wood articles <i>Excluded country:</i> Laos does not benefit from normal trade relations status and is therefore also excluded from GSP. Tariffs above the MFN rate and particularly stringent Rules of origin apply. <i>Rules of origin:</i> See GSP <i>Graduation:</i> See GSP
GSP for LDCs Value of GSP preferential imports from LDCs 2002: 3,381 mill US\$	Amendment to GSP 1997	Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Kinshasa), Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia	<i>Type of preference:</i> Duty-free treatment of eligible articles from beneficiary countries meeting rules of origin <i>Coverage:</i> 1,783 items in addition to the standard GSP list	No CNLs	
AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act) Value of AGOA preferential imports 2002: 4,920 mill US\$	Signed into law 18/05/2000 In effect until 30/09/2008 Amended (AGOA II) 06/08/2002	Angola, Benin*, Botswana*, Cameroon*, Cape Verde*, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Côte d'Ivoire*, Djibouti, Ethiopia*, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana*, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya*, Lesotho*, Madagascar*, Malawi*, Mali*, Mauritania, Mauritius*, Mozambique*, Namibia*, Niger*, Nigeria, Rwanda*, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal*, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa*, Swaziland*, Tanzania*, Uganda*, Zambia	<i>Type of preference:</i> Duty-free treatment of eligible articles from beneficiary countries meeting rules of origin <i>Coverage:</i> Approximately 1,800 items in addition to the standard GSP list (7,000 lines covered in total); Including footwear, luggage, handbags, watches and flatware.	<i>Apparel provisions:</i> Duty- and quota-free access to US market for apparel made in eligible countries from US fabric and yarn. Imports of apparel made from Sub-Saharan African fabric are duty-free but subject to a cap, growing from 3 to 7% of overall US apparel imports	<i>Excluded items:</i> More than 1,000 tariff lines, of which almost 900 face average tariffs of about 11%. Agricultural products often subject to TRQs with high out-of-quota tariffs. <i>Rules of origin:</i> • 35% value-added local content; 15% of the 35% value may consist of US parts and materials • Items must be "growth, product or manufacture" of one or more AGOA-beneficiary countries

			Apparel imports are duty- and quota-free under certain conditions.	until 2008, to be filled on a "first-come, first-served" basis. Requirements: Visa system determined by the United States to be effective against transshipment and use of counterfeit documentation Special rule for apparel: Duty-free access for apparel made from fabric originating anywhere in the world for Less Developed Beneficiary Countries (LDBCs; countries with a per capita GDP of less than US\$ 1,500 in 1998). The quantity of imports is subject to a cap, growing from 1.5% to 3.5% of overall US apparel imports until 2008. The rule applies to all countries eligible for apparel provisions except Mauritius and South Africa (Botswana and Namibia are granted LDBC-	• Cumulation permitted among beneficiaries • Product must be imported directly • Stricter Rules of origin for textiles and apparel (see apparel provisions); certificate of origin required <i>Eligibility criteria:</i> The US President determines which countries are eligible. Besides basic requirements concerning core human and worker rights, the country must have eliminated barriers to U.S. trade and investments, must have shown continual progress towards fighting corruption and establishing a market-based economy that protects private property rights, the rule of law, and must pursue economic policies to reduce poverty in order to be eligible for preferential treatment.
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				status) and is effective until 30/09/2004.	
ATPDEA (Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act)	ATPA (Andean Trade Preference Act) signed into law 12/1991 Amended through ATPDEA	Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru	<i>Type of preference:</i> Additional advantages to GSP (broader product coverage, more liberal rules of origin, no CNLs, no graduation) <i>Coverage:</i> With the amendment of ATPA through ATPDEA, preferential treatment is extended to certain textile and apparel articles, footwear, tuna packaged in foil or other flexible packages, petroleum and petroleum derivatives, watches and watch parts, certain leather goods	No CNLs	<i>Excluded items:</i> Textile and apparel articles not otherwise eligible for preferential treatment under the ATPDEA; rum and tafia; above-quota imports of certain agricultural products subject to TRQs, including sugars, syrups and sugar-containing products; tuna in cans <i>Rules of origin:</i> • 35% value-added local content • Inputs from other ATPDEA beneficiary countries; Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands and beneficiaries of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) may be counted toward the 35% requirement <i>Eligibility criteria:</i> Requirement on counter-narcotics cooperation <i>Safeguard provisions</i>
CBI (Caribbean Basin Initiative)	The CBI is a broad program to promote economic development in Central America and the Caribbean and consists of the CBERA (Caribbean Basin	Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados*, Belize*, British Virgin Islands, Costa Rica*, Dominica, Dominican Republic*, El Salvador*, Grenada, Guatemala*, Guyana*, Haiti*, Honduras*, Jamaica*, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua*, Panama*, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia*, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago*	<i>Type of preference:</i> Duty-free treatment for a wide range of products grown and manufactured in CBI countries	The CBTPA provides NAFTA-equivalent, i.e. duty- and quota-free treatment for certain items previously excluded from duty-free treatment under the CBI program, mainly in the areas of apparel, liqueurs,	<i>Excluded items:</i> Several agricultural products such as sugar, rice, and tobacco continue to be covered by TRQs. <i>Rules of origin:</i> • 35% value-added local content • 15% of the value of the product may be accounted for by US components <i>Designation criteria:</i>

	Economic Recovery Act, commonly known CBI) enacted in 1984, modified in 1990) and the CBTPA (Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act, signed into law 18/05/2000, in effect until 30/09/2008)	*eligible for CBTPA preferences		and articles considered import-sensitive (e.g. certain foot-wear, tuna, petro-leum, watches, handbags). Concerning textiles, duty- and quota-free treatment has been extended to textile and apparel products assembled from U.S. fabric in CBI beneficiary countries from U.S. fabric and yarn. Duty free treatment also will be provided for apparel assembled from CBI regional fabric, subject to a quantitative limit which increases over time.	Several criteria concerning the political system, trade policy and economic and legal conditions (protection of IPRs, worker rights) in the country must be met in order to qualify for CBI benefits. For textile and apparel entries under CBTPA preferences, additional requirements have to be fulfilled, such as a special certificate of origin and proven progress towards implementation of NAFTA requirements. The President of the United States is authorized to withdraw, suspend or limit benefits if he determines that the country is not meeting designation criteria.
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Note: Unless otherwise indicated, country eligibility and programme conditions refer to the current situation (2004). With their accession to the European Union on 01/05/2004, the new EU members have been removed from the list of GSP beneficiaries of the United States, Canada and Japan. In the case of Canada and Japan, this affects all ten new member countries; in case of the United States, only the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the Slovak Republic were former GSP beneficiaries.

¹ Source of total imports data shown in Annex 3 for the Quad countries and Australia: WTO (2003) *World Trade Report*.

² Source: of EU import data for 2001 in Euros : <http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/goods/stats.htm>, Intra-EU trade excluded

³ Source of GSP and ACP import data: European Commission (2003).

TABLES AND CHARTS

Table 1. Overview of preferential tariffs, for product groups (HS 10-digit) with imports in 2002 -- Australia

Treatment	Number of lines concerned (1)	Average tariff (2)	Average MFN tariff in concerned lines (3)	Minimum tariff	Maximum tariff	Count of ad valorem tariffs	Count of non ad valorem tariffs
The general rate of duty has been used, special rate that applies has not been claimed	5,748	5.7	--	0	25	5,715	33
No preferential rate of duty has been claimed	1,673	1.5	--	0	25	1,652	21
Developing Country preferential rate of duty (DCS)	6,056	5.7	7.3	0	25	5,993	63
Developing Country preferential rate of duty – historical (DC) (4)	536	5.7	9.9	0	20	530	6
Forum Island Country preferential rate of duty (FI)	608	0.0	11.5	0	0	604	4
Special rates for the specific countries (DCT)	4,944	4.6	6.2	0	25	4,919	25

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), International Trade; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Notes: Calculations based on "statrates" (statutory rates) of imports. Australian tariffs are determined based on the HS line, the preferential scheme, country of origin, nature of entry, nature of tariff and treatment code. The original ABS database used in these tables for 2002 lists 156 countries as eligible for the Developing Country preferential rate (17 out of 156 countries did not export under this scheme). According to the original ABS database, the following countries were eligible for the "Forum Island Country preferential rates": Cook Island, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Samoa, Solomon Island, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. According to the original ABS database, the following countries were eligible for "special rates": Canada, Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan Province of China, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Singapore. Country eligibility for the various tariff preferences as of December 2004 is shown in Annex 2.

(1) Number of lines at the HS 10-digit level where there are imports entering under the treatment indicated.

(2) Simple average of lines where there have been imports. Calculation based on *ad valorem* tariffs only.

(3) "MFN" tariffs refer to the maximum general rate. This column presents the simple averages of "MFN" tariffs for the lines corresponding to those in the preferential programmes with imports. The calculation is based on *ad valorem* tariffs only.

(4) The category "historical" covers a set of developing countries that tend to be relatively less developed, have been traditionally treated as developing countries under the Australian tariff system, and receive special preferences on a comparatively limited set of tariff lines (see Annex 2 for the country listing and more details of the DC preferential scheme).

Table 2. Overview of preferential tariffs, for product groups (HS 8-digit) with imports in 2002 -- Canada

Treatment	Number of lines concerned (1)	Average tariff (2)	Average MFN tariff in concerned lines (3)	Minimum tariff	Maximum tariff	Count of ad valorem tariffs	Count of non-ad valorem tariffs
MFN (4)	6,931 (29 blanks)	4.2%		0.0%	26.5%	6,735	167
GPT	4,122 (11 blanks)	1.5%	3.5%	0.0%	16.5%	4,040	71
Mexican Tariff	3,166 (5 blanks)	0.2%	5.5%	0.0%	3.0%	3,150	11
Canada-Israel Agreement Tariff	761	0.0%	6.7%	0.0%	5.0%	757	4
Mexican-United States Tariff	657	0.0%	4.0%	0.0%	2.5%	656	1
Commonwealth Caribbean Countries Tariff	206	0.0%	3.4%	0.0%	0.0%	206	0
Chile Tariff	174	0.6%	5.5%	0.0%	19.0%	170	4
LDCT	170	0.0%	6.6%	0.0%	0.0%	169	1
Costa Rica Tariff	2	0.0%	6.2%	0.0%	0.0%	2	0
No tariff data available							
United States Tariff	1,044	N/A	5.9%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
British Preferential Tariff	464	N/A	18.7%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
General Tariff	31	N/A	5.3%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Informal Entries & Aggregated records	13	N/A	7.7%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Source: Canadian Department of Finance; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Notes:

(1) Number of lines at the HS 8-digit level where there are imports entering under the treatment indicated. "Blank" refers to an HS line for which no tariff is available in the database.

(2) Simple average of lines where there have been imports. Calculation based on *ad valorem* tariffs only.

(3) Simple average of MFN tariffs in these lines. Calculation based on *ad valorem* tariffs only.

(4) Imports from 181 countries eligible for Canadian GSP preferences.

Table 3. Overview of preferential tariffs, for product groups (HS 6-digit) with imports in 2002 -- European Union

Treatment	Number of lines concerned (1)	Average tariff (2)	Average MFN tariff in concerned lines (3)	Minimum tariff	Maximum tariff	Count of ad valorem tariffs	Count of non-ad valorem tariffs
MFN (4)	5,144	4.7%		0.0%	74.9%	4,976	168
Trade preferences for groups of developing countries							
GSP	3,945	2.7%	5.7%	0.0%	52.4%	3,907	38
EBA	2,233	0.0%	6.2%	0.0%	0.0%	2,233	0
ACP	2,732	0.1%	5.7%	0.0%	17.0%	2,679	53
Illustrative bilateral trade preferences							
South Africa	2,379	0.9%	5.1%	0%	16.3%	2,355	24
Morocco	1,960	0.0%	6.1%	0%	15.3%	1,942	18

Source: WITS; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Notes:

(1) Number of lines at the HS 6-digit level where there are imports eligible for entering under the treatment indicated.

(2) Simple average based on ad valorem tariffs only.

(3) Simple average of MFN tariffs in these lines (see (2)). Calculation based on *ad valorem* tariffs only.

(4) MFN imports from all economies eligible for EU GSP preferences (a total of 178 economies).

Table 4. Overview of preferential tariffs, for product groups (HS 6-digit) with imports in 2002 -- Japan

Treatment	Number of lines concerned (1)	Average tariff (2)	Average MFN tariff in concerned lines (3)	Minimum tariff	Maximum tariff	Count of ad valorem tariffs	Count of non ad valorem tariffs
MFN (4)	4,695	5.0%		0.0%	40%	4,639	56
GSP	2,004	1.4%	6.5%	0.0%	15.0%	1,995	9
GSP LDC	224	0.0%	14.4%	0.0%	0.0%	224	0

Source: WITS; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Notes:

(1) Number of lines at the HS 6-digit level where there are imports inferred as entering under the treatment indicated.

(2) Simple average of lines where there have been imports. Calculation based on *ad valorem* tariffs only.(3) Simple average of MFN tariffs in these lines. Calculation based on *ad valorem* tariffs only.

(4) Calculations based on imports from countries eligible for Japanese GSP preferences (a total of 147 economies).

Table 5. Overview of preferential tariffs, for product groups (HS 8-digit) with imports in 2002 -- United States

Treatment	Number of lines concerned (1)	Average tariff (2)	Average MFN tariff in concerned lines (3)	Minimum tariff	Maximum tariff
MFN (4)	7,889 (1 blank)	4.6%		0.0%	131.8%
GSP	2,701	0.0%	4.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Israel	1,969	0.0%	6.6%	0.0%	0.0%
CBI	1,235	0.3%	5.3%	0.0%	22.5%
Andean Act (ATPA)	680	0.3%	5.5%	0.0%	17.5%
CBTPA	301	0.2%	15.1%	0.0%	15.0%
GSP LDC	254	0.0%	4.7%	0.0%	0.0%
AGOA	163	0.0%	7.6%	0.0%	0.0%
Pharmaceuticals	163	0.0%	6.3%	0.0%	0.0%
AGOA 2 (5)	158	0.0%	15.9%	0.0%	0.0%
Jordan	128	5.9%	10.8%	0.0%	23.4%
West Bank and Gaza	100	0.0%	16.1%	0.0%	0.0%
Civil Aircraft	76	0.0%	3.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Dyes	36	0.0%	7.6%	0.0%	0.0%
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA)	22	0.0%	9.3%	0.0%	0.0%
Puerto Rico-CBI	21	0.0%	7.0%	0.0%	0.0%

Source: USITC Trade Database; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Notes:

(1) Number of lines at the HS 8-digit level where there are imports entering under the treatment indicated. "Blank" refers to an HS line for which no tariff is available in the database.

(2) Simple average of lines where there have been imports. Calculation based on *ad valorem* tariffs only.

(3) Simple average of MFN tariffs in these lines. Calculation based on *ad valorem* tariffs only.

(4) Imports from 144 countries eligible for US trade preferences.

(5) Duty free treatment in HS chapters 61, 62 and 65 for selected countries (Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia).

Table 6. Imports, by tariff treatment received, 2002 – Australia

Treatment	Imports 2002 USD (1)	Share in total imports	Count of HS lines (2)	Share in all HS lines (3)
No preferential rate of duty has been claimed	724,703,930	2.7%	3,285	3.6%
The general rate of duty has been used, special rate that applies has not been claimed	10,705,481,321	40.5%	38,153	41.9%
The Developing Country preferential rate of duty has been claimed (DCS)	10,820,191,624	40.9%	33,427	36.7%
The special rate for the specific country has been claimed (DCT)	4,053,009,659	15.3%	14,736	16.2%
The Developing Country preferential rate of duty has been claimed – historical (DC)	32,732,538	0.1%	801	0.9%
The Forum Island Country preferential rate of duty has been claimed (FI)	119,582,080	0.5%	720	0.8%
Confidential	0	0.0%	6	0.0%
TOTAL	26,455,701,151	100.0%	91,128	100.0%

Source: ABS International Trade; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Notes:

(1) Total imports refer to imports from all countries. 156 countries are available in the database.

(2) The total of HS lines reflects all imports from the countries included in the database at 10-digit level (i.e. there can be multiple entries per HS line).

(3) The share in all HS lines indicates the proportion of all flows that entered under the respective treatment.

Table 7. Imports, by tariff treatment received, 2002 -- Canada

Treatment	Imports 2002 CAN \$ (1)	Imports 2002 US \$ (2)	Share in total imports	Count of HS lines (3)	Share in all HS lines (4)
MFN	42,013,888,160	26,775,787,496	72.8%	65983	72.8%
GSP	8,923,411,919	5,686,961,901	15.5%	17563	19.4%
Mexican Tariff	5,009,147,938	3,192,370,109	8.7%	3166	3.5%
Mexican-United States Tariff	745,138,327	474,882,625	1.3%	657	0.7%
British Preferential Tariff	535,656,446	341,378,144	0.9%	464	0.5%
Caribbean	153,441,169	97,789,286	0.3%	292	0.3%
Canada-Israel Agreement Tariff	147,133,290	93,769,224	0.3%	761	0.8%
Chile Tariff	111,903,454	71,316,968	0.2%	174	0.2%
United States Tariff	44,082,819	28,094,334	0.1%	1261	1.4%
GSP LDC	9,382,807	5,979,738	0.0%	211	0.2%
Informal Entries & Aggregated records	136,279	86,852	0.0%	13	0.0%
Costa Rica Tariff	98,878	63,016	0.0%	2	0.0%
General Tariff	28,689	18,284	0.0%	31	0.0%
TOTAL	57,693,450,175	36,768,497,977	100.0%	90578	100.0%

Source: Canadian Department of Finance; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Notes:

(1) Total imports refer to imports from countries that are eligible for Canadian GSP

(2) Annual average exchange rate 2002: 1 US \$ = 1.5691 CAN \$. Source: OECD (2004) Statistical Databases

(3) The total of HS lines reflects all imports from the countries included in the database at 8 digit level (i.e. there can be multiple entries per HS line).

(4) The share in all HS lines indicates the proportion of all flows that entered under the respective treatment.

Table 8. Imports, by tariff treatment received, 2002 -- European Union

Treatment	Imports 2002 USD (1)	Share in total imports	Count of HS lines (2)	Share in all HS lines (3)
MFN	171,006,311,833	47.88%	22,804	19.09%
Preferential	186,150,287,253	52.12%	96,674	80.91%
TOTAL	357,156,599,086	100.00%	119,478	100.00%

Source: WITS TRAINS Database; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Notes:

- (1) Total imports refer to imports from all countries that are eligible for GSP trade preferences (178).
 (2) The total of HS lines reflects all imports from the countries included in the database at 6-digit level (i.e. there can be multiple entries per HS line).
 (3) The share in all HS lines indicates the proportion of all flows that entered under the respective treatment.

Table 9. Imports, by tariff treatment received, 2002 -- Japan

Treatment	Imports 2002 USD (1)	Share in total imports	Count of HS lines (2)	Share in all HS lines (3)
MFN	114,482,827,334	81.44%	13,902	64.52%
Preferential	26,084,637,683	18.56%	7,644	35.48%
TOTAL	140,567,465,017	100.00%	21,546	100.00%

Source: WITS TRAINS Database; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Notes:

- (1) Total imports refer to imports from all countries that are eligible for GSP trade preferences (147).
 (2) The total of HS lines reflects all imports from the countries included in the database at 6-digit level (i.e. there can be multiple entries per HS line).
 (3) The share in all HS lines indicates the proportion of all flows that entered under the respective treatment.

Table 10. Imports, by tariff treatment received, 2002 -- United States

Treatment	Imports 2002 US \$ (1)	Share in total imports	Count of HS lines (2)	Share in all HS lines (3)
MFN	139,951,297,216	79.4%	53,400	70.4%
GSP	14,054,914,446	8.0%	14,300	18.8%
CBTPA	7,035,213,238	4.0%	959	1.3%
AGOA	4,121,836,443	2.3%	207	0.3%
GSP LDC	3,381,327,128	1.9%	372	0.5%
CBI	2,916,244,359	1.7%	2,504	3.3%
Israel	2,206,407,355	1.3%	1,969	2.6%
AGOA 2 (4)	798,160,684	0.5%	427	0.6%
Andean Act (ATPA)	762,026,506	0.4%	909	1.2%
Pharmaceuticals	507,185,669	0.3%	296	0.4%
West Bank and Gaza	376,474,381	0.2%	115	0.2%
Andean Act (ATPDEA)	175,748,821	0.1%	26	0.0%
Civil Aircraft	31,049,165	0.0%	209	0.3%
Jordan	12,600,834	0.0%	128	0.2%
Dyes	9,945,445	0.0%	38	0.1%
Puerto Rico-CBI	6,854,337	0.0%	21	0.0%
TOTAL	176,347,286,027	100.0%	75,880	100.0%

Source: USITC Trade Database; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Notes:

(1) Total imports refer to imports from all countries that are eligible for US trade preferences.

(2) The total of HS lines reflects all imports from countries eligible for US trade preferences at 8-digit level (i.e. there can be multiple entries per HS line).

(3) Indicates the proportion of all flows that entered under the respective treatment.

(4) Duty free treatment in HS chapters 61, 62 and 65 for selected countries (Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia)

Table 11. Australia: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002

Share of Preferential Imports in Total Imports, By Country, US Dollars and Percentages

Treatment	Afghanistan	Albania	Algeria	Argentina	Bahamas	Bahrain	Bangladesh	Barbados	Belize	Bermuda	Bhutan	Bolivia	Bosnia-Herzegov	Botswana	Brazil
The Developing Country preferential rate		2,536,366	28,636,429	63,185,714	1,565,537	25,896,815	228,228	66,182	15,443			1,065,750	517,269		138,200,225
The DC preferential rate of duty has been claimed - historical	22,201						10,356,426				3,947			564	
The Forum Island Country preferential rate															
The special rate for the specific country															
Subtotal preferential	22,201	2,536,366	28,636,429	63,185,714	1,565,537	25,896,815	10,356,426	228,228	66,182	15,443	3,947	1,065,750	517,269	564	138,200,225
The special rate that applies has not been claimed and the preferential rate of duty has been used	4,684	596	1,009,604	26,316,234	7,088	9,736,032	12,123,923	15,008	6,908	87,186	243	74,301	40,110	6,827	111,039,237
No preferential rate of duty has been claimed	71,650	5,883	393,949	3,884,215		148,584	1,990,572		10,151			16,837		428	6,530,954
Subtotal non preferential	76,334	6,480	1,403,553	30,200,449	7,088	9,884,616	14,114,496	15,008	17,059	87,186	243	91,138	40,110	7,255	117,570,191
Grand Total	98,535	2,542,845	30,039,982	93,386,162	1,572,625	35,781,431	24,470,922	243,236	83,240	102,629	4,190	1,156,888	557,380	7,819	253,770,415
Percentage of preferential imports in total	22.5%	99.7%	95.3%	67.7%	99.5%	72.4%	42.3%	93.8%	78.5%	15.0%	94.2%	92.1%	92.8%	7.2%	53.7%

Treatment	Brunei Darussalam	Bulgaria	Burundi	Cambodia	Cameroon	Cape Verde	Cayman Is	Chile	China	China, Hong Kong SAR	China, Macao SAR	China, Taiwan Province of	Colombia	Congo	Congo (DROC)
The Developing Country preferential rate	100,821,653	4,997,667			159,213		209	26,982,723	5,103,425,746		2,615,937		10,593,090	72,512	
The DC preferential rate of duty has been claimed - historical			221	1,468,208		414									16,818
The Forum Island Country preferential rate															
The special rate for the specific country										350,505,405		1,257,296,158			
Subtotal preferential	100,821,653	4,997,667	221	1,468,208	159,213	414	209	26,982,723	5,103,425,746	350,505,405	2,615,937	1,257,296,158	10,593,090	72,512	16,818
The special rate that applies has not been claimed and the general rate of duty has been used	181,831,460	1,298,979	57,031	147,149	6,183		11,589	21,112,868	1,842,395,158	360,913,407	1,304,583	555,117,504	3,051,813	79,366	937
No preferential rate of duty has been claimed	27,253,468	196,525		15,566				919,991	14,476,282	1,763,953	58,509	488,811	871,754	7,225	
Subtotal non preferential	209,084,929	1,495,504	57,031	162,715	6,183	0	11,589	22,032,859	1,856,871,440	362,677,360	1,363,092	555,606,316	3,923,567	86,591	937
Grand Total	309,906,582	6,493,171	57,252	1,630,923	165,396	414	11,798	49,015,582	6,960,301,186	713,182,765	3,979,029	1,812,902,473	14,516,657	159,103	177,55
Percentage of preferential imports in total	32.5%	77.0%	0.4%	90.0%	96.3%	100.0%	1.8%	55.0%	73.3%	49.1%	65.7%	69.4%	73.0%	45.6%	94.7%

Table 11. Australia: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002, continued

Share of Preferential Imports in Total Imports, By Country, US Dollars and Percentages

Treatment	Cook Is	Costa Rica	Côte d'Ivoire	Croatia	Cuba	Cyprus	Dominica	Dominican Rep.	East Timor	Ecuador	Egypt	El Salvador	Eritrea	Estonia	Ethiopia
The Developing Country preferential rate		3,767,306	6,317,456	5,335,996	3,247,615	1,087,791	14,676	1,723,846	27,019	1,455,398	13,326,939	343,672			
The DC preferential rate of duty has been claimed - historical	70 685												1,287		372,665
The Forum Island Country preferential rate	112 620														
The special rate for the specific country															
Subtotal preferential	183,305	3,767,306	6,317,456	5,335,996	3,247,615	1,087,791	14,676	1,723,846	27,019	1,455,398	13,326,939	343,672	1,287	0	372,665
The special rate that applies has not been claimed and the general rate of duty has been used	411,900	1,264,469	66,646	605,489	926,151	809,303	113,074	1,011,983	160,520	155,265	878,760	652,110	706		517,070
No preferential rate of duty has been claimed	1,468,385	2,431,001	4,432,505	44,684	392,860	473,041		102,768	203,686	89,913	709,965	5,537	396	1,044,778	
Subtotal non preferential	1,880,286	3,695,470	4,499,151	650,173	1,319,012	1,282,344	113,074	1,114,751	364,206	245,178	1,588,724	657,647	1,102	1,044,778	517,070
Grand Total	2,063,590	7,462,776	10,816,607	5,986,169	4,566,626	2,370,135	127,750	2,838,597	391,225	1,700,576	14,915,663	1,001,319	2,389	1,044,778	889,735
Percentage of preferential imports in total	8.9%	50.5%	58.4%	89.1%	71.1%	45.9%	11.5%	60.7%	6.9%	85.6%	89.3%	34.3%	53.9%	0.0%	41.9%

Treatment	Fiji	Gabon	Gambia	Ghana	Gibraltar	Grenada Is	Guam	Guatemala	Guinea	Guyana	Haiti	Honduras	India	Indonesia	Iran
The Developing Country preferential rate		11,764,437		2,355,924	40,046	5,101		1,576,411		15,284		2,040,364	391,213,657	1,005,368,902	9,928,652
The DC preferential rate of duty has been claimed - historical	1,859,850		10,937				4,660		3,848		16,672				
The Forum Island Country preferential rate	71,911,553														
The special rate for the specific country															
Subtotal preferential	73,771,403	11,764,437	10,937	2,355,924	40,046	5,101	4,660	1,576,411	3,848	15,284	16,672	2,040,364	391,213,657	1,005,368,902	9,928,652
The special rate that applies has not been claimed and the general rate of duty has been used	45,090,250	17,987,460		100,644	3,027		123,895	591,390	1,929	278,674	2,386	467,667	108,653,560	1,241,568,140	9,019,618
No preferential rate of duty has been claimed - historical	804,931			50,809		1,994	2,391	45,036			572		8,976,309	45,712,429	1,591,181
Subtotal non preferential	45,895,182	17,987,460		151,453	3,027	1,994	126,286	636,426	1,929	278,674	2,958	467,667	117,628,869	1,287,280,569	10,610,799
Grand Total	119,666,584	29,751,897	10,937	2,510,377	43,072	7,094	130,946	2,212,837	5,777	293,958	19,631	2,508,032	508,842,526	2,292,649,471	20,539,451
Percentage of preferential imports in total	61.6%	39.5%	100.0%	94.0%	93.0%	71.9%	3.6%	71.2%	68.6%	5.2%	84.9%	81.4%	76.9%	43.9%	48.3%

Table 11. Australia: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002, continued

Share of Preferential Imports in Total Imports, By Country, US Dollars and Percentages

Treatment	Iraq	Israel	Jamaica	Jordan	Kenya	Kiribati	Korea Dem. People's Rep. of	Kuwait	Laos P. Dem. Rep.	Lebanon	Macedonia	Madagascar	Malawi	Malaysia	Maldives
The Developing Country preferential rate		199,087,686	831,773	602,774	5,987,848		1,268,686	1,884,451		3,790,520	1,942,006			876,139,796	
The DC preferential rate of duty has been claimed - historical						24,049			72,817			214,443	1,232,908		
The Forum Island Country preferential rate						4,327								3,281,596	
The special rate for the specific country														881,421,391	0
Subtotal preferential	0	199,087,686	831,773	602,774	5,987,848	28,377	1,268,688	1,884,451	72,817	3,790,520	1,942,006	214,443	1,232,908	881,421,391	0
The special rate that applies has not been claimed and the general rate of duty has been used	19,865,160	59,045,793	2,198,219	309,927	3,724,658	45,095	8,604,914	88,356,715	240,135	354,986	66,823	603,005	2,420,723	1,173,736,473	33,482
No preferential rate of duty has been claimed - historical		40,882,500		257,501	2,451,328	51,906	1,841	3,107,236		12,585	3,190	191,666	669,558	68,661,729	
The DC non preferential	19,865,160	98,928,294	2,198,219	567,428	6,175,985	97,001	8,606,756	91,463,951	240,135	367,571	70,012	794,672	3,090,261	1,242,398,201	33,482
Grand Total	19,865,160	299,015,980	3,029,992	1,170,201	12,163,833	125,378	9,875,443	93,348,402	312,952	4,158,092	2,012,018	1,009,115	4,323,189	2,123,819,593	33,482
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	0.0%	66.6%	27.5%	51.5%	49.2%	22.5%	12.8%	2.0%	23.3%	91.2%	96.5%	21.3%	26.5%	41.5%	0.0%

Treatment	Mal	Malta	Marianas Northern	Marshall Islands	Mauritania	Mauritius	Mongolia	Montserrat Is	Morocco	Myanmar	Namibia	Nauru	Nepal	Neth. Antilles	New Caledonia
The Developing Country preferential rate		695,298				431,523	687	2,838	3,092,768					2,104,639	
The DC preferential rate of duty has been claimed - historical	29,151		76,435		677				5,120,316		1,320,955		941,986		182,952
The Forum Island Country preferential rate				17,216								1,903,317			
The special rate for the specific country															
Subtotal preferential	29,151	695,298	76,435	17,216	677	431,523	687	2,838	3,092,768	5,120,316	1,320,955	1,903,317	941,986	2,104,639	182,952
The special rate that applies has not been claimed and the general rate of duty has been used	286,115	1,394,693	8,830	18,037	2,557	2,746,121	102,962		2,530,583	3,536,341	2,454,126	19,355	433,623	7,577	25,685,341
No preferential rate of duty has been claimed	353,724	472,793	8,944	2,709	7,868	140,948			9,388,401	1,213,696	1,159,242	14,205	55,555		529,030
The DC non preferential	639,839	1,867,486	17,774	20,746	10,425	2,887,069	102,962	0	11,918,984	4,750,037	3,613,368	33,561	489,178	7,577	26,214,371
Grand Total	668,990	2,562,784	94,209	37,962	11,102	3,318,592	103,649	2,838	15,011,751	9,870,353	4,934,323	1,936,878	1,431,163	2,112,215	26,397,323
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	4.4%	27.1%	81.1%	45.4%	6.1%	13.0%	0.7%	100.0%	20.6%	51.9%	26.8%	98.3%	65.8%	99.6%	0.7%

Table 11. Australia: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002, continued

Share of Preferential Imports in Total Imports, By Country, US Dollars and Percentages

Treatment	Nicaragua	Niger	Nigeria	Niue	Oman	Pakistan	Panama	Papua New Guinea	Peru	Philippines	Qatar	Romania	Rwanda	Saint Kitts/Nevis	Saint Lucia Is
The Developing Country preferential rate	730,445				1,177,200	73,393,342	88,969		14,873,480	232,804,326	33,196,141	4,192,769		3,400	2,207
The DC preferential rate of duty has been claimed - historical		2,668													
The Forum Island Country preferential rate				61.4				260,739,335					33,199		
The special rate for the specific country															
Subtotal preferential	730,445	2,668	12,520	61.4	1,177,200	73,393,342	88,969	260,739,335	14,873,480	232,804,326	33,196,141	4,192,769	33,199	3,400	2,207
The special rate that applies has not been claimed and the general rate of duty has been used	218,190	12,739	2,456		35,471	36,228,646	49,489	379,503,426	4,395,077	181,428,514	61,122,179	3,115,086			
No preferential rate of duty has been claimed		137,039			76,909	405,678	14,691	24,497,271	20,569,429	4,590,260	13,077,612	295,095			
Subtotal non preferential	218,190	149,777	2,456	0	112,380	36,634,324	64,191	404,000,698	24,954,507	186,018,773	74,199,791	3,410,180	33,056	0	0
Grand Total	948,635	152,446	14,976	61.4	1,289,581	110,027,666	153,159	664,740,033	39,827,986	418,823,099	107,395,932	7,602,950	66,255	3,400	2,207
Percentage of preferential imports in total	77.0%	1.8%	83.6%	100.0%	91.3%	66.7%	58.1%	38.2%	37.3%	55.6%	30.9%	55.1%	50.1%	100.0%	100.0%

Treatment	Saint Vincent/Gren.	Samoa	Saudi Arabia	Senegal	Seychelles	Sierra Leone	Singapore	Slovenia	Solomon Is	Somalia	Sri Lanka	Sudan	Surinam	Swaziland	Syrian Arab Rep.
The Developing Country preferential rate	236		384,812,688		344,471			20,765,663			37,924,784		2,608	18,199,470	395,044
The DC preferential rate of duty has been claimed - historical		77,966		7,386		1,414			236,921	384		5,935			
The Forum Island Country preferential rate		45,073,317							363,633						
The special rate for the specific country							1,015,505,661								
Subtotal preferential	236	45,151,283	384,812,688	7,386	344,471	1,414	1,015,505,661	20,765,663	600,553	384	37,924,784	5,935	2,608	18,199,470	395,044
The special rate that applies has not been claimed and the general rate of duty has been used		1,420,999	221,699,998	158,995	343,244	8,006	1,301,243,308	5,896,951	69,932	197	9,283,879	54,243	1,006	47,926	54,540
No preferential rate of duty has been claimed															
Subtotal non preferential	0	1,420,999	270,337,099	169,129	343,494	8,006	1,301,365,461	6,530,783	125,763	197	9,738,355	70,536	1,006	2,443	91,059
Grand Total	236	46,572,282	655,149,788	176,515	687,966	9,419	2,316,871,122	27,296,447	728,316	581	47,663,139	76,472	3,614	18,248,839	540,644
Percentage of preferential imports in total	100.0%	96.9%	58.7%	4.2%	50.1%	15.0%	43.8%	76.1%	82.7%	66.1%	79.6%	7.8%	72.2%	98.7%	73.1%

Table 11. Australia: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002, continued
Share of Preferential Imports in Total Imports, By Country, US Dollars and Percentages

Treatment	Tanzania	Thailand	Togo	Tokelau	Tonga	Trinidad and Tobago	Tunisia	Turkey	Tuvalu	Uganda	United Arab Emir	Uruguay	Vanuatu	Venezuela	Vietnam
The Developing Country preferential rate		947,940,140				651,803	1,317,515	88,722,695			20,892,175	3,342,493		1,287,951	620,519,381
The DC preferential rate of duty has been claimed - historical	1,096,232		2,056,589	1,190	98,623				5,837	4,512,003			74,112		
The Forum Island Country preferential rate					47,604				743				2,068,283		
The special rate for the specific country															
Subtotal preferential	1,096,232	947,940,140	2,056,589	1,190	146,227	651,803	1,317,515	88,722,695	6,580	4,512,003	20,892,175	3,342,493	2,142,395	1,287,951	620,519,381
The special rate that applies has not been claimed and the general rate of duty has been used	1,076,614	753,893,469	7,579,440	32,877	41,949	174,606	1,822,252	20,071,728		2,439,081	116,653,885	1,447,570	353,659	458,655	600,365,501
No preferential rate of duty has been claimed	1,556,212	10,359,769			170,464	68,338	44,990	1,153,619	1,467	802,070	69,898,049	92,867	46,036	2,243,486	16,388,374
Subtotal non preferential	2,632,827	764,253,238	7,579,440	32,877	212,414	242,944	1,867,242	21,225,347	1,467	3,241,150	186,551,934	1,540,437	399,695	2,702,141	616,753,875
Grand Total	3,729,059	1,712,193,378	9,636,029	34,068	358,641	894,747	3,184,757	109,948,042	8,048	7,753,154	207,444,109	4,882,930	2,542,090	3,990,092	1,237,273,256
Percentage of preferential imports in total	29.4%	55.4%	21.3%	3.5%	40.8%	72.8%	41.4%	80.7%	81.8%	58.2%	10.1%	68.5%	84.3%	32.3%	50.2%

Treatment	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Grand Total
The Developing Country preferential rate		2,162,611	10,580,166,019
The DC preferential rate of duty has been claimed - historical	266,739		31,903,291
The Forum Island Country preferential rate			121,503,227
The special rate for the specific country			2,887,328,154
Subtotal preferential	266,739	2,162,611	13,620,900,691
The special rate that applies has not been claimed and the general rate of duty has been used	65,069	2,345,137	9,673,329,519
No preferential rate of duty has been claimed	14,466	2,321,431	476,176,832
Subtotal non preferential	79,535	4,666,567	10,149,506,351
Grand Total	346,274	6,829,178	23,770,407,042
Percentage of preferential imports in total	77.0%	31.7%	57.3%

Source: ABS International Trade; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Table 12. Canada: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002

Share of Preferential Imports in Total Imports, By Country, US Dollars and Percentages

Treatment	Afghanistan	Algeria	Angola	Anguilla	Antarctica	Antigua Barbuda	Argentina	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Bahamas	Bahrain	Bangladesh	Barbados	Belarus
British Preferential Tariff												58 538 235		
Canada-Israel Agreement Tariff														
Chile Tariff										4 622 839			1 262 937	
Commonwealth Caribbean Countries Tariff														
Costa Rica Tariff														
General Tariff														
GSP	9 036	24 547					24 187 403	121 286		99 022	110 370	3 862 117	1 841 426	2 043 697
GSP LDC												2 351 651		
Mexican Tariff														
Mexican-United States Tariff														
United States Tariff														
Sub-Total	9 036	24 547	0	0	0	0	24 187 403	121 286	0	4 721 861	110 370	64 752 003	3 104 364	2 043 697
MFN	227 726	1 098 374 976	25 689	8 333	639	608 224	181 502 069	1 415 678	495 517	5 786 237	8 000 354	40 121 240	1 702 985	5 056 277
Grand Total	236 762	1 098 399 523	25 689	8 333	639	608 224	205 689 472	1 536 965	495 517	10 508 098	8 110 724	104 873 243	4 807 349	7 099 975
Percentage of Preferential Imports in Total	3.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.8	7.9	0.0	44.9	1.4	61.7	64.6	28.8

Treatment	Belize	Benin	Bermuda	Bhutan	Bolivia	Bosnia herzegovina	Botswana	Bouvet Island	Br. Virgin Is.	Brazil	Bri. Indian O. Ter	Brunei Darussalam	Bulgaria	Burkina Faso
British Preferential Tariff	469 533		20						6 115			2 803 043		
Canada-Israel Agreement Tariff														
Chile Tariff														
Commonwealth Caribbean Countries Tariff														
Costa Rica Tariff														
General Tariff	196 540		1 484											
GSP	252 732		96 681		278 363	240 262	3 012		48 600	251 938 748		2 245	9 173 471	1 794 8 417
GSP LDC														
Mexican Tariff														
Mexican-United States Tariff														
United States Tariff														
Sub-Total	918 805	0	98 185	0	278 363	240 262	3 012	0	54 715	253 025 438	0	2 805 288	9 173 471	10 211
MFN	3 148 028	1 780	2 325 833	3 802	8 825 376	1 467 905	557 977	1 202	264 532	959 719 964	71 928	1 138 944	35 041 893	12 057
Grand Total	4 066 833	1 780	2 424 018	3 802	9 103 738	1 708 167	560 988	1 202	319 247	1 212 745 402	71 928	3 944 232	44 215 365	22 268
Percentage of Preferential Imports in Total	22.6	0.0	4.1	0.0	3.1	14.1	0.5	0.0	17.1	20.9	0.0	71.1	20.7	45.9

Table 12. Canada: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002, continued

Treatment	Burundi	Cambodia	Cameroon	Cape Verde	Cayman Islands	Central Afric. Rep.	Chad	Chile	China People's Rep.	Christmas Is Aust	Cocos Islands	Colombia	Comoros	Congo
British Preferential Tariff								71,316,968						
Canada-Israel Agreement Tariff														
Chile Tariff														
Commonwealth Caribbean Countries Tariff														
Costa Rica Tariff														
General Tariff								7,458,054	3,572,672,069			11,711,332		9,189
GSP	5,698		123,730						8,730					
GSP LDC	1,139					90								
Mexican Tariff														
Mexican-United States Tariff														
United States Tariff														
Sub-Total	0	6,836	123,730	0	0	90	0	294	644,455	0	0	11,711,363	0	9,189
MFN	285,060	13,310,152	6,655,873	10,069	2,383,453	228,725	27,652	348,341,632	6,618,857,242	35,426	2,140	238,672,047	136,378	640,366
Grand Total	285,060	13,316,988	6,779,603	10,069	2,383,453	228,815	27,652	427,116,948	10,192,182,497	35,426	2,140	250,383,410	136,378	649,555
Percentage of Preferential Imports in Total	0.0	0.1	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	18.4	35.1	0.0	0.0	4.7	0.0	1.4

Treatment	Congo, D.R. (eZaire)	Cook Islands	Costa Rica	Côte d'Ivoire	Croatia	Cuba	Cyprus	Czech Republic	Djibouti	Dominica	Dominican Rep.	East Timor	Ecuador	Egypt
British Preferential Tariff														
Canada-Israel Agreement Tariff														
Chile Tariff														
Commonwealth Caribbean Countries Tariff														
Costa Rica Tariff			63,016											
General Tariff								2,723					642	
GSP		5,383	18,188,593	882,312	1,448,047	17,131,027	120,514	16,838,657	30,571	1,104	2,779,536		1,645,855	8,884,627
GSP LDC														
Mexican Tariff														
Mexican-United States Tariff														
United States Tariff														
Sub-Total	0	5,383	18,251,609	882,312	1,448,047	17,131,027	120,514	16,841,380	30,571	25,704	2,779,613	0	1,802,113	8,884,627
MFN	23,170	43,993	138,982,874	43,972,614	9,685,190	190,054,691	1,373,837	95,830,832	385,348	576,318	72,252,247	24,459	100,299,340	28,014,722
Grand Total	23,170	49,376	157,234,483	44,854,925	11,133,238	207,195,719	1,494,351	112,672,212	415,919	602,022	75,031,860	24,459	102,101,454	36,899,349
Percentage of Preferential Imports in Total	0.0	10.9	11.6	2.0	13.0	8.3	8.1	14.9	7.4	4.3	3.7	0.0	1.8	24.1

Table 12. Canada: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002, continued

Treatment	El Salvador	Equatorial Guinea	Eritrea	Estonia	Ethiopia	Falkland Islands	Fiji	French Polynesia	French S. Terr.	Gabon	Gambia	Georgia	Ghana	Gibraltar
British Preferential Tariff														
Canada-Israel Agreement Tariff														
Chile Tariff														
Commonwealth Caribbean Countries Tariff														
Costa Rica Tariff														
General Tariff	55,834			1,280,414	436,918 15,107		2,465,431	22,695	509	157		13,032	348,063	
GSP							269							
GSP LDC														
Mexican Tariff														
Mexican-United States Tariff														
United States Tariff														
Sub-Total	55,834	0	0	1,280,414	452,025	0	2,534,279	22,695	509	157	0	13,032	348,063	0
MFN	34,942,633	187,164,697	46,350	34,365,889	3,442,360	3,464	1,276,487	1,742,242	3	1,662,833	28,359	439,165	26,054,423	14,588
Grand Total	34,998,467	187,164,697	46,350	35,646,303	3,894,385	3,464	3,810,766	1,764,937	512	1,662,991	28,359	452,197	26,402,486	14,588
Percentage of Preferential Imports in Total	0.2	0.0	0.0	3.6	11.6	0.0	66.5	1.3	99.4	0.0	0.0	2.9	1.3	0.0

68,579

323,670

182,334,253

Treatment	Grenada	Guam	Guatemala	Guinea	Guinea-Bissau	Guyana	Haiti	Heard/McDonald Is	Honduras	Hong Kong	Hungary	India	Indonesia	Iran, Islamic Rep.
British Preferential Tariff														
Canada-Israel Agreement Tariff														
Chile Tariff														
Commonwealth Caribbean Countries Tariff														
Costa Rica Tariff														
General Tariff	843		20,114,777	191		1,688,943	27,408 1,778,053		6,701,516	80,447,541	7,420,199	167,248,409	124,838,041	12,839,031
GSP														
GSP LDC														
Mexican Tariff														
Mexican-United States Tariff														
United States Tariff														
Sub-Total	843	0	20,123,362	191	0	2,339,244	1,805,461	0	6,701,516	80,447,541	7,420,199	349,582,662	124,838,041	12,839,031
MFN	940,219	839,671	71,728,795	25,932,407	1,670	141,289,566	4,966,903	139,793	75,168,642	549,403,070	99,088,339	495,609,754	489,165,975	22,122,690
Grand Total	941,062	839,671	91,852,157	25,932,598	1,670	143,628,810	6,772,364	139,793	81,870,157	629,850,611	106,508,537	845,192,416	614,004,016	34,961,721
Percentage of Preferential Imports in Total	0.1	0.0	21.9	0.0	0.0	1.6	26.7	0.0	8.2	12.8	7.0	41.4	20.3	36.7

Table 12. Canada: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002, continued

Treatment	Iraq	Israel	Jamaica	Jordan	Kazakhstan	Kenya	Kiribati	Korea, South	Kuwait	Kyrgyzstan	Laos P. Dem. Rep.	Latvia	Lebanon	Lesotho
British Preferential Tariff		93,769,224				2,232								69,468
Canada-Israel Agreement Tariff														
Chile Tariff														
Commonwealth Caribbean Countries Tariff			7,684,341											
Costa Rica Tariff						43		1,081						
General Tariff		2,348,373	5,116,291	209,321		601,434		359,570,410	11,324	26,578	17,492 51,672	2,066,778	2,794,473	1,755
GSP														
GSP LDC														
Mexican Tariff														
Mexican-United States Tariff														
United States Tariff														
Sub-Total	0	96,119,189	12,800,632	209,321	0	603,710	0	359,572,442	11,324	26,578	69,163	2,066,778	2,794,473	71,223
MFN		694,455,730	304,928,314	159,864,051	2,406,468	6,812,363	2,654	2,730,935,196	15,661,565	29,270	2,089,874	6,306,928	2,471,837	3,237,645
Grand Total	694,455,730	401,047,503	172,664,683	2,615,789	6,812,363	7,918,685	2,654	3,090,507,638	15,672,890	55,849	2,159,037	8,373,707	5,266,311	3,308,868
Percentage of Preferential Imports in Total	0.0	24.0	7.4	8.0	0.0	7.6	0.0	11.6	0.1	47.6	3.2	24.7	53.1	2.2

Treatment	Liberia	Lithuania	Macau	Macedonia	Madagascar	Malawi	Malaysia	Maldives	Mali	Malta	Mauritania	Mauritius	Mexico	Moldova
British Preferential Tariff							25,207,461			2,926		1,503,277		
Canada-Israel Agreement Tariff														
Chile Tariff														
Commonwealth Caribbean Countries Tariff														
Costa Rica Tariff														
General Tariff		4,567,116	5,177,828	31,591	202,478 2,231	25,342	132,794,611	87 122,247	231,513 3,339	963,640	244,027	294,671	1,791 2,318,010	5,155
GSP														
GSP LDC													3,192,366,325 474,882,625	
Mexican Tariff														
Mexican-United States Tariff														
United States Tariff														
Sub-Total	0	4,567,116	5,178,743	31,591	204,710	25,342	158,009,723	122,333	234,852	966,566	244,027	1,823,939	3,695,433,854	5,155
MFN		1,202,238	10,421,826	53,164,546	2,736,334	3,034,617	1,047,106	1,128,837,412	1,756,481	7,544,585	122,308	6,938,295	4,416,954,954	2,379,535
Grand Total	1,202,238	14,988,941	58,343,289	2,767,924	3,239,326	1,072,448	1,286,847,135	1,772,395	1,991,333	8,511,151	366,335	8,762,234	8,112,388,808	2,384,690
Percentage of Preferential Imports in Total	0.0	30.5	8.9	1.1	6.3	2.4	12.3	6.9	11.8	11.4	66.6	20.8	45.6	0.2

Table 12. Canada: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002, continued

Treatment	Mongolia	Montserrat	Morocco	Mozambique	Namibia	Nauru	Nepal	Neth. Antilles	New Caledonia	Nicaragua	Niger	Nigeria	Niue	Norfolk Island
British Preferential Tariff														
Canada-Israel Agreement Tariff														
Chile Tariff														
Commonwealth Caribbean Countries Tariff														
Costa Rica Tariff														
General Tariff	1,695		2,097,382		3,603	296	1,433,186	4,591	11,991	60,663	21,873	39,691		
GSP							1,554,499							
GSP LDC														
Mexican Tariff														
Mexican-United States Tariff														
United States Tariff														
Sub-Total	1,695	0	2,097,382	0	3,603	296	2,987,685	4,591	11,991	60,663	21,873	40,326	0	0
MFN	6,357,571	170,438	52,952,435	111,241	12,790,633	52,926	2,638,575	896,252	212,204	28,904,131	887,602	129,329,199	18,469	600
Grand Total	6,359,266	170,438	55,049,816	111,241	12,794,236	53,222	5,626,260	900,843	224,195	28,964,794	909,475	129,369,525	18,469	600
Percentage of Preferential Imports in Total	0.0	0.0	3.8	0.0	0.0	0.6	53.1	0.5	5.3	0.2	2.4	0.0	0.0	0.0

Treatment	Pakistan	Panama	Papua New Guinea	Paraguay	Peru	Philippines	Pitcairn Island	Poland	Qatar	Romania	Russia	Rwanda	Saint Kitts/Nevis	Saint Lucia
British Preferential Tariff														
Canada-Israel Agreement Tariff														
Chile Tariff														
Commonwealth Caribbean Countries Tariff														
Costa Rica Tariff														
General Tariff	30,249,941	3,913,612		837,746	59,629,132	49,547,759		48,796,220		14,902,751	26,241,589		2,949	39,139
GSP														
GSP LDC														
Mexican Tariff														
Mexican-United States Tariff														
United States Tariff														
Sub-Total	166,596	3,913,612	0	855,072	59,629,132	49,547,759	0	48,796,220	0	14,902,751	26,246,050	0	2,949	39,374
MFN	74,606,431	3,829,892	636,497	5,849,046	127,184,796	659,735,510	51,762	148,018,242	309,143	66,362,793	215,474,763	525,810	4,749,958	222,621
Grand Total	184,369,650	7,743,505	636,497	6,704,118	186,813,928	709,283,269	51,762	196,814,462	309,143	81,265,544	241,720,813	525,810	4,752,907	261,994
Percentage of Preferential Imports in Total	40.5	50.5	0.0	12.8	31.9	7.0	0.0	24.8	0.0	18.3	10.9	0.0	0.1	15.0

Table 12. Canada: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002, continued

Treatment	Saint Vincent/Gren.	Samoa, American	Sao Tome/Princip	Senegal	Seychelles	Sierra Leone	Singapore	Slovakia	Slovenia	Solomon Islands	Somalia	South Africa	Sri Lanka	St-Helena
							6,836,309						19,005,481	
British Preferential Tariff														
Canada-Israel Agreement Tariff														
Chile Tariff														
Commonwealth Caribbean Countries Tariff														
Costa Rica Tariff														
General Tariff														
GSP				186,362		318,217	19,810,411	8,825,456	11,482,968		73,805	35,519,598	16,360,276	
GSP LDC														
Mexican Tariff														
Mexican-United States Tariff														
United States Tariff														
Sub-Total	0	0	0	186,362	0	318,217	26,646,720	8,825,456	11,482,968	0	73,805	35,519,598	35,375,422	0
MFN	394,447	252,239	869,377	481,556	177,177	1,255,728	603,188,477	26,893,717	24,255,999	35,529	125,940	275,777,709	35,454,851	119,377
Grand Total	394,447	252,239	869,377	667,919	177,177	1,573,946	629,835,197	35,719,173	35,738,967	35,529	199,746	311,297,307	70,830,273	119,377
Percentage of Preferential Imports in Total	0.0	0.0	0.0	27.9	0.0	20.2	4.2	24.7	32.1	0.0	36.9	11.4	49.9	0.0

Treatment	Sudan	Surinam	Swaziland	Syrian Arab Rep.	Tajikistan	Tanzania, Un. Rep.	Thailand	Togo	Tonga	Trinidad and Tobago	Tunisia	Turkey	Turkmenistan	Turks/Caicos Is.
			15,555							2,094				
British Preferential Tariff														
Canada-Israel Agreement Tariff														
Chile Tariff														
Commonwealth Caribbean Countries Tariff														
Costa Rica Tariff														
General Tariff														
GSP		632	5,712	649,490		6,360	321,100,792	30,543		4,270,103	687,447	61,623,912	9,962	
GSP LDC						1,891		11,924						
Mexican Tariff														
Mexican-United States Tariff														
United States Tariff														
Sub-Total	0	632	21,267	649,490	0	100,433	321,110,699	42,467	0	87,721,510	687,447	61,624,615	9,962	178,513
MFN	153,919	29,825,392	1,482,915	31,143,447	241,257	2,182,390	809,987,042	399,702	19,195	18,519,906	10,308,012	193,620,985	7,703,493	1,317,139
Grand Total	153,919	29,826,024	1,504,182	31,792,937	241,257	2,282,823	1,131,097,741	442,169	19,195	106,241,417	10,995,459	255,245,599	7,713,455	1,495,652
Percentage of Preferential Imports in Total	0.0	0.0	1.4	2.0	0.0	4.4	28.4	9.6	0.0	82.6	6.3	24.1	0.1	11.9

Table 12. Canada: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002, continued

Treatment	Uganda	Ukraine	United Arab Emir.	Uruguay	Uzbekistan	Vanuatu	Venezuela	Vietnam	Western Sahara	Western Samoa	Yemen	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Grand Total
British Preferential Tariff														341,378,144
Canada-Israel Agreement Tariff														93,769,224
Chile Tariff														71,316,968
Commonwealth Caribbean Countries Tariff														97,789,286
Costa Rica Tariff														63,016
General Tariff														18,284
GSP	19,001	2,168,662	3,118,784	8,078,456	98,026		12,710,263	39,320,530		11,771	5,828	2,908,718	5,686,961,901	5,979,738
GSP LDC											3,673			3,192,370,109
Mexican Tariff														474,882,625
Mexican-United States Tariff														28,094,334
United States Tariff														9,992,623,629
Sub-Total	19,001	2,168,662	3,118,784	8,078,456	98,026	0	12,710,263	39,320,530	0	11,771	0	9,502	2,908,718	9,992,623,629
MFN	385,301	52,073,302	14,618,740	22,466,202	5,056,152	19,825	772,005,729	141,737,845	229	74,883	77,172	933,977	3,213,723	26,775,787,496
Grand Total	404,302	54,241,964	17,737,524	30,544,657	5,154,178	19,825	784,715,991	181,058,374	229	86,654	77,172	943,478	6,122,441	36,768,411,125
Percentage of Preferential Imports in Total	4.7	4.0	17.6	26.4	1.9	0.0	1.6	21.7	0.0	13.6	0.0	1.0	47.5	27.2

Source: Canadian Department of Finance; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Table 13. European Union: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002
Share of Preferential Imports in Total Imports, By Country. US Dollars and Percentages

Description	Afghanistan	Albania	Algeria	Andorra	Angola	Argentina	Armenia	Aruba	Azerbaijan	Bahamas
PREF	5,509,561	285,807,796	2,157,847,519	35,044,538	62,165,481	2,738,062,308	21,988,467	84,999,935	198,069,397	428,391,912
MFN	15,142,614	46,252,616	8,053,749,009	17,625,323	2,049,676,849	3,129,420,963	99,082,477	6,998,459	864,365,723	6,057,834
Grand Total	20,646,175	332,060,412	10,211,596,528	52,669,861	2,111,842,330	5,867,483,271	121,050,944	91,998,394	1,062,435,120	434,449,746
Percentage of preferential imports in total	26.7%	86.1%	21.1%	66.5%	2.9%	99.6%	46.7%	92.4%	18.6%	98.6%

Description	Bahrain	Bangladesh	Barbados	Belarus	Belize	Benin	Bhutan	Bolivia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Botswana	Br. Aml. Terr.
PREF	295,711,009	3,158,883,064	36,740,551	590,984,163	57,796,306	24,616,339	1,044,327	24,243,455	437,149,818	69,553,851	365,764
MFN	27,740,526	47,196,261	22,893,130	192,432,144	1,250,251	23,268,911	538,825	67,913,284	135,195,694	1,523,774,624	79,219
Grand Total	323,451,535	3,206,079,325	59,633,681	783,416,307	59,046,557	47,885,250	1,583,152	92,156,739	572,345,512	1,593,328,475	444,983
Percentage of preferential imports in total	91.4%	98.5%	61.6%	75.4%	97.9%	51.4%	66.0%	26.3%	76.4%	4.4%	82.2%

Description	Brazil	British Indian Ocean Ter.	British Virgin Islands	Brunei	Bulgaria	Burkina Faso	Burundi	Cambodia	Cameroon	Cape Verde	Cayman Islands	Central African Republic
PREF	7,121,044,352	370,397	37,650,164	44,734,825	2,521,567,732	23,539,242	1,483,252	481,045,664	539,835,605	15,360,363	179,257,619	11,707,710
MFN	8,768,890,406	10,762	18,021,733	24,532,615	739,479,014	27,313,968	16,170,986	3,610,100	932,732,098	379,950	932,353	156,632,017
Grand Total	15,889,934,758	381,159	55,671,897	69,267,440	3,261,046,746	50,853,210	17,654,238	484,655,764	1,472,567,703	15,740,313	180,189,972	168,539,727
Percentage of preferential imports in total	44.8%	97.2%	67.6%	64.6%	77.3%	46.3%	8.4%	99.3%	36.7%	97.6%	99.5%	6.9%

Description	Chad	Chile	China	Christmas Island	Cocos (Keeling) Islands	Colombia	Comoros	"Congo, Dem. Rep."	"Congo, Rep."	Cook Islands	Costa Rica	Cote d'Ivoire
PREF	4,387,248	1,527,630,887	55,015,276,643	179,504	124,310	941,165,094	48,133,580	20,159,350	73,240,432	302,623	1,014,343,761	1,115,834,941
MFN	377,982,037	2,701,951,628	18,711,349,945	59,686	20,219	1,376,136,157	595,596	1,113,733,729	391,215,796	18,028	665,541,522	1,286,510,868
Grand Total	42,179,285	4,229,582,715	73,726,626,588	239,190	144,529	2,219,301,251	48,729,138	1,133,893,079	464,456,228	320,651	1,679,885,283	2,404,345,829
Percentage of preferential imports in total	10.4%	36.1%	74.6%	75.0%	86.0%	37.9%	98.8%	1.8%	15.8%	94.4%	60.4%	46.4%

Table 13. European Union: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002, continued

Description	Croatia	Cuba	Cyprus	Djibouti	Dominica	Dominican Republic	East Timor	Ecuador	Egypt	El Salvador	Equatorial Guinea	Eritrea
PREF	1,589,896,882	275,517,061	478,857,253	2,367,946	22,968,062	241,584,848	0	913,176,929	1,919,262,365	21,261,229	30,434,091	4,987,199
MFN	416,656,364	86,508,460	131,388,236	1,953,782	6,375,342	133,285,841	3,061,453	196,452,321	1,062,943,242	85,297,647	652,221,834	693,112
Grand Total	2,006,553,246	362,025,521	610,245,489	4,321,728	29,343,404	374,870,689	3,061,453	1,109,631,250	2,982,205,607	106,558,876	682,655,925	5,680,311
Percentage of preferential imports in total	79.2%	76.1%	78.5%	54.8%	78.3%	64.4%	0.0%	82.3%	64.4%	20.0%	4.5%	87.8%

Description	Estonia	Ethiopia	Fiji	Gambia	Gabon	Georgia	Ghana	Gibraltar	Grenada	Guatemala	Guinea	Guinea Bissau
PREF	2,025,338,827	54,010,351	86,117,922	17,153,513	113,007,155	107,853,952	479,359,952	63,172,548	3,649,998	117,365,576	55,069,577	6,672,825
MFN	1,007,710,843	111,888,015	719,045	5,640,337	264,521,292	75,181,246	431,776,889	4,033,776	11,885,967	131,955,195	359,372,514	3,714,148
Grand Total	3,033,050,670	165,898,366	86,836,967	22,793,850	377,528,447	183,035,198	911,136,845	67,206,324	15,535,965	248,720,771	414,442,091	10,386,973
Percentage of preferential imports in total	66.8%	32.6%	99.2%	75.3%	29.9%	58.9%	52.6%	94.0%	23.5%	47.2%	13.3%	64.2%

Description	Guyana	Haiti	Honduras	Hong Kong, China	India	Indonesia	Iraq	Iran	Israel	Jamaica	Jordan	Kazakhstan
PREF	147,629,149	8,968,154	122,193,457	487,666,387	9,866,385,382	7,150,643,546	182,910	677,044,445	3,881,909,952	432,893,671	63,095,444	304,300,543
MFN	27,880,147	5,112,085	156,282,766	15,174,346,177	2,670,405,422	2,384,370,906	2,514,798,689	4,248,121,808	4,215,684,187	7,719,147	57,225,363	3,009,380,673
Grand Total	175,509,296	14,080,239	278,476,223	15,662,012,564	12,536,770,804	10,115,014,452	2,514,981,599	4,925,166,253	8,096,604,039	440,628,818	120,321,807	3,313,681,216
Percentage of preferential imports in total	84.1%	63.7%	43.9%	3.1%	78.7%	70.7%	0.0%	13.7%	47.9%	98.2%	52.4%	9.2%

Description	Kenya	Kiribati	Korea, Dem. Rep	Kuwait	Kyrgyz Republic	Laos PDR	Latvia	Lebanon	Lesotho	Liberia	Libya	Lithuania
PREF	556,322,027	987,975	52,018	584,688,058	3,177,039	120,935,603	1,123,323,022	107,539,712	3,931,373	354,345,957	1,577,205,932	2,015,070,423
MFN	220,490,399	280,096	66,608,792	1,045,389,137	14,170,053	10,428,451	956,625,952	69,029,693	42,767	82,206,367	7,290,803,731	622,749,019
Grand Total	776,812,426	1,278,071	66,660,810	1,630,077,195	17,347,092	131,364,054	2,079,948,974	176,569,405	3,974,140	436,552,324	8,868,009,663	2,637,819,442
Percentage of preferential imports in total	71.6%	78.1%	0.1%	35.9%	18.3%	92.1%	54.0%	60.9%	98.9%	81.2%	17.8%	76.4%

Table 13. European Union: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002, continued

Description	Macao	Macedonia	Madagascar	Malawi	Malaysia	Maldives	Mali	Malta	Marshall Islands	Mauritania	Mauritius	Mayotte
PREF	570,929,272	459,153,951	444,866,553	137,395,173	5,437,476,952	21,184,039	12,012,271	659,895,349	92,749,910	134,994,269	1,095,418,929	22,426
MFN	18,939,128	67,378,907	36,508,509	15,933,607	7,257,556,638	175,723	54,891,258	406,208,691	5,787,070	261,328,687	84,011,612	797,540
Grand Total	589,768,400	526,532,758	481,374,862	153,299,780	12,695,033,490	21,339,762	66,903,529	1,066,093,040	98,536,880	396,322,956	1,169,430,541	809,966
Percentage of preferential imports in total	96.8%	87.2%	92.4%	89.6%	42.8%	99.2%	18.0%	61.9%	94.1%	34.1%	92.8%	2.8%

Description	Micronesia, Fed. Sts	Moldova	Monaco	Mongolia	Montserrat	Morocco	Mozambique	Myanmar	Namibia	Nauru	Nepal	Netherlands Antilles
PREF	181,919	209,655,019	35,503	7,362,382	323,898	5,526,267,679	626,108,823	348,405,569	306,175,138	2,021,300	86,769,375	112,068,415
MFN	472,632	49,088,681	4,820,186	16,348,861	204,829	608,687,854	20,608,177	34,751,178	291,374,932	1,794,384	2,346,365	20,670,865
Grand Total	654,551	257,743,700	4,855,689	23,711,243	528,727	6,134,955,533	646,717,000	383,156,747	597,550,070	3,815,684	89,115,740	132,739,280
Percentage of preferential imports in total	27.8%	81.3%	0.7%	31.1%	61.3%	90.1%	96.8%	90.9%	51.2%	53.0%	97.4%	84.4%

Description	New Caledonia	Nicaragua	Niger	Nigeria	Niue	Norfolk Island	Northern Mariana Islands	Occ. Pal. Terr	Onan	Pakistan	Palau	Panama
PREF	12,163,540	27,866,133	5,839,440	360,640,651	106,566	161,896	663,866	118,323	139,630,605	2,699,741,800	2,766	527,829,014
MFN	179,375,675	50,074,617	72,095,145	4,223,695,702	39,352	18,704	36,322	6,723,667	269,090,579	129,595,073	19,025	36,406,721
Grand Total	191,539,215	77,940,750	77,874,585	4,584,336,353	145,918	180,600	700,188	6,841,990	407,691,184	2,829,336,873	20,791	564,235,735
Percentage of preferential imports in total	6.4%	35.8%	7.5%	7.9%	73.0%	89.6%	94.8%	1.7%	34.2%	95.4%	13.3%	93.5%

Description	Papua New Guinea	Paraguay	Peru	Philippines	Plcainm	Qatar	Romania	Russian Federation	Rvandia	Saint Helena	Samoa	Sao Tome and Principe
PREF	161,619,028	63,802,693	460,871,437	1,759,603,591	642,398	80,016,333	8531,532,018	9,629,090,408	1,393,922	1,894,314	2,645,730	1,818,245
MFN	85,570,194	80,795,412	872,542,123	3,942,725,375	416,929	233,025,310	11,691,133,867	26,676,735,959	19,040,394	2,835,911	212,930	4,662,110
Grand Total	247,189,222	144,598,105	1,323,413,560	5,702,328,966	1,059,327	313,041,643	9,700,665,885	36,305,826,347	19,434,316	4,730,225	2,859,660	6,480,355
Percentage of preferential imports in total	65.4%	44.1%	34.1%	30.9%	60.6%	25.6%	87.9%	26.5%	7.2%	40.0%	92.5%	28.1%

Table 13. European Union: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002, continued

Description	Saudi Arabia	Senegal	Seychelles	Sierra Leone	Singapore	Slovenia	Solomon Islands	Somalia	South Africa	Sri Lanka	St. Kitts and Nevis	St. Lucia
PREF	2,111,726,177	320,666,962	223,775,276	64,933,932	4,057,515,366	5,240,439,637	2,392,176	1,697,946	5,987,066,742	1,147,176,417	12,043,832	35,662,709
MFN	6,246,726,363	61,170,389	10,461,006	64,474,826	8,697,053,487	730,662,449	520,843	1,183,591	7,010,038,187	293,151,593	757,896	279,167
Grand Total	10,358,454,540	381,837,351	249,256,284	129,408,560	12,754,568,853	5,971,091,986	2,913,019	2,881,537	12,997,074,929	1,440,328,000	12,801,720	35,931,876
Percentage of preferential imports in total	20.4%	84.0%	93.4%	50.2%	31.8%	87.8%	82.1%	58.9%	46.1%	79.6%	94.1%	99.2%
Description	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	Sudan	Suriname	Swaziland	Syrian Arab Republic	Taiwan, China	Tajikistan	Tanzania	Thailand	Togo	Tokelau	Tonga
PREF	118,325,609	43,180,755	86,537,062	110,688,175	421,494,918	58,736,624	19,650,931	186,322,334	7,470,150,924	26,803,840	11,122,734	2,102,986
MFN	675,591	129,695,694	19,475,539	4,953,892	3,325,386,075	19,380,092,740	44,076,733	91,326,835	3,995,060,908	39,702,239	305,424	560,402
Grand Total	119,001,200	172,876,449	105,012,601	115,652,067	3,746,880,993	19,439,829,364	63,727,664	277,649,169	11,055,211,832	66,506,079	11,428,158	2,663,388
Percentage of preferential imports in total	99.4%	25.0%	82.4%	95.7%	11.2%	0.3%	30.8%	67.1%	67.6%	40.3%	97.3%	79.0%
Description	Trinidad and Tobago	Tunisia	Turkey	Turkmenistan	Turks and Caicos Isl.	Tuvalu	Uganda	Ukraine	United Arab Emirates	Uruguay	Us Msc. Pac.I	Uzbekistan
PREF	312,869,479	5,257,579,194	19,890,525,555	128,672,374	14,299,312	1,082,297	121,572,417	2,300,923,767	1,699,817,994	273,549,084	2,293,351	96,048,644
MFN	70,538,028	617,406,847	954,588,003	36,407,295	1,476,742	140,636	103,651,454	1,505,508,216	814,422,848	243,217,202	251,476	268,635,983
Grand Total	383,402,507	5,874,986,041	20,845,093,558	165,079,669	15,776,054	1,222,933	225,223,871	3,806,431,973	2,504,240,742	516,765,286	2,544,827	354,684,527
Percentage of preferential imports in total	81.6%	89.5%	95.4%	77.9%	90.6%	88.5%	54.0%	60.4%	67.5%	52.3%	90.1%	24.3%
Description	Vanuatu	Venezuela	Vietnam	Yemen	Yugoslavia	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Grand Total				
PREF	2,729,411	725,657,145	3,824,572,101	34,214,629	1,054,593,915	68,157,894	455,204,948	224,610,642,277				
MFN	1,219,171	1,839,658,077	619,281,904	13,591,277	139,289,151	17,620,164	103,199,865	210,331,603,591				
Grand Total	3,948,582	2,565,315,222	4,443,854,005	47,805,906	1,193,883,066	85,778,148	558,404,813	434,942,245,868				
Percentage of preferential imports in total	69.1%	28.3%	86.1%	71.6%	88.3%	79.5%	81.5%	51.6%				

Source: WITS TRAINS database; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Table 14. Japan: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002
Share of Preferential Imports in Total Imports, By Country. US Dollars and Percentages

Description	Afghanistan	Albania	Algeria	Andorra	Angola	Anguilla	Antigua and Barbuda	Argentina	Armenia	Azerbaijan
PREF	6,892	103,391	22,902,517		2,513,836	2,974		37,299,182		
MFN	1,596,505	403,284	15,816,861	64,584	391,925,974	1,759	77,975	398,119,259	2,749,960	694,511
Grand Total	1,603,397	506,675	38,719,378	64,584	394,439,810	4,733	77,975	435,418,441	2,749,960	694,511
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	0.4%	20.4%	59.2%	0.0%	0.6%	62.8%	0.0%	8.6%	0.0%	0.0%

Description	Bahamas	Bahrain	Bangladesh	Barbados	Belarus	Belize	Benin	Bermuda	Bhutan	Bolivia
PREF	17,565	83,843,484	62,444,420		201,203	177,770			23,977	773,940
MFN	1,912,843	75,024,922	49,318,969	387,972	5,140,259	7,522,782	170,773	445,177	15,974	38,473,614
Grand Total	1,930,408	158,868,406	111,763,389	387,972	5,341,462	7,700,552	170,773	445,177	39,951	39,247,554
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	0.9%	52.8%	55.9%	0.0%	3.8%	2.3%	0.0%	0.0%	60.0%	2.0%

Description	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Botswana	Br. Antr. Terr	Brazil	British Virgin Islands	Brunei	Bulgaria	Burkina Faso	Burundi	Cambodia
PREF	103,552			282,570,146		14,360,540	3,871,404	52,222	14,655	72,755,711
MFN	261,324	424,606	2,526	2,349,505,032	48,234	1,504,458,735	16,812,642	8,377,400	254,969	1,707,787
Grand Total	364,876	424,606	2,526	2,632,075,178	48,234	1,518,819,275	20,684,046	8,429,622	269,624	74,463,498
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	28.4%	0.0%	0.0%	10.7%	0.0%	0.9%	18.7%	0.6%	5.4%	97.7%

Description	Cameroon	Cape Verde	Cayman Islands	Central African Republic	Chad	Chile	China	Cocos Islands	Colombia	Comoros
PREF	340,185	18,652		60,226		284,697,037	15,193,584,832		35,956,258	
MFN	4,381,171	4,781	108,900	1,015,540	77,072	1,861,125,696	46,154,557,694	22,339	190,716,222	977,669
Grand Total	4,721,356	23,433	108,900	1,075,766	77,072	2,145,822,733	61,348,142,526	22,339	226,672,480	977,669
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	7.2%	79.6%	0.0%	5.6%	0.0%	13.3%	24.8%	0.0%	15.9%	0.0%

Table 14. Japan: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002, continued

Description	Congo, Dem. Rep.	Congo, Rep.	Cook Islands	Costa Rica	Cote d'Ivoire	Croatia	Cuba	Cyprus	Djibouti	Dominica
PREF	2,546,112	389,612	441,125	8,728,453	741,025	2,309,965	158,420	306,407		800,971
MFN	28,579,919	78,937,593	2,395,535	125,817,197	10,933,667	56,801,662	28,013,305	2,412,013	4,461	414,413
Grand Total	31,126,031	79,327,205	2,836,660	134,545,650	11,674,692	59,111,627	28,171,725	2,718,420	4,461	1,215,384
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	8.2%	0.5%	15.6%	6.5%	6.3%	3.9%	0.8%	11.3%	0.0%	65.9%

Description	Dominican Republic	East Timor	Ecuador	Egypt	El Salvador	Equatorial Guinea	Eritrea	Estonia	Ethiopia	Fiji
PREF	18,380,952		87,002,767	42,087,001	405,291		7,036	5,001,928		203,737
MFN	16,603,212	46,531	94,580,891	26,013,907	12,091,569	47,849,667	162,260	11,357,469	41,441,306	45,696,877
Grand Total	34,984,164	46,531	181,583,658	68,110,908	12,496,860	47,849,667	169,296	16,359,397	42,018,026	45,900,614
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	52.5%	0.0%	47.9%	61.8%	3.2%	0.0%	4.2%	30.6%	1.4%	0.4%

Description	Gabon	Gambia	Georgia	Ghana	Grenada	Guatemala	Guinea	Guyana	Haiti	Honduras
PREF	1,411,429	50,345	122,140	1,274,355		3,735,578	56,669	25,520	232,735	185,420
MFN	33,725,540	105,326	4,662,330	68,327,693	215,545	69,924,398	514,991	3,173,415	231,536	44,781,509
Grand Total	35,136,969	155,671	4,784,470	69,602,048	215,545	73,659,976	571,660	3,198,935	464,271	44,966,929
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	4.0%	32.3%	2.6%	1.8%	0.0%	5.1%	9.9%	0.8%	50.1%	0.4%

Description	Hong Kong, China	India	Indonesia	Iran	Iraq	Israel	Jamaica	Jordan	Kazakhstan	Kenya
PREF	177,393,094	534,992,045	2,182,629,336	46,868,240		115,978,351	1,116,814	18,636	93,334,550	9,082,441
MFN	1,008,682,800	1,552,806,331	11,886,452,373	4,689,824,230	110,966,171	635,995,477	32,292,885	81,460,881	5,341,691	17,799,473
Grand Total	1,186,075,894	2,087,798,376	14,069,081,709	4,736,692,470	110,966,171	751,973,828	33,409,699	81,479,517	98,676,241	26,881,914
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	15.0%	25.6%	15.5%	1.0%	0.0%	15.4%	3.3%	0.0%	94.6%	33.8%

Table 14. Japan: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002, continued

Description	Kiribati	Korea, Dem. Rep.	Kuwait	Kyrgyz Republic	Lao PDR	Latvia	Lebanon	Lesotho	Liberia	Libya
PREF		36,321	857,552,063	23,001	6,543,163	15,332,852	189,810	262,091		
MFN	20,023,469	234,649,971	3,348,608,441	9,810,368	149,378	2,187,135	4,485,311		59,020	6,280,911
Grand Total	20,023,469	234,686,292	4,206,160,504	9,833,369	6,692,541	17,519,987	4,655,121	262,091	59,020	6,280,911
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	0.0%	0.0%	20.4%	0.2%	97.8%	87.5%	4.1%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%

Description	Lithuania	Macao	Macedonia	Madagascar	Malawi	Malaysia	Maldives	Mali	Malta	Marshall Islands
PREF	4,461,337	202,643	126,624	1,894,475	3,403,463	1,417,521,863	687,067	119,304		92,710
MFN	13,208,197	19,626,775	6,853,227	33,368,859	22,410,313	9,487,858,397	16,955,428	411,551	47,354,836	5,012,768
Grand Total	17,669,534	19,829,418	6,979,851	35,263,334	25,813,776	10,905,380,260	17,642,495	530,855	47,354,836	5,105,478
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	25.2%	1.0%	1.8%	5.4%	13.2%	13.0%	3.9%	22.5%	0.0%	1.8%

Description	Mauritania	Mauritius	Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	Moldova	Mongolia	Montserrat	Morocco	Mozambique	Myanmar	Namibia
PREF	39,254,859	180,209	3,094	45,980	692,583		258,150,007	195,613	42,846,158	3,250,151
MFN	2,631,118	12,696,315	14,526,588	154,854	6,493,076	2,119	68,394,261	19,477,068	66,774,772	18,595,268
Grand Total	42,085,977	12,876,524	14,529,682	200,834	7,185,659	2,119	326,544,268	19,672,881	109,620,930	21,845,419
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	93.3%	1.4%	0.0%	22.9%	9.6%	0.0%	79.1%	1.0%	39.1%	14.9%

Description	Nauru	Nepal	Netherlands Antilles	New Caledonia	Nicaragua	Niger	Nigeria	Niue	Northern Mariana Islands	Oman
PREF		4,939,113	1,997,799	61,330,580	97,882	148,658	14,008,456		3,222	2,064,940
MFN	154,958	1,242,383	1,522,681	49,933,111	6,736,826	316,481	729,774,078	4,245	1,252,331	2,096,251,505
Grand Total	154,958	6,181,496	3,520,480	111,263,691	6,834,708	465,139	743,782,534	4,245	1,255,553	2,098,316,445
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	0.0%	79.9%	56.7%	55.1%	1.4%	32.0%	1.9%	0.0%	0.3%	0.1%

Table 14. Japan: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002, continued

Description	Pakistan	Palau	Panama	Papua New Guinea	Paraguay	Peru	Philippines	Pitcairn	Qatar	Romania
PREF	87 207 089	52 383	2 415 930	41 021 434	921 705	40 055 302	1 102 727 996		143 651 402	6 044 216
MFN	64 021 019	9 103 897	75 921 942	235 868 281	22 324 710	387 384 923	5 227 673 197	19 724	5 109 157 812	45 001 153
Grand Total	151 228 108	9 156 280	78 337 872	276 889 715	23 246 415	427 440 225	6 330 401 193	19 724	5 252 809 214	51 045 369
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	57.7%	0.8%	3.1%	14.8%	4.0%	9.4%	17.4%	0.0%	2.7%	11.8%

Description	Russian Federation	Rwanda	Saint Helena	Samoa	Saudi Arabia	Senegal	Seychelles	Sierra Leone	Singapore	Slovenia
PREF	3 274 711 915		57 420	255 592	571 535 864	8 863 073	10 593	1 623	711 770 114	3 410 504
MFN		9 098	3 499 261	71 971	11 024 152 383	2 435 382	21 959 395	849 156	3 796 835 034	23 888 807
Grand Total	3 274 711 915	9 098	3 556 681	327 563	11 595 688 247	11 298 455	21 969 988	850 779	4 508 605 148	27 299 311
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	78.0%	4.9%	78.4%	0.0%	0.2%	15.8%	12.5%

Description	Solomon Islands	Somalia	South Africa	Sri Lanka	St. Kitts and Nevis	St. Lucia	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	Sudan	Suriname	Swaziland
PREF	12 774 355		305 683 960	56 194 391		163 066		73 058	48 736	250 420
MFN	7 822 740	82 812	2 580 447 713	109 836 679	13 752		9 842	284 432 822	18 727 008	4 757 250
Grand Total	20 597 095	82 812	2 886 131 673	166 031 070	13 752	163 066	9 842	284 505 880	18 775 744	5 007 670
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	62.0%	0.0%	10.6%	33.8%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%	5.0%

Description	Syrian Arab Republic	Taiwan, China	Tajikistan	Tanzania	Thailand	Togo	Tokelau	Tonga	Trinidad and Tobago	Tunisia
PREF	6 478 518	1 866 665 191		3 621 951	2 123 281 240	11 609	6 148	146 277	639 623	1 007 146
MFN	14 525 884	11 030 715 601	1 820 661	101 620 241	7 886 910 236	142 926	41 238	11 521 577	1 730 453	21 783 980
Grand Total	21 004 402	12 897 380 792	1 820 661	105 242 192	10 010 191 476	154 535	47 386	11 667 854	2 370 076	22 791 126
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	30.8%	14.5%	0.0%	3.4%	21.2%	7.5%	13.0%	1.3%	27.0%	4.4%

Table 14. Japan: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002, continued

Description	Turkey	Turkmenistan	Uganda	Ukraine	United Arab Emirates	Uruguay	Uzbekistan	Vanuatu	Venezuela	Vietnam
PREF	62 867 064		23 417	14 972 330	595 650 126	5 122 965	3 023 493	1 294 534	1 677 016	690 745 980
MFN	103 247 073	875 796	14 556 801	132 053 418	10 991 222 701	46 794 348	70 796 620	3 062 077	114 418 868	1 823 631 112
Grand Total	166 114 137	875 796	14 580 218	147 025 748	11 586 872 827	51 917 313	73 820 113	4 356 611	116 095 884	2 514 377 092
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	37.8%	0.0%	0.2%	10.2%	5.1%	9.9%	4.1%	29.7%	1.4%	27.5%

Description	Western Sahara	Yemen	Yugoslavia	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Grand Total
PREF		36 163 126	59 770	37 166 980	77 983 694	30 798 758 506
MFN	7 107 955	39 287 653	1 801 564	29 044 501	47 454 334	155 165 758 034
Grand Total	7 107 955	75 450 779	1 861 334	66 211 481	125 438 028	185 964 516 540
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	0.0%	47.9%	3.2%	56.1%	62.2%	16.6%

Source: WITS TRAINS database; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Table 15. United States: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002, continued

Description	Colombia	Comoros	Congo	Congo (DROC)	Cook Is	Costa Rica	Côte d'Ivoire	Croatia	Czech Republic	Djibouti	Dominica	Dominican Rep.
AGOA			59,933,485				27,264,724					
AGOA 2												
Andean Act (ATPA)	276851607											
Andean Act (ATPDEA)	91696780											
CBI						658,050,639					373,558	895,187,580
CBTPA						478,011,249						1,783,021,868
Civil Aircraft	98950					2,030			2,979,726			11,119
Dyes									162,992			
GSP									299,012,315			
GSP LDC										23,035		
Israel	204,255,839		12,690	111,542,785	42,079	13,230,268	22,468,163	36,208,835			197,007	16,395,242
Jordan												
Pharmaceuticals					8,000			4,672,652	36,779,355			68,684
Puerto-Rico CBI						17,068						
West Bank and Gaza												
Subtotal	572,903,176	12,690	62,798,603	111,542,785	50,079	1,149,311,254	49,732,887	40,881,487	338,934,388	23,035	570,565	2,694,684,493
MFN	5,033,412,069	5,312,304	137,822,075	90,805,723	1,058,065	1,992,371,387	326,670,450	104,449,819	893,027,330	1,892,235	4,099,897	1,473,939,903
Grand Total	5,606,315,245	5,324,994	200,590,678	202,348,508	1,108,144	3,141,682,641	376,403,337	145,331,306	1,231,961,718	1,915,270	4,670,462	4,168,624,396
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	10.2%	0.2%	31.3%	55.1%	4.5%	36.583%	13.2%	28.1%	27.5%	1.2%	12.2%	64.6%

Description	Ecuador	Egypt	El Salvador	Equatorial Guinea	Eritrea	Estonia	Ethiopia	Fiji	Gabon	Gambia	Georgia	Ghana
AGOA							22,041		737,989,568			21,841,246
AGOA 2							1,297,077					324,155
Andean Act (ATPA)	85769421											
Andean Act (ATPDEA)	84045778											
CBI												
CBTPA												
Civil Aircraft		674										
Dyes												
GSP												
GSP LDC												
Israel	74,618,111	23,544,724	12,149,635	358,025,616	11,250	15,344,810	1,001,322	18,005,075		149,133	7,302,388	11,829,431
Jordan												
Pharmaceuticals												
Puerto-Rico CBI												
West Bank and Gaza												
Subtotal	244,433,984	23,682,403	1,156,286,264	358,025,616	11,250	15,419,235	2,320,440	18,005,075	738,138,701	24,017	7,302,388	33,994,832
MFN	1,901,406,138	1,328,243,456	826,108,524	162,399,161	357,680	148,120,448	23,338,548	138,316,984	853,890,504	320,847	10,186,954	82,332,631
Grand Total	2,145,840,122	1,351,925,859	1,982,394,788	520,424,777	368,930	163,539,683	25,658,988	156,322,059	1,592,029,205	344,864	17,489,342	116,327,463
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	11.4%	1.8%	58.3%	68.8%	3.0%	9.428%	9.0%	11.5%	46.4%	7.0%	41.8%	29.2%

Table 15. United States: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002, continued

Description	Gibraltar	Grenada Is	Guatemala	Guinea	Guyana	Haiti	Honduras	Hungary	India	Indonesia	Israel	Jamaica
AGOA												
AGOA 2												
Andean Act (ATPA)												
Andean Act (ATPDEA)												
CBI		37,060	343,286,734		13,687,450	16,477,374	218,564,847					84,436,791
CBTPA			699,726,047		8,142,750	160,032,775	1,772,949,182					109,866,231
Civil Aircraft										655,525		
Dyes								6,720		7,003,629		3,034,831
GSP								14,823		9,670,234		
GSP LDC								2,039,565,686		1,513,025,363		1,031,432
Israel	18,731		24,865,818		452,039	1,130,472	20,184,495	366,301,603			2,206,407,355	
Jordan												
Pharmaceuticals												
Puerto-Rico CBI												
West Bank and Gaza												
Subtotal	18,731	37,060	1,068,347,993	68,190	22,368,290	177,640,621	2,011,795,654	677,716,666	2,130,031,890	1,520,050,413	2,261,495,170	195,359,460
MFN	1,117,056	6,829,222	1,731,486,865	71,517,146	93,209,494	77,375,395	1,252,241,836	1,961,090,500	9,687,934,367	8,123,602,969	10,180,658,676	196,243,320
Grand Total	1,135,787	6,866,282	2,799,834,858	71,585,336	115,577,784	255,016,016	3,264,037,490	2,638,807,166	11,817,966,257	9,643,653,382	12,442,153,846	391,602,780
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	1.6%	0.5%	38.2%	0.1%	19.4%	69.659%	61.6%	25.7%	18.0%	15.8%	18.2%	49.9%

Description	Jordan	Kazakhstan	Kenya	Kyrgyzstan	Latvia	Lebanon	Lesotho	Lithuania	Macedonia	Madagascar	Malawi	Mali
AGOA												
AGOA 2												
Andean Act (ATPA)												
Andean Act (ATPDEA)												
CBI												
CBTPA												
Civil Aircraft												
Dyes												
GSP												
GSP LDC												
Israel												
Jordan	12,600,834											
Pharmaceuticals												
Puerto-Rico CBI												
West Bank and Gaza												
Subtotal	369,455,485	165,227,492	128,749,816	1,018,769	11,255,196	22,675,355	226,014	4,306,253	3,113,547	3,889,628	4,512,941	340,579
MFN	388,033,565	169,372,492	60,017,072	3,806,826	185,712,430	38,995,590	3,642,788	295,010,192	70,965,657	136,296,240	12,365,151	2,240,687
Grand Total	412,234,634	334,599,984	188,766,888	4,825,595	197,080,474	61,670,945	321,528,564	298,316,445	74,079,204	215,832,505	70,411,871	2,582,737
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	94.1%	49.4%	68.2%	21.1%	5.8%	36.768%	98.9%	1.4%	4.2%	36.9%	82.4%	13.2%

Table 15. United States: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002, continued

Description	Mauritania	Mauritius	Moldova	Mongolia	Morocco	Mozambique	Namibia	Nepal	Neth. Antilles	Nicaragua	Niger	Nigeria
AGOA								6,754				2,774,292,326
AGOA 2		106,498,898				186,167	1,536,502					
Andean Act (ATPA)												
Andean Act (ATPDEA)												
CBI										84,772,965		
CBTPA										127,742,634		
Civil Aircraft		127,988			18,123			8,264				92,397
Dyes												
GSP												
GSP LDC	35,298	7,763,820	93,298		21,131,079	5,729,479	173,893	8,406,624				483,150
Israel												
Jordan												
Pharmaceuticals												
Puerto-Rico CBI												
West Bank and Gaza												
Subtotal	35,298	114,390,706	93,298	93,298	163,295	5,915,646	1,717,149	8,414,888	3,075,835	212,534,389	21,803	2,774,867,873
MFN	893,593	166,120,623	39,045,317	161,335,623	2,582,412	371,150,856	55,711,772	143,948,298	358,620,594	466,631,061	888,112	3,189,308,111
Grand Total	928,891	280,511,329	39,138,615	161,498,918	392,300,058	8,498,058	57,428,921	152,363,186	361,696,429	679,165,450	909,915	5,964,175,984
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	3.8%	40.8%	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%	5.4%	69.612%	3.0%	5.5%	0.9%	31.3%	2.4%

Description	Norfolk Is	Oman	Pakistan	Panama	Papua New Guinea	Paraguay	Peru	Philippines	Poland	Romania	Russia	Rwanda
AGOA												
AGOA 2												
Andean Act (ATPA)												
Andean Act (ATPDEA)												
CBI							362,286,201					
CBTPA							6,263					
Civil Aircraft												
Dyes												
GSP												
GSP LDC	43,991	30,181,146	89,798,249	2,472,922	5,214,245	10,591,814	165,467,045	694,660,737	328,835,908	102,665,871	379,855,677	10,100
Israel												
Jordan												
Pharmaceuticals												
Puerto-Rico CBI												
West Bank and Gaza												
Subtotal	43,991	30,181,146	89,798,249	44,125,392	5,214,245	10,591,814	527,837,160	695,293,881	343,628,497	102,986,387	379,969,462	10,100
MFN	51,737	370,389,418	2,214,825,792	258,164,992	85,080,336	33,059,239	1,403,885,968	10,290,014,008	757,113,606	592,140,116	6,444,974,091	3,076,111
Grand Total	95,728	400,570,564	2,304,624,041	302,290,384	90,294,581	43,651,053	1,931,823,128	10,985,307,889	1,100,742,103	695,126,503	6,824,943,553	3,086,211
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	46.0%	7.5%	3.9%	14.6%	5.8%	24.265%	27.3%	6.3%	31.2%	14.8%	5.6%	0.3%

Table 15. United States: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002, continued

Description	Saint Kitts/Nevis	Saint Lucia Is	Saint Vincent/Gren.	Samoa	Senegal	Seychelles	Sierra Leone	Slovakia	Solomon Is	South Africa	Sri Lanka	Surinam
450										356,471,619		
AGOA										84,974,481		
AGOA 2												
Andean Act (ATPA)												
Andean Act (ATPDEA)												
CBI	27305273	7,979,824	5,514,209									
CBTPA												
Civil Aircraft						5,000				2,157,547		
Dyes												
GSP	350,326	313,514			499,038		216,978	63,954,846	2,051	552,861,175	89,593,525	48,288
GSP LDC				117,353								
Israel												
Jordan												
Pharmaceuticals								41,055		6,098,632		
Puerto-Rico CBI												
West Bank and Gaza												
Subtotal	27,655,599	8,293,338	5,514,209	117,353	499,488	5,000	216,978	63,995,901	2,051	1,002,563,454	89,593,525	48,288
MFN	20,973,311	10,854,296	10,961,200	6,261,842	3,299,343	26,318,264	3,615,862	190,627,395	524,836	3,024,496,309	1,720,828,942	132,761,972
Grand Total	48,628,910	19,147,634	16,475,409	6,379,195	3,798,831	26,323,264	3,832,840	254,623,296	526,887	4,027,059,763	1,810,422,467	132,810,260
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	56.9%	43.3%	33.5%	1.8%	13.1%	0.019%	5.7%	25.1%	0.4%	24.9%	4.9%	0.0%

Description	Swaziland	Tanzania	Thailand	Togo	Tokelau Is	Tonga	Trinidad and Tobago	Tunisia	Turkey	Uganda	Uruguay	Uzbekistan
450										12,506		
AGOA	411,421	375,215										
AGOA 2	73718305	124,356										
Andean Act (ATPA)												
Andean Act (ATPDEA)												
CBI							319,636,189					
CBTPA							821,486,769					
Civil Aircraft	15668		1,894,729	50,345				6,255	25,287			
Dyes												
GSP	6,939,064		2,311,816,316		185,474	303,523	2,865,907	10,359,510	467,758,228	19,380	68,247,629	11,082,004
GSP LDC		654,325		13,845								
Israel												
Jordan												
Pharmaceuticals			3,777				6,076,367		910,813		2,203,941	
Puerto-Rico CBI												
West Bank and Gaza												
Subtotal	81,084,458	1,153,896	2,313,714,822	64,190	185,474	303,523	1,150,065,232	10,365,765	468,694,328	31,886	70,451,570	11,082,004
MFN	33,428,437	23,652,026	12,485,556,736	2,595,078	2,527,864	8,838,175	1,287,191,613	83,190,099	3,046,126,713	15,165,096	122,660,363	65,895,143
Grand Total	114,512,895	24,805,922	14,799,271,558	2,659,268	2,713,338	9,141,698	2,437,256,845	93,555,864	3,514,821,041	15,196,982	193,111,933	76,977,147
Percentage of preferential Imports in total	70.8%	4.7%	15.6%	2.4%	6.8%	3.320%	47.2%	11.1%	13.3%	0.2%	36.5%	14.4%

Table 15. United States: Imports according to tariff treatment, 2002, continued

Description	Vanuatu	Venezuela	West Bank and Gaza	Yemen	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Grand Total
AGOA					51,650		4,121,836,443
AGOA 2							798,160,684
Andean Act (ATPA)							762,026,506
Andean Act (ATPDEA)							175,748,821
CBI							2,916,244,359
CBTPA							7,035,213,238
Civil Aircraft		30,303					31,049,165
Dyes							9,945,445
GSP		582,133,353	142,124			54,881,288	14,054,914,446
GSP LDC	49,000			121,683,128	31,165		3,381,327,128
Israel							2,206,407,355
Jordan							12,600,834
Pharmaceuticals							507,185,669
Puerto-Rico CBI							6,854,337
West Bank and Gaza			7,018,896				376,474,381
Subtotal	49,000	582,163,656	7,161,020	121,683,128	82,815	54,881,288	36,395,988,811
MFN	2,739,699	14,526,322,616	48,300	124,120,059	7,776,684	47,872,086	139,951,297,216
Grand Total	2,788,699	15,108,486,272	7,209,320	245,803,187	7,859,499	102,753,374	176,347,286,027
Percentage of preferential imports in total	1.8%	3.9%	99.3%	49.5%	1.1%	53.4%	20.6%

Source: USITC Trade Database; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Table 16. Illustrative cases of preference reliance, Australia, trade-weighted data, 2002

(Leading suppliers' imports benefiting from preference margins of greater than 1 percentage point and amounting to the equivalent of .85% or more of the supplier's total exports)

Supplier	Product group	Product Name	Imports value, USD	% of supplier's global exports	Preferential programme	MFN duty %	Preferential rate %
Fiji	61	Art of apparel & clothing	11,198,527	2.5%	The Forum Island Country preference	25.0	0.0
Fiji	62	Art of apparel & clothing	39,243,137	8.6%	The Forum Island Country preference	24.8	0.0
Fiji	64	Footwear,	7,808,185	1.7%	The Forum Island Country preference	14.1	0.0
Samoa	85	Electrical mchy equip parts	19,153,782	30.1%	The Forum Island Country preference	15.0	0.0
Swaziland	21	Miscellaneous edible preparations.	18,104,904	4.0%	The Developing Country preferential rate	4.0	0.0

Source: ABS International Trade; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Notes:

Calculations are based on HS 10-digit underlying data.

Australian tariff are not determined by the HS and the Preferential scheme only... 3 other things influence the tariff (Nature of entry, nature of tariff and treatment code). MFN duty refers to the Maximum General rate (Preference code X: The special rate that applies has not been claimed and the general rate of duty has been used).

Total exports for country X refer to the sum of reported imports from X by the other countries. COMTRADE database.

Table 17. Illustrative cases of preference reliance, Canada, trade-weighted data, 2002

(Leading suppliers' imports benefiting from preference margins of greater than 1 percentage point and amounting to the equivalent of .85% or more of the supplier's total exports)

Supplier	Product group	Product Name	Imports value, USD	% of supplier's global exports	Preferential programme	MFN duty	Preferential rate
Trinidad and Tobago	72	Iron and steel.	69,277,207	1.6%	Commonwealth Caribbean Countries Tariff		0.0%
Cuba	17	Sugars and sugar confectionery.	12,964,370	1.0%	GPT	USD 14.77/tonne (1)	0.0%

Source: Canadian Department of Finance; OECD Secretariat calculations.

(1) The world price of sugar in 2002 was roughly USD 200 per tonne.

Table 18. Illustrative cases of inferred preference reliance, European Union, trade-weighted data, 2002

(Leading suppliers' imports benefiting from preference margins of greater than 1 percentage point and amounting to the equivalent of 5% or more of the supplier's total exports)

Supplier	Product group	Product Name	Imports value, '000 USD	% of supplier's global exports	Preferential rate	MFN duty
Russia	27	Mineral fuels, oils	5,613,938	5%	0.00	2.48
Tunisia	62	Art of apparel & clothing	2,218,268	33%	0.00	11.89
Vietnam	64	Footwear	2,108,263	13%	8.15	12.48
Algeria	27	Mineral fuels, oils	1,886,980	11%	0.00	2.46
Morocco	62	Art of apparel & clothing	1,877,615	21%	0.00	11.97
Bangladesh	61	Art of apparel & clothing	1,510,448	23%	0.00	12.13
Libya	27	Mineral fuels, oils	1,377,257	13%	0.00	2.92
Bangladesh	62	Art of apparel & clothing	1,200,598	19%	0.00	12.16
Costa Rica	08	Edible fruit and nuts	776,796	10%	9.56	13.10
Morocco	61	Art of apparel & clothing	769,633	9%	0.00	12.05
Tunisia	61	Art of apparel & clothing	726,773	11%	0.00	11.87
Tunisia	85	Electrical mchy equi parts	687,701	10%	0.00	2.05
Ecuador	08	Edible fruit and nuts	608,372	10%	12.26	15.78
Pakistan	63	Other made up textile articles	594,721	7%	9.06	11.37
Mozambique	76	Aluminium and articles.	528,162	45%	0.00	6.00
Egypt	27	Mineral fuels, oils	494,236	8%	0.00	3.20
Morocco	85	Electrical mchy equi parts	483,370	6%	0.00	2.15
Pakistan	62	Art of apparel & clothing	459,145	5%	9.77	12.24
Morocco	03	Fish & crustacean, mollusc	446,361	5%	0.00	9.43
Mauritius	61	Art of apparel & clothing	433,322	26%	0.00	12.02
Sri Lanka	62	Art of apparel & clothing	382,369	8%	9.46	11.85
Sri Lanka	61	Art of apparel & clothing	380,947	8%	9.44	11.81
Cote d'Ivoire	18	Cocoa and cocoa prep.	350,217	8%	0.00	8.46
Tunisia	64	Footwear	347,605	5%	0.00	5.92
Liberia	89	Ships, boats	344,401	46%	0.00	1.02
Cote d'Ivoire	08	Edible fruit and nuts	286,661	7%	0.01	10.97
Cambodia	61	Art of apparel & clothing	283,578	15%	0.00	12.21
Panama	08	Edible fruit and nuts	277,277	9%	12.06	15.56
Cameroon	44	Wood and articles of wood;	272,781	14%	0.00	1.66
Croatia	62	Art of apparel & clothing	254,861	8%	0.00	12.11
Cote d'Ivoire	44	Wood and articles of wood;	225,572	5%	0.00	2.06
Namibia	03	Fish & crustacean, mollusc	221,578	28%	0.00	10.90
Jamaica	28	Inorgn chem; compds of prec mtl	220,263	15%	0.00	4.00
Kenya	06	Live tree & other plant; bulb,	210,035	10%	0.00	8.86
Macao	62	Art of apparel & clothing	204,728	8%	9.64	12.07

Supplier	Product group	Product Name	Imports value, '000 USD	% of supplier's global exports	Preferential rate	MFN duty
Macao	61	Art of apparel & clothing	199,910	8%	9.66	12.09
Antigua / Barbuda	89	Ships, boats	199,419	80%	0.00	1.13
Senegal	03	Fish & crustacean, mollusc	192,087	26%	0.00	10.37
Macedonia	62	Art of apparel & clothing	191,534	21%	0.00	12.28
Croatia	61	Art of apparel & clothing	190,885	6%	0.00	11.94
Seychelles	16	Prep of meat, fish or crustaceans	182,150	51%	0.00	23.94
Cayman Islands	89	Ships, boats	172,980	74%	0.00	1.14
Azerbaijan	27	Mineral fuels, oils	167,138	10%	0.00	2.37
Mauritius	62	Art of apparel & clothing	164,248	10%	0.00	11.62
Cyprus	87	Vehicles o/t railw/tramw	161,721	14%	0.00	10.76
Cameroon	08	Edible fruit and nuts	151,108	8%	0.00	15.88
Myanmar	62	Art of apparel & clothing	147,701	8%	0.00	12.23
Papua NewGuinea	15	Animal/veg fats & oils	142,438	11%	0.00	2.53
Macao	64	Footwear	141,504	6%	6.14	10.05
Myanmar	61	Art of apparel & clothing	141,375	8%	0.00	12.21
Ghana	76	Aluminium and articles.	137,283	9%	0.00	6.00
Kenya	07	Edible vegetables	134,284	6%	0.65	6.16
Mauritania	03	Fish & crustacean, mollusc	125,654	22%	0.00	9.72
Madagascar	03	Fish & crustacean, mollusc	123,534	15%	0.00	12.66
Cambodia	62	Art of apparel & clothing	123,255	7%	0.00	12.32
Tanzania	03	Fish & crustacean, mollusc	113,585	17%	0.00	12.51
Ghana	44	Wood and articles of wood;	113,527	7%	0.00	2.66
Bosnia/Herzegovin	76	Aluminium and articles thereof.	109,010	10%	0.00	6.00
Albania	64	Footwear	103,722	28%	0.00	3.68
St. Vincent / Grena	89	Ships, boats	94,015	54%	0.00	1.08
Cuba	24	Tobacco	86,627	7%	7.06	20.13
Bosnia/Herzegovin	64	Footwear	83,334	7%	0.00	7.11
Jamaica	61	Art of apparel & clothing	74,437	5%	0.00	12.09
Cuba	03	Fish & crustacean, mollusc	73,083	6%	4.57	12.49
Bosnia/Herzegovin	62	Art of apparel & clothing	72,346	6%	0.00	11.69
Madagascar	62	Art of apparel & clothing	71,583	9%	0.00	11.10
Lao PDR	62	Art of apparel & clothing	69,047	40%	0.00	12.13
Madagascar	09	Coffee, tea, and spices.	68,423	8%	0.00	6.08
Uzbekistan	52	Cotton.	67,459	5%	4.49	5.64
Mozambique	03	Fish & crustacean, mollusc	65,715	6%	0.00	12.63
Albania	62	Art of apparel & clothing	64,571	18%	0.00	11.94
Macedonia	72	Iron and steel.	62,686	7%	19.02	20.03
Uganda	03	Fish & crustacean, mollusc	60,659	15%	0.00	12.59
Georgia	27	Mineral fuels, oils	59,983	11%	0.00	2.38

Supplier	Product group	Product Name	Imports value, '000 USD	% of supplier's global exports	Preferential rate	MFN duty
Madagascar	61	Art of apparel & clothing	59,447	7%	0.00	12.10
Senegal	15	Animal/veg fats & oils	58,819	8%	0.00	3.20
Moldova	62	Art of apparel & clothing	57,918	7%	9.84	12.32
Aruba	27	Mineral fuels, oils	56,865	6%	0.00	2.74
Nepal	57	Carpets and other textile	48,358	8%	0.00	8.00
Lao PDR	61	Art of apparel & clothing	46,780	27%	0.00	12.06
Suriname	28	Inorgn chem; compds of prec mtl	43,144	10%	0.00	4.00
Seychelles	03	Fish & crustacean, mollusc	36,843	10%	0.00	7.27
St. Lucia	08	Edible fruit and nuts	33,032	41%	0.00	16.00
Sierra Leone	94	Furniture; bedding	29,117	19%	0.00	2.21
Albania	61	Art of apparel & clothing	26,627	7%	0.00	12.04
Belize	08	Edible fruit and nuts	25,354	13%	0.35	15.10
Ethiopia	41	Raw hides and skins	24,766	6%	0.00	2.21
Brit. Virgin Isl.	89	Ships, boats	23,939	6%	0.00	1.22
St. Vincent / Grena	08	Edible fruit and nuts	22,864	13%	0.00	16.00
Bermuda	89	Ships, boats	22,467	13%	0.00	1.19
Uganda	06	Live tree & other plant;	20,792	5%	0.00	7.41
Bermuda	08	Edible fruit and nuts	17,782	10%	12.50	16.00
Benin	41	Raw hides and skins	17,208	10%	0.00	2.00
Comoros	09	Coffee, tea, and spices.	15,435	26%	0.00	6.55
Bermuda	29	Organic chemicals.	15,202	9%	0.00	4.61
Dominica	08	Edible fruit and nuts	11,999	20%	0.02	15.87
Togo	03	Fish & crustacean, mollusc	11,783	5%	0.00	10.52
Maldives	16	Prep of meat, fish or crusta	11,261	5%	0.00	23.99
Gambia	15	Animal/veg fats & oils	9,932	27%	0.00	3.20
Sierra Leone	84	Nuclear reactors	8,473	6%	0.00	1.99
Sierra Leone	85	Electrical mchy equip parts	7,721	5%	0.00	3.06
Dominica	85	Electrical mchy equip parts	6,642	11%	0.00	1.61
Turks / Caicos Isl.	84	Nuclear reactors, boilers, mchy	6,148	24%	0.00	2.15
Tokelau	27	Mineral fuels, oils	5,703	30%	0.00	2.30
Cape Verde	64	Footwear	3,868	21%	0.00	3.10
Gambia	03	Fish & crustacean, mollusc	3,769	10%	0.00	10.45
Comoros	33	Essential oils & resinoids	3,750	6%	0.00	1.17
Chad	88	Aircraft, spacecraft	3,486	5%	0.00	1.34
Guinea-Bissau	03	Fish & crustacean, mollusc	3,363	5%	0.00	9.23
Eritrea	41	Raw hides and skins	2,342	27%	0.00	1.87
Vanuatu	15	Animal/veg fats & oils	2,273	5%	0.00	6.05
Cape Verde	62	Art of apparel & clothing	2,244	12%	0.00	12.18
Cape Verde	61	Art of apparel & clothing	1,802	10%	0.00	12.03
Turks / Caicos Isl.	61	Art of apparel & clothing	1,782	7%	0.00	11.90
Nauru	39	Plastics and articles.	1,179	5%	1.40	7.70
Tokelau	61	Art of apparel & clothing	1,057	5%	9.75	12.20

Supplier	Product group	Product Name	Imports value, '000 USD	% of supplier's global exports	Preferential rate	MFN duty
Tokelau	57	Carpets and other textile	966	5%	5.75	7.20
Eritrea	03	Fish & crustacean, mollusc	791	9%	0.00	12.72
Tuvalu	29	Organic chemicals.	755	47%	0.00	4.88
Sao Tome/Principe	03	Fish & crustacean, mollusc	607	6%	0.00	9.26
North. Mariana Isl.	61	Art of apparel & clothing	456	6%	0.00	12.30
Pitcairn	87	Vehicles o/t railw/tramw	157	8%	0.00	8.06
Tuvalu	39	Plastics	136	8%	0.00	7.46
Pitcairn	84	Nuclear reactors	122	6%	0.00	1.65
Norfolk Island	12	Oil seed, oleagi fruits;	121	12%	0.00	2.75
Wallis / Futura Isl.	63	Other made up textile articles	70	16%	0.00	8.80

Source: WITS TRAINS Database; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Table 19. Illustrative cases of inferred preference reliance, Japan, trade-weighted data, 2002

(Leading suppliers' imports benefiting from preference margins of greater than 1 percentage point and amounting to the equivalent of .85% or more of the supplier's total exports)

Supplier	Product group	Product Name	% of supplier's global exports	Imports value, '000 USD	Preferential rate	MFN duty
Philippines	08	Edible fruit and nuts;	0.97%	426,403	9.64	15.53
Vietnam	85	Electrical mchy equip parts	1.21%	194,325	0.00	2.55
Ecuador	08	Edible fruit and nuts;	1.31%	79,943	10.00	16.00
Bahrain	27	Mineral fuels, oils & product	2.87%	75,522	1.08	2.31
Zimbabwe	72	Iron and steel.	3.12%	47,967	3.18	5.30
Zimbabwe	75	Nickel and articles	1.92%	29,542	7.02	11.70
Dominica	62	Art of apparel & clothing	1.18%	710	0.00	8.50

Source: WITS TRAINS Database; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Table 20. Illustrative cases of preference reliance, United States, trade-weighted data, 2002

(Leading suppliers' imports benefiting from preference margins of greater than 1 percentage point and amounting to the equivalent of .85% or more of the supplier's total exports)

Supplier	Product group	Product Name	Imports value, USD	% of supplier's global exports	Preferential programme	Preferential rate	MFN duty
Honduras	61	Art of apparel & cloth	1,248,319,634	29.0%	CBTPA	0%	19%
Dominican Rep.	62	Art of apparel & cloth	1,101,578,511	22.6%	CBTPA	0%	19%
El Salvador	61	Art of apparel & cloth	873,626,158	27.7%	CBTPA	0%	17%
India	71	Natural/cultured pearls, prec stone	862,000,583	1.8%	GSP	0%	6%
Dominican Rep.	61	Art of apparel & cloth	656,982,860	13.5%	CBTPA	0%	16%
Honduras	62	Art of apparel & cloth	523,912,816	12.2%	CBTPA	0%	19%
Guatemala	62	Art of apparel & cloth	333,996,138	6.8%	CBTPA	0%	19%
Hungary	29	Organic chemicals.	311,393,520	0.9%	Pharmaceuticals	0%	4%
Venezuela	29	Organic chemicals.	279,951,623	1.2%	GSP	0%	6%
Israel	61	Art of apparel & cloth	277,235,025	1.0%	Israel	0%	16%
Israel	71	Natural/cultured pearls, prec stone	272,372,494	1.0%	Israel	0%	6%
Costa Rica	62	Art of apparel & cloth	271,323,694	3.6%	CBTPA	0%	19%
Jordan	61	Art of apparel & cloth	264,900,370	16.4%	West Bank and Gaza	0%	21%
Peru	74	Copper and articles	237,774,984	3.6%	Andean Act (ATPA)	0%	1%
Costa Rica	08	Edible fruit and nuts;	232,831,025	3.1%	CBI	0%	8%
Trinidad and Tobago	29	Organic chemicals.	219,875,840	5.1%	CBI	0%	8%
Guatemala	61	Art of apparel & cloth	218,481,784	4.4%	CBTPA	0%	20%
Costa Rica	61	Art of apparel & cloth	203,743,467	2.7%	CBTPA	0%	12%
Lesotho	61	Art of apparel & cloth	202,923,768	57.4%	AGOA 2	0%	21%
Dominican Rep.	85	Electrical mchy equip parts	191,468,010	3.9%	CBI	0%	3%
Dominican Rep.	24	Tobacco and manufactured tobacco	190,013,988	3.9%	CBI	0%	3%
El Salvador	62	Art of apparel & cloth	179,131,931	5.7%	CBTPA	0%	20%
Dominican Rep.	71	Natural/cultured pearls, prec stone	166,617,565	3.4%	CBI	0%	6%
Colombia	06	Live tree & other plant; bulb, root	139,888,168	1.1%	Andean Act (ATPA)	0%	6%

Supplier	Product group	Product Name	Imports value, USD	% of supplier's global exports	Preferential programme	Preferential rate	MFN duty
Haiti	61	Art of apparel & cloth	138,250,742	47.9%	CBTPA	0%	20%
Lesotho	62	Art of apparel & cloth	114,735,994	32.5%	AGOA 2	0%	17%
Nicaragua	62	Art of apparel & cloth	108,694,297	10.0%	CBTPA	0%	22%
Jordan	62	Art of apparel & cloth	103,244,005	6.4%	West Bank and Gaza	0%	18%
Jamaica	61	Art of apparel & cloth	99,516,555	6.9%	CBTPA	0%	14%
Kenya	62	Art of apparel & cloth	98,985,972	4.8%	AGOA 2	0%	18%
Mauritius	62	Art of apparel & cloth	89,833,514	5.5%	AGOA 2	0%	17%
Dominican Rep.	17	Sugars and sugar confectionery.	80,108,227	1.6%	CBI	0%	3%
Guatemala	08	Edible fruit and nuts	78,677,813	1.6%	CBI	0%	22%
Costa Rica	85	Electrical mchy equip parts	67,771,012	0.9%	CBI	0%	4%
Bahamas	39	Plastics and articles.	64,169,660	5.1%	CBI	0%	6%
Honduras	62	Art of apparel & cloth	63,360,313	1.5%	CBI	0%	1%
Peru	07	Edible vegetables and certain roots	63,197,749	1.0%	Andean Act (ATPA)	0%	13%
Dominican Rep.	39	Plastics.	52,643,938	1.1%	CBI	0%	5%
Swaziland	61	Art of apparel & cloth	51,816,006	11.4%	AGOA 2	0%	20%
Guatemala	17	Sugars and sugar confectionery.	51,042,575	1.0%	CBI	0%	3%
Equatorial Guinea	29	Organic chemicals.	49,390,288	2.6%	GSP LDC	0%	8%
Jamaica	22	Beverages, spirits and vinegar.	47,600,534	3.3%	CBI	0%	2%
Honduras	24	Tobacco and manufactured tobacco	45,947,820	1.1%	CBI	0%	4%
Madagascar	61	Art of apparel & cloth	45,845,934	5.4%	AGOA 2	0%	16%
Guatemala	71	Natural/cultured pearls, prec stone	43,882,550	0.9%	CBI	0%	6%
Uruguay	41	Raw hides and skins (	43,234,166	2.0%	GSP	0%	3%
Malawi	24	Tobacco and manufactured tobacco	41,539,160	9.1%	AGOA	0%	12%
Bahrain	76	Aluminium	37,183,970	1.4%	GSP	0%	3%
Nicaragua	02	Meat and edible meat	32,580,401	3.0%	CBI	0%	1%
Madagascar	62	Art of apparel & cloth	29,566,200	3.5%	AGOA 2	0%	17%
Bolivia	71	Natural/cultured pearls, prec stone	26,815,051	2.1%	Andean Act (ATPA)	0%	6%
Saint Kitts/Nevis	85	Electrical mchy equip parts	26,604,463	38.3%	CBI	0%	3%

Supplier	Product group	Product Name	Imports value, USD	% of supplier's global exports	Preferential programme	Preferential rate	MFN duty
Zimbabwe	71	Natural/cultured pearls, prec stone	26,454,517	1.7%	GSP	0%	6%
Bolivia	71	Natural/cultured pearls, prec stone	22,972,210	1.8%	GSP	0%	6%
Kenya	61	Art of apparel & cloth	22,318,921	1.1%	AGOA 2	0%	24%
Swaziland	62	Art of apparel & cloth	21,889,977	4.8%	AGOA 2	0%	19%
Haiti	62	Art of apparel & cloth	21,690,610	7.5%	CBTPA	0%	22%
Nicaragua	24	Tobacco and manufactured tobacco	20,843,303	1.9%	CBI	0%	2%
Nicaragua	61	Art of apparel & cloth	19,047,840	1.7%	CBTPA	0%	21%
Mauritius	61	Art of apparel & cloth	16,665,384	1.0%	AGOA 2	0%	17%
Lebanon	71	Natural/cultured pearls, prec stone	13,509,791	1.6%	GSP	0%	5%
Armenia	71	Natural/cultured pearls, prec stone	12,664,950	3.6%	GSP	0%	6%
Belize	62	Art of apparel & cloth	12,093,206	6.3%	CBTPA	0%	13%
Belize	20	Prep of vegetable, fruit,	11,747,256	6.1%	CBI	0%	41%
Belize	17	Sugars and sugar confectionery.	10,641,848	5.5%	CBI	0%	3%
Belize	08	Edible fruit and nuts	7,806,075	4.0%	CBI	0%	5%
Barbados	22	Beverages, spirits and vinegar.	7,153,995	1.9%	CBI	0%	7%
Georgia	72	Iron and steel.	7,075,549	1.2%	GSP	0%	4%
Saint Lucia Is	85	Electrical mchy equip parts	6,708,194	8.2%	CBI	0%	2%
Swaziland	17	Sugars and sugar confectionery.	6,573,302	1.4%	GSP	0%	3%
Guyana	44	Wood and articles of wood;	6,176,918	1.5%	CBI	0%	8%
Nepal	71	Natural/cultured pearls, prec stone	6,048,790	1.1%	GSP LDC	0%	6%
Malawi	62	Art of apparel & cloth	5,903,181	1.3%	AGOA 2	0%	20%
Malawi	61	Art of apparel & cloth	5,501,330	1.2%	AGOA 2	0%	25%
Haiti	08	Edible fruit and nuts;	5,482,390	1.9%	CBI	0%	6%
Guyana	17	Sugars and sugar confectionery.	5,450,869	1.3%	CBI	0%	3%

Supplier	Product group	Product Name	Imports value, USD	% of supplier's global exports	Preferential programme	Preferential rate	MFN duty
Guyana	62	Art of apparel & cloth	5,032,273	1.2%	CBTPA	0%	17%
Fiji	17	Sugars and sugar confectionery.	4,440,922	1.0%	GSP	0%	3%
Saint Vincent/ Gren.	71	Natural/cultured pearls, prec stone	2,470,320	1.4%	CBI	0%	5%
Tonga	07	Edible vegetables and certain roots	291,523	1.0%	GSP	0%	7%

Source: USITC Database; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Note: AGOA 2 indicates the special supplemental preferences for apparel products available to certain African countries.

Table 21. GTAP database (version 6.05): list of available countries*

Australia	Germany
New Zealand	United Kingdom
China	Greece
Hong Kong	Ireland
Japan	Italy
Korea	Luxembourg
Taiwan	Netherlands
Indonesia	Portugal
Malaysia	Spain
Philippines	Sweden
Singapore	Switzerland
Thailand	Rest of EFTA
Vietnam	Hungary
Bangladesh	Poland
India	Rest of Central European Associates
Sri Lanka	Former Soviet Union
Rest of South Asia	Turkey
Canada	Rest of Middle East
United States	Morocco
Mexico	Rest of North Africa
Central America and the Caribbean	Botswana
Colombia	Rest of South African Customs Union
Peru	Malawi
Venezuela	Mozambique
Rest of Andean Pact	Tanzania
Argentina	Zambia
Brazil	Zimbabwe
Chile	Other Southern Africa
Uruguay	Uganda
Rest of South America	Rest of Sub Saharan Africa
Austria	Rest of World
Belgium	
Denmark	
Finland	
France	

* Each of these countries may be incorporated separately or as a part of a broader aggregated region.

Table 22. GTAP database (version 6.05): list of available sectors*

Paddy rice	Wood products
Wheat	Paper products, publishing
Cereal grains nec	Petroleum, coal products
Vegetables, fruit, nuts	Chemical, rubber, plastic products
Oil seeds	Mineral products nec
Sugar cane, sugar beet	Ferrous metals
Plant-based fibers	Metals nec
Crops nec	Metal products
Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses	Motor vehicles and parts
Animal products nec	Transport equipment nec
Raw milk	Electronic equipment
Wool, silk-worm cocoons	Machinery and equipment nec
Forestry	Manufactures nec
Fishing	Electricity
Coal	Gas manufacture, distribution
Oil	Water
Gas	Construction
Minerals nec	Trade
Bovine meat products	Transport nec
Meat products nec	Water transport
Vegetable oils and fats	Air transport
Dairy products	Communication
Processed rice	Financial services nec
Sugar	Insurance
Food products nec	Business services nec
Beverages and tobacco products	Recreational and other services
Textiles	Public Administration, Defense, Education, Health
Wearing apparel	Dwellings
Leather products	

Table 23. EU: differences between market average and bilateral *ad valorem* measures of protection by product and source country (%)

	Paddy rice	Wheat	Cereal grains	Vegetables, fruits and nuts	Oil seeds	Sugar cane, sugar beet	Primary argiculture nec	Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses	Natural resources	Bovine cattle, sheep and goat meat	Meat products	Other manufacturing	Vegetable oils and fats	Dairy products	Processed rice	Sugar	Food products nec	Beverages and tobacco products	Textiles	Wearing apparel	Leather products
Rest of Oceania	36	5	0	-3	2	15	1	2	0	13	0	-1	5	-50	-17	-120	-4	-3	0	-1	1
Australia	-31	-1	-17	1	2	15	1	-1	0	-1	-6	-1	-33	1	7	-12	-4	-3	-4	1	1
China	-5	-16	-13	-33	2	-34	0	3	0	-9	-54	-1	3	-1	-99	-78	-7	-4	-6	-7	-6
North/East Asia	35	5	3	-9	0	15	-4	1	0	13	-4	-2	-10	-7	14	55	-7	-15	-8	-8	-5
Japan	-46	5	-5	-3	1	15	-1	3	0	8	-4	-3	-12	-27	-26	31	-6	-6	-5	-7	-3
Indonesia	-18	5	-3	0	2	-74	-1	4	0	-32	-13	-1	0	-8	5	14	-5	-11	-6	-6	-7
Malaysia	36	5	-6	6	2	15	1	2	0	-18	-16	0	0	-61	49	47	-3	-18	-6	-8	-5
Philippines	-2	5	1	6	-2	15	-3	4	0	7	-21	0	0	-45	49	-47	-13	-9	-7	-6	-4
Singapore	-32	5	6	5	2	15	0	3	0	17	-13	-2	-2	-15	-16	20	-6	-8	-9	-9	-7
Thailand	-57	5	-35	-9	0	-52	-3	4	0	-1	-20	-1	2	-36	-89	-30	-13	-11	-7	-8	-7
Vietnam	13	5	2	6	0	-4	1	4	0	17	-2	-1	4	4	-2	63	-3	-1	-6	-6	-5
Rest of the World	-3	-2	-20	-36	-1	5	1	2	0	-26	-7	-1	-26	-15	17	-72	-3	-1	0	-2	1
Bangladesh	12	5	6	8	2	15	2	4	0	17	6	1	5	4	45	63	4	2	2	3	3
India	-14	4	-2	6	1	11	0	2	0	-182	-9	0	4	-12	-49	2	-3	-17	-6	-5	0
Sri Lanka	-33	5	5	3	0	-39	-2	4	0	15	-7	0	2	-79	-92	-67	-3	-8	-7	-6	-3
Canada	-41	-1	1	7	1	15	-4	3	0	-8	-9	-1	-13	-32	-25	58	-8	-2	-5	-7	-4
United States	-31	1	-3	3	1	15	-7	3	0	-27	-22	-2	-1	-31	-33	34	-12	-7	-5	-7	-2
Mexico	36	-69	-2	3	1	15	1	2	0	14	-8	0	2	-11	49	-31	-8	-13	0	0	2
Rest of North America	36	5	6	-30	2	15	1	4	0	12	-12	1	5	4	49	63	4	2	0	2	2
Colombia	12	5	1	-57	2	-20	1	4	0	-13	6	1	5	0	-11	-61	2	-1	2	3	3
Peru	36	4	-15	2	1	15	1	4	0	-117	6	1	5	-2	49	39	3	0	1	3	3
Venezuela	36	5	6	-44	2	15	2	4	0	2	-12	0	5	0	49	63	1	1	2	3	3
Argentina	36	-10	-25	-8	2	15	-2	-2	0	-16	-15	-1	5	-32	16	-44	-6	-5	-1	1	0
Brazil	-60	5	-23	-1	-2	-42	-2	1	0	-98	-25	-1	5	-30	31	-120	-11	-8	-5	-4	-1
Chile	36	4	5	-5	1	15	-1	1	0	-61	-14	0	0	-26	49	18	-4	-5	-3	-5	1
Uruguay	-30	5	2	-1	2	15	0	-1	0	-25	-3	1	1	4	-41	43	-4	-4	-1	3	1
EU	36	3	5	6	1	-6	1	3	0	14	4	1	4	2	49	61	3	1	2	3	3
Rest of Europe	-19	-14	-11	2	-1	-3	0	-21	0	-25	-16	0	1	-35	34	36	-6	-9	2	3	3
Turkey	-13	1	-4	5	1	-246	1	3	0	-21	-23	-1	-54	-29	-53	-6	1	-1	2	3	3
Rest of Middle East and North /	-18	4	5	0	1	-31	-1	3	0	-77	-11	0	-29	-33	-43	35	-4	-7	-1	0	2
Morocco	36	5	6	-7	2	15	0	2	0	-151	0	1	-42	-7	49	51	2	-13	2	3	3
Tunisia	36	5	-4	4	2	15	1	3	0	17	-1	1	-69	-11	49	44	2	-7	2	3	3
Botswana	36	5	6	7	2	15	2	4	0	-70	2	1	-7	4	49	63	1	2	2	3	3
South Africa	36	5	-1	-3	1	5	-1	3	0	-91	3	0	3	-33	6	24	-9	-6	0	-1	2
Rest of SACU	36	5	6	0	2	15	2	4	0	-71	-1	1	-6	-37	49	-124	3	0	2	3	3
Malawi	36	5	6	8	1	15	2	4	0	17	6	1	5	4	49	-34	4	2	2	3	3
Mozambique	36	5	6	8	2	15	2	4	0	17	6	1	5	4	49	41	4	2	2	3	3
Tanzania	36	5	6	8	2	15	2	4	0	17	6	1	5	4	42	-33	3	2	2	3	3
Zambia	36	5	6	8	2	15	1	4	0	17	6	1	5	4	49	-35	4	2	2	3	3
Zimbabwe	36	5	-6	4	2	15	1	4	0	-94	3	1	5	4	49	-53	3	2	2	3	3
Rest of SADC	36	5	6	3	2	15	1	1	0	-10	4	1	3	0	32	-37	3	-1	2	3	3
Madagascar	36	5	6	8	2	15	2	4	0	17	6	1	-30	4	22	-31	4	2	2	3	3
Uganda	36	5	6	5	-4	15	2	4	0	17	6	1	5	4	49	63	4	2	2	3	3
Rest of Sub-Saharan	36	4	-10	-5	1	10	1	-2	0	17	-5	1	3	-6	39	12	3	1	2	3	3

Source: GTAP database; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Table 24. US: differences between market average and bilateral *ad valorem* measures of protection by product and source country (%)

	Paddy rice		Wheat		Cereal grains Vegetables, fruits and nuts		Oil seeds		Sugar cane, sugar beet		Primary argiculture nec		Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses		Natural resources		Bovine cattle, sheep and goat meat		Meat products		Other manufacturing Vegetable oils and fats		Dairy products		Processed rice		Sugar		Food products nec Beverages and tobacco products		Textiles		Wearing apparel		Leather products	
Rest of Oceania	4	0	0	0	1	-1	1	0	0	-2	-1	0	-7	7	4	-1	-2	-1	-3	-2	6															
Australia	-1	-3	0	-2	0	0	1	0	0	-2	-1	0	-4	8	-3	-10	0	-3	-2	-1	8															
China	-2	0	-1	-2	-4	-1	1	0	0	1	-4	-1	-1	16	-5	-24	0	-1	0	0	-3															
North/East Asia	-1	0	-1	-1	3	0	1	0	0	2	-2	0	0	2	-2	-10	-1	-3	-3	-3	1															
Japan	-1	0	-1	-5	1	0	1	0	0	1	-3	-1	-1	7	-3	-16	-2	-1	0	-1	3															
Indonesia	4	0	0	-8	-35	-1	1	0	0	3	0	1	1	4	1	-31	1	1	-4	-3	-2															
Malaysia	-5	0	-1	0	-8	0	1	0	0	3	-3	0	-2	-3	-4	7	1	-2	-3	-4	0															
Philippines	4	0	-1	1	3	0	-5	0	0	3	1	1	1	0	2	-21	0	-1	-4	-3	1															
Singapore	4	-3	-1	0	3	0	1	0	0	1	-9	0	-8	1	-3	5	1	-2	-5	-4	6															
Thailand	-2	0	0	0	3	0	-4	0	0	1	-4	0	-3	-1	1	-4	1	-8	-3	0																
Vietnam	4	0	0	1	3	-2	2	0	0	3	-6	0	-5	-8	-3	25	2	-4	-4	-5																
Rest of the World	1	-2	-1	0	1	0	1	0	0	-1	0	1	0	4	2	-10	2	1	-4	-1	7															
Bangladesh	4	0	0	-2	3	0	0	0	0	3	-1	-1	1	5	-1	22	2	1	-3	-2	2															
India	0	-3	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	-3	-1	1	0	17	2	-10	1	1	1	-2	6															
Sri Lanka	-2	0	0	-1	3	0	1	0	0	3	1	-3	-1	0	-5	-10	1	0	-3	-3	1															
Canada	4	0	0	1	3	0	2	0	0	3	1	1	1	5	4	20	0	1	8	10	12															
United States	4	0	0	1	3	0	2	0	0	3	1	1	1	18	4	25	2	1	8	10	12															
Mexico	4	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	3	1	1	1	15	4	25	2	1	8	10	12															
Rest of North America	4	0	0	1	3	0	2	0	0	3	1	1	1	18	4	25	-1	1	-9	-13	7															
Colombia	4	0	0	1	3	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	-1	-2	4	-13	0	1	-1	-2	7															
Peru	4	0	0	-1	3	0	2	0	0	1	1	0	1	3	4	-21	2	1	-6	-6	6															
Venezuela	4	0	0	1	3	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	1	-13	4	25	2	-11	4	-3	5															
Argentina	4	0	0	0	-35	0	-7	0	0	-2	-1	-1	-8	-11	-4	0	-2	-3	0	5	9															
Brazil	-2	-3	0	-1	2	0	-5	0	0	-1	-2	0	-1	-11	-5	-18	-3	-1	-1	-1	4															
Chile	4	0	0	-1	3	0	1	0	0	2	-2	0	-5	-7	4	8	1	-4	-4	-5	6															
Uruguay	4	0	0	1	3	0	1	0	0	-2	0	1	1	-12	1	1	2	1	-5	4	11															
EU	-1	-2	0	-2	-2	0	0	0	0	1	0	-1	0	-2	-2	2	-3	0	-1	0	5															
Rest of Europe	4	0	0	-1	-2	0	-2	0	0	2	0	0	-1	-4	3	19	-1	1	-1	-3	5															
Turkey	-2	-3	0	-2	3	0	-6	0	0	3	0	0	0	-17	1	20	0	-9	-3	-1	7															
Rest of Middle East and North A	-1	-4	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	0	1	0	6	1	24	0	-1	3	1	7															
Morocco	4	0	0	-4	3	0	2	0	0	3	-4	1	1	18	4	7	1	-11	-3	-1	5															
Tunisia	4	0	0	-10	3	0	2	0	0	3	1	0	1	18	1	25	1	1	-5	-2	6															
Botswana	4	0	0	1	3	0	2	0	0	3	1	-1	1	18	4	25	2	1	-7	-1	10															
South Africa	4	0	0	1	-41	0	0	0	0	2	1	1	1	7	4	4	1	1	-2	-2	12															
Rest of SACU	4	0	0	1	3	0	2	0	0	3	1	1	1	18	4	-21	2	1	-5	-2	9															
Malawi	4	0	0	1	3	0	-12	0	0	3	1	1	1	18	4	1	2	1	-7	-1	12															
Mozambique	4	0	0	1	3	0	2	0	0	3	1	1	1	18	4	1	2	1	-9	-5	12															
Tanzania	4	0	0	1	3	0	-3	0	0	3	1	1	1	18	4	25	2	1	-1	9	12															
Zambia	4	0	0	1	3	0	1	0	0	3	1	1	1	18	4	25	2	1	0	1	12															
Zimbabwe	4	0	0	-2	3	0	-12	0	0	3	1	1	1	18	4	-3	-1	1	-1	0	10															
Rest of SADC	4	0	0	1	3	0	1	0	0	3	1	1	1	18	4	12	2	1	-6	-1	10															
Madagascar	4	0	0	1	3	0	2	0	0	3	1	1	1	18	4	25	2	1	-5	-1	6															
Uganda	4	0	0	1	3	0	2	0	0	3	1	1	1	18	4	25	2	1	2	8	12															
Rest of Sub-Saharan	4	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	2	0	1	1	-2	4	25	2	1	-1	0	12															

Source: GTAP database; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Table 25. Japan: differences between market average and bilateral *ad valorem* measures of protection by product and source country (%)

	Paddy rice	Wheat	Cereal grains	Vegetables, fruits and nuts	Oil seeds	Sugar cane, sugar beet	Primary agriculture	Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses	Natural resources	Bovine cattle, sheep and goat meat	Meat products	Other manufacturing	Vegetable oils and fats	Dairy products	Processed rice	Sugar	Food products nec	Beverages and tobacco products	Textiles	Wearing apparel	Leather products
Rest of Oceania	755	183	24	7	0	0	-1	-24	0	14	40	-1	-1	11	834	-61	-7	-11	3	-2	1
Australia	-49	-2	-50	5	0	0	1	-33	0	-2	-15	0	-14	7	55	-72	-7	-29	6	-2	3
China	-245	-42	14	-9	-2	0	-2	19	0	36	35	0	2	-83	-166	-67	-1	-17	-1	0	1
North/East Asia	755	183	9	6	0	0	-1	19	0	29	0	0	-7	2	412	-34	0	-8	0	-1	1
Japan	755	183	39	14	0	0	2	19	0	43	50	0	2	53	834	244	9	15	7	10	13
Indonesia	755	183	5	5	0	0	0	19	0	35	39	-1	1	-164	834	112	6	-33	3	1	-2
Malaysia	-245	183	39	5	0	0	1	0	0	8	42	0	2	-82	834	-93	2	5	3	4	1
Philippines	755	183	33	4	0	0	0	-85	0	-30	45	0	-2	-58	834	116	3	2	2	0	0
Singapore	755	183	39	-82	0	0	-1	19	0	41	42	0	-7	-112	834	98	-29	7	-2	0	-4
Thailand	755	183	-6	-15	0	0	1	19	0	43	41	0	0	8	-166	-65	1	-33	2	2	2
Vietnam	755	183	39	12	0	0	0	19	0	43	44	0	-3	-80	2	122	6	-14	1	1	1
Rest of the World	745	182	35	-9	0	0	1	-7	0	37	44	0	1	-47	491	-22	5	-2	3	4	10
Bangladesh	755	183	39	4	0	0	2	19	0	-7	50	0	-16	53	-79	244	8	15	6	10	13
India	755	-37	30	8	0	0	0	19	0	39	44	0	0	-20	8	-125	7	-15	3	1	2
Sri Lanka	755	183	39	14	0	0	-3	19	0	43	47	0	0	-105	834	-28	5	9	3	2	4
Canada	-245	2	-71	-129	0	0	1	-5	0	3	-29	0	-11	13	834	232	2	-44	-1	-2	2
United States	-50	-2	3	3	0	0	1	3	0	0	-26	0	-3	-14	54	183	-3	5	0	-1	0
Mexico	755	183	39	10	0	0	0	19	-3	-41	-14	0	2	53	834	244	0	9	1	0	-3
Rest of North America	755	183	39	14	0	0	2	19	0	43	50	0	2	53	834	244	7	-3	7	-3	13
Colombia	755	183	39	5	0	0	2	19	0	43	50	0	2	53	834	-29	3	4	-2	-1	9
Peru	755	-11	2	-38	0	0	0	19	0	15	43	0	2	53	834	-107	8	5	4	2	9
Venezuela	755	183	39	14	0	0	1	19	0	43	50	0	2	53	834	244	2	-1	2	-2	11
Argentina	755	183	17	-148	0	0	-5	19	0	43	41	0	-10	-54	834	-93	5	-17	6	1	-2
Brazil	755	183	3	-100	0	0	0	19	0	37	42	0	2	-12	834	-81	-8	-35	1	0	-4
Chile	755	183	36	5	0	0	1	19	0	-70	-7	0	1	-113	834	38	5	-12	5	-2	2
Uruguay	755	183	39	14	0	0	2	19	0	5	49	0	-12	-13	-166	244	5	1	6	-3	-5
EU	-144	3	34	-9	0	0	0	5	0	-33	-16	0	1	4	457	34	-6	-3	-1	-1	-3
Rest of Europe	755	183	37	-35	0	0	1	19	0	35	0	0	1	-32	834	175	3	-15	2	0	-5
Turkey	755	183	28	10	0	0	1	19	0	43	21	0	-1	23	834	244	-1	-5	3	0	2
Rest of Middle East and North Africa	755	183	39	8	0	0	1	19	0	28	45	0	1	-13	834	194	-4	-16	4	0	3
Morocco	755	183	39	11	0	0	2	19	0	43	50	0	-6	53	834	39	2	-31	-4	-1	-1
Tunisia	755	183	39	14	0	0	-1	19	0	43	50	0	2	53	834	244	5	-31	-3	0	-3
Botswana	755	183	39	14	0	0	2	19	0	43	50	0	2	53	834	244	9	15	7	10	13
South Africa	755	-33	2	3	-10	0	-1	19	0	12	49	0	-4	8	834	73	-3	-9	6	-2	10
Rest of SACU	755	183	39	2	0	0	-2	19	0	43	44	0	2	53	834	244	7	15	7	7	12
Malawi	755	183	39	10	0	0	2	19	0	43	50	0	2	53	834	244	9	15	7	10	13
Mozambique	755	183	39	14	0	0	2	19	0	43	50	0	2	29	834	244	8	15	7	10	13
Tanzania	755	183	39	14	0	0	2	19	0	43	50	0	2	53	834	244	5	15	7	10	13
Zambia	755	183	39	14	0	0	2	19	0	43	50	0	2	53	834	244	9	15	7	10	13
Zimbabwe	755	183	39	14	0	0	2	19	0	43	50	-3	2	53	834	244	-3	15	-3	3	10
Rest of SADC	755	183	39	14	0	0	1	19	0	43	50	0	2	53	834	244	5	15	-4	0	13
Madagascar	755	183	39	14	0	0	2	19	0	43	50	0	2	53	834	244	8	15	7	10	13
Uganda	755	183	39	14	0	0	2	19	0	43	50	0	2	53	834	244	5	15	7	10	13
Rest of Sub-Saharan	755	183	39	8	0	0	1	19	0	43	50	0	-3	53	834	244	5	-13	6	3	11

Source: GTAP database; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Table 26. Australia: differences between market average and bilateral *ad valorem* measures of protection by product and source country (%)

	Paddy rice	Wheat	Cereal grains	Vegetables, fruits and nuts	Oil seeds	Sugar cane, sugar beet	Primary argiculture nec	Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses	Natural resources	Bovine cattle, sheep and goat meat	Meat products	Other manufacturing	Vegetable oils and fats	Dairy products	Processed rice	Sugar	Food products nec	Beverages and tobacco products	Textiles	Wearing apparel	Leather products
Rest of Oceania	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	-2	1	0	0	0	2	0	-3	2	-1	1
Australia	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	1	5	1	1	0	2	2	10	13	22	10
China	0	0	0	1	-2	0	0	0	1	0	-3	1	0	-3	0	2	-1	-9	-5	0	0
North/East Asia	0	0	0	0	-2	0	0	0	3	0	-2	0	0	0	0	-11	1	-3	2	5	0
Japan	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	0	-4	1	1	0	-5	2	3	4	3	5
Indonesia	0	0	0	1	-4	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	-1	0	2	1	-13	4	-1	-2
Malaysia	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	2	1	-12	5	0	0
Philippines	0	0	0	1	-1	0	0	0	5	0	1	2	1	-3	0	-5	1	3	7	1	1
Singapore	0	0	0	1	-3	0	0	0	4	0	1	3	-2	1	0	2	1	-5	3	5	1
Thailand	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	-1	1	-3	0	2	0	-2	4	0	-3
Vietnam	0	0	0	1	-1	0	0	0	-1	0	1	-1	-1	1	0	-7	2	-1	-3	-2	-2
Rest of the World	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	-5	2	-1
Bangladesh	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	1	4	-4	1	0	-26	2	10	11	3	5
India	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	4	0	1	1	1	1	0	2	2	0	3	1	1
Sri Lanka	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	-2	0	1	1	0	-9	2	-4	7	1	4
Canada	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	1	3	1	0	0	2	1	3	7	1	3
United States	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	-3	2	1	1	0	1	0	3	3	6	2
Mexico	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	1	2	1	1	0	-5	-1	7	4	0	4
Rest of North America	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	1	4	1	1	0	2	2	10	13	-3	10
Colombia	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	5	0	1	1	1	1	0	2	2	-8	7	-3	4
Peru	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	1	3	1	1	0	2	1	-8	-8	2	4
Venezuela	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	1	1	1	1	0	2	2	-41	13	22	10
Argentina	0	0	0	-3	-4	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	-4	1	0	2	-1	-14	8	1	5
Brazil	0	0	0	1	-1	0	0	0	5	0	-2	1	-4	1	0	2	-2	-11	1	8	-1
Chile	0	0	0	-4	0	0	0	0	5	0	1	2	1	1	0	2	2	-18	-1	10	5
Uruguay	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	1	3	1	1	0	2	1	-6	2	7	4
EU	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	-1	1	3	1	-1
Rest of Europe	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	1	-1	0	1	-1	2	3	1	-2
Turkey	0	0	0	-2	1	0	0	0	4	0	1	-1	1	-3	0	2	-2	-3	2	-1	3
Rest of Middle East and North A	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	-1	3	0	-2	0	-4	-2	-10	4	2	-3
Morocco	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	-1	4	1	1	0	2	2	10	-5	-1	-5
Tunisia	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	1	2	1	1	0	2	1	10	-9	0	-3
Botswana	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	1	2	1	1	0	2	2	10	13	22	10
South Africa	0	0	0	-3	-4	0	0	0	5	0	1	-5	1	1	0	-22	2	-5	2	0	0
Rest of SACU	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	1	1	1	1	0	2	1	10	8	-2	10
Malawi	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	1	2	1	1	0	2	2	10	13	22	10
Mozambique	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	1	4	1	1	0	2	2	10	13	22	10
Tanzania	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	1	4	1	1	0	2	2	10	8	6	10
Zambia	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	1	5	1	1	0	2	2	10	13	22	10
Zimbabwe	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	1	0	1	1	0	2	-2	-8	1	0	6
Rest of SADC	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	1	3	1	1	0	2	2	-6	-12	-3	2
Madagascar	0	0	0	1	-1	0	0	0	5	0	1	4	1	1	0	2	2	10	-7	22	10
Uganda	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	1	4	1	1	0	2	2	10	13	22	10
Rest of Sub-Saharan	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	1	1	0	1	0	2	2	10	2	4	3

Source: GTAP database; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Table 27. Canada: differences between market average and bilateral *ad valorem* measures of protection by product and source country (%)

	Paddy rice	Wheat	Cereal grains	Vegetables, fruits and nuts	Oil seeds	Sugar cane, sugar beet	Primary argiculture nec	Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses	Natural resources	Bovine cattle, sheep and goat meat	Meat products	Other manufacturing	Vegetable oils and fats	Dairy products	Processed rice	Sugar	Food products nec	Beverages and tobacco products	Textiles	Wearing apparel	Leather products
Rest of Oceania	0	0	0	-2	0	0	3	0	0	-3	41	-1	-1	-16	0	-1	-2	1	-3	-2	6
Australia	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	-5	47	0	-3	-22	0	1	-2	0	-1	5	1
China	0	1	0	-1	0	0	-2	0	0	2	23	-1	-4	110	0	-7	3	-5	-8	-1	-2
North/East Asia	0	0	0	-1	0	0	2	0	0	2	43	-2	-8	14	0	-6	4	-11	-8	-3	1
Japan	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	7	47	-2	-7	19	0	-4	1	1	-1	-1	2
Indonesia	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	7	-1	-1	-1	80	0	-9	7	-5	-7	-3	-5
Malaysia	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	7	46	0	-1	110	0	-7	4	-16	-9	-3	-3
Philippines	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	7	-1	0	1	-24	0	-4	5	-16	-11	-3	4
Singapore	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	7	49	0	-4	-51	0	-6	5	-6	-13	-4	4
Thailand	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	-41	-1	1	14	0	-4	6	-21	-6	-4	-1
Vietnam	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	7	20	-2	1	26	0	1	8	-21	-10	-3	-4
Rest of the World	0	-2	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	6	48	0	0	33	0	0	7	4	-9	-2	3
Bangladesh	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	7	-35	0	1	110	0	1	8	5	-12	-3	8
India	0	-2	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	4	50	-1	0	56	0	-5	6	0	-6	-3	0
Sri Lanka	0	1	-1	-1	0	0	4	0	0	7	51	-3	-1	-27	0	-5	6	-8	-12	-3	0
Canada	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	7	51	0	1	110	0	1	8	5	5	14	9
United States	0	1	0	0	0	0	-2	0	0	7	-5	0	0	27	0	1	0	-2	5	14	9
Mexico	0	1	0	-1	0	0	4	0	0	7	51	0	1	110	0	-2	-1	5	5	12	9
Rest of North America	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	7	51	0	1	110	0	1	7	5	-4	3	9
Colombia	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	7	50	0	-3	110	0	0	7	-11	-2	-4	5
Peru	0	1	0	-2	0	0	3	0	0	-36	51	0	1	-21	0	1	8	-7	-8	-4	5
Venezuela	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	7	51	0	1	110	0	1	6	5	5	-5	6
Argentina	0	1	0	-1	0	0	4	0	0	-7	46	0	1	-16	0	-3	-19	-21	2	10	9
Brazil	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	4	45	-1	1	16	0	-1	2	0	-9	-2	0
Chile	0	-1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	7	43	0	1	18	0	1	7	5	5	14	8
Uruguay	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	-6	51	-1	1	-46	0	-3	8	-2	1	8	9
EU	0	1	0	-2	0	0	2	0	0	5	46	-1	1	-9	0	-5	-10	1	-4	-2	1
Rest of Europe	0	1	0	-2	0	0	4	0	0	7	48	-1	-2	31	0	-2	5	0	-5	-3	-1
Turkey	0	-1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	7	-4	0	1	110	0	-9	3	-3	-6	-3	5
Rest of Middle East and North A	0	1	0	-1	0	0	4	0	0	7	3	0	-2	43	0	-4	2	-5	-1	1	5
Morocco	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	7	19	0	1	110	0	-6	5	-11	-11	-4	-1
Tunisia	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	7	51	-1	1	110	0	-3	4	-7	-12	-2	-2
Botswana	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	7	51	0	1	110	0	1	8	5	-14	-4	9
South Africa	0	1	0	-1	0	0	3	0	0	-7	18	0	-4	110	0	0	3	-2	0	-3	4
Rest of SACU	0	1	0	-2	0	0	4	0	0	7	51	-1	1	110	0	1	8	3	-14	-4	-3
Malawi	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	7	51	0	1	110	0	1	8	5	5	-4	9
Mozambique	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	7	51	0	1	110	0	1	8	5	5	-3	9
Tanzania	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	7	51	0	1	110	0	1	8	5	1	14	9
Zambia	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	7	51	0	1	110	0	1	8	5	0	14	9
Zimbabwe	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	7	51	0	1	110	0	1	8	5	-1	14	9
Rest of SADC	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	7	51	0	1	110	0	-1	7	5	-14	-4	4
Madagascar	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	7	51	0	1	110	0	1	8	5	-13	-4	7
Uganda	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	7	51	0	1	110	0	1	8	5	0	7	9
Rest of Sub-Saharan	0	1	0	-1	0	0	4	0	0	7	-60	0	0	110	0	1	7	4	-8	-1	0

Source: GTAP database; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Table 28. Welfare implications of simultaneous 50% cut in ad-valorem equivalent measures of protection by the EU, US, Japan, Canada and Australia

	Breakdown of welfare gains by country taking liberalisation action									
	EU		US		Japan		Canada		Australia	
	initial preferential margin	% change in per capita welfare	initial preferential margin	% change in per capita welfare	initial preferential margin	% change in per capita welfare	initial preferential margin	% change in per capita welfare	initial preferential margin	% change in per capita welfare
Rest of Oceania	-4.16	0.29	-0.32	0.06	0.85	0.03	-2.89	0.05	0.72	0.04
Australia	-0.79	0.03	-0.50	0.02	-1.74	0.05	-0.61	0.00	2.63	-0.01
China	-2.17	0.10	-0.84	0.09	0.25	0.03	-1.32	0.01	-0.03	0.00
North/East Asia	-1.66	0.09	-0.64	0.08	-0.20	0.02	-1.63	0.01	-0.25	0.00
Japan	-2.14	0.02	-0.73	0.02	41.52	0.00	-2.17	0.00	-4.26	0.01
Indonesia	-2.36	0.12	-0.61	0.05	0.27	0.00	-0.95	0.00	0.68	0.01
Malaysia	-0.56	0.06	0.10	0.03	0.27	0.02	-0.11	0.00	1.58	0.00
Philippines	-0.45	0.02	-0.11	0.11	0.58	0.01	-0.60	0.00	1.47	0.00
Singapore	-1.06	0.12	0.30	0.03	-0.48	0.09	0.10	0.00	2.80	-0.02
Thailand	-3.19	0.31	-0.30	0.09	0.71	0.00	0.21	0.00	-0.17	0.01
Vietnam	-2.99	0.77	0.02	0.06	1.39	0.07	-0.64	0.02	-0.51	0.05
Rest of the World	-1.58	0.04	-0.58	0.07	1.10	0.00	-0.16	0.00	0.00	0.00
Bangladesh	2.38	-0.20	-1.61	0.21	6.43	-0.01	-4.57	0.01	5.91	0.00
India	-1.55	0.06	0.32	0.02	1.77	0.00	-1.57	0.00	1.20	0.00
Sri Lanka	-2.88	0.31	-2.36	0.53	0.29	0.00	-2.10	0.02	0.61	0.01
Canada	-0.46	0.00	1.01	-0.05	-1.51	0.01	4.34	0.08	1.98	0.00
United States	-1.29	0.02	2.08	-0.03	-0.04	0.00	0.56	0.00	1.26	0.00
Mexico	-0.45	0.00	1.54	-0.12	-1.03	0.00	0.67	-0.01	1.15	0.00
Rest of North America	1.11	-0.35	-0.19	0.03	3.35	-0.04	3.10	-0.03	0.10	-0.01
Colombia	-4.95	0.05	0.02	0.03	1.15	0.00	0.62	0.00	0.44	0.00
Peru	-0.87	0.05	-0.92	0.05	3.22	-0.01	-1.42	0.01	2.02	0.00
Venezuela	-0.11	-0.01	0.13	0.01	0.29	0.00	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.00
Argentina	-3.84	0.05	-0.32	0.01	2.46	0.00	-1.43	0.00	1.23	0.00
Brazil	-5.69	0.21	-0.28	0.03	2.19	0.00	-0.69	0.00	-0.21	0.00
Chile	-0.91	0.02	-0.21	0.03	0.82	0.00	1.12	0.00	1.04	0.00
Uruguay	-3.83	0.20	1.52	0.00	-1.22	0.01	-2.11	0.04	0.77	0.00
EU	0.87	0.03	-0.38	0.02	-0.45	0.00	-0.82	0.00	0.10	0.00
Rest of Europe	0.05	0.03	-0.03	0.00	-0.28	0.00	0.18	0.00	0.21	0.00
Turkey	0.49	0.00	-0.84	0.04	0.97	0.00	-0.57	0.00	-0.49	0.00
Rest of MENA	-0.09	0.04	0.32	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.08	0.00	1.24	0.00
Monocco	0.71	-0.11	0.12	0.02	1.67	0.00	0.15	0.00	1.41	0.00
Tunisia	0.36	0.18	0.01	0.02	1.60	0.00	-0.04	0.00	0.06	0.00
Botswana	-0.96	0.15	-0.42	0.03	1.22	0.00	0.86	0.00	0.37	-0.01
South Africa	-0.75	0.06	0.63	-0.01	0.99	0.00	0.10	0.00	-3.97	0.01
Rest of SACU	-11.79	1.32	-2.43	0.34	2.62	-0.01	-1.51	0.01	0.90	-0.01
Malawi	-2.14	0.17	-7.66	0.51	1.83	-0.04	1.32	-0.01	0.13	-0.01
Mozambique	0.98	-0.21	0.15	0.02	4.56	-0.02	0.16	0.00	0.37	-0.01
Tanzania	1.23	-0.07	0.31	0.00	3.28	-0.01	2.00	0.00	1.32	0.00
Zambia	0.50	-0.14	0.76	0.01	0.59	-0.01	0.31	0.00	1.91	-0.01
Zimbabwe	-2.55	0.22	-0.76	0.04	-1.20	0.02	0.32	0.00	0.10	-0.01
Rest of SADC	-1.53	0.16	-0.02	0.03	1.11	0.00	-0.42	0.00	0.27	0.00
Madagascar	2.60	-0.14	-2.20	0.20	7.18	-0.02	-2.58	0.00	3.86	0.00
Uganda	1.80	-0.11	0.72	0.00	2.06	0.00	0.89	0.00	0.48	0.00
Rest of Sub-Saharan	0.41	-0.02	0.11	-0.02	1.49	0.00	0.60	-0.01	0.67	0.00

Source: GTAP model simulations.


Table 29. Welfare implications of worldwide 50% cut in ad-valorem equivalent measures of protection

(% change in per capita welfare sorted by the magnitude of overall impact)

	Breakdown of % welfare gains by region taking liberalisation action						
	All	Australia	Japan	Canada	US	EU	others
Rest of North America	-6.09	-0.01	-0.04	-0.02	0.03	-0.31	-5.74
Tanzania	-0.29	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.07	-0.21
Uganda	-0.29	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.11	-0.18
Mozambique	-0.22	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.02	-0.21	0.00
Colombia	-0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.05	-0.28
Rest of Sub-Saharan	-0.16	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.11
Madagascar	-0.14	0.00	-0.02	0.00	0.20	-0.13	-0.19
United States	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.03	0.02	0.00
Canada	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.08	-0.05	0.00	-0.02
Peru	0.06	0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.05	0.05	-0.04
Chile	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.02
Zambia	0.09	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.14	0.24
Philippines	0.10	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.11	0.02	-0.04
Mexico	0.10	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.12	0.00	0.23
Venezuela	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.10
Australia	0.11	-0.01	0.05	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.02
EU	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.07
Argentina	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.05	0.07
Rest of the World	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.04	0.03
Rest of Europe	0.16	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.13
Bangladesh	0.26	0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.21	-0.20	0.25
Brazil	0.26	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.20	0.03
Uruguay	0.26	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.20	0.02
Indonesia	0.31	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.05	0.11	0.13
Rest of MENA	0.31	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.04	0.28
Japan	0.32	0.01	0.18	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.09
South Africa	0.32	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.06	0.26
China	0.36	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.08	0.10	0.14
India	0.44	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.06	0.36
Turkey	0.46	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.42
Botswana	0.58	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.03	0.15	0.42
Morocco	0.64	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	-0.12	0.74
Zimbabwe	0.65	-0.01	0.02	0.00	0.04	0.21	0.39
Singapore	0.68	-0.02	0.08	0.00	0.03	0.12	0.47
Rest of Oceania	0.81	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.28	0.36
North/East Asia	0.92	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.08	0.09	0.72
Thailand	1.07	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.08	0.30	0.67
Rest of SADC	1.21	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.15	1.04
Sri Lanka	1.26	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.51	0.30	0.43
Malawi	1.43	-0.01	-0.03	-0.01	0.49	0.16	0.83
Tunisia	1.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.18	1.30
Malaysia	1.64	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.06	1.53
Rest of SACU	1.80	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.34	1.31	0.16
Vietnam	2.64	0.05	0.07	0.02	0.06	0.77	1.67


Source: GTAP model simulations.

Annex Figure 1, continued. EU: average trade weighted preference margins by source country




Source: GTAP database; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Annex Figure 2. US: average trade weighted preference margins by source country




Annex Figure 2, continued. US: average trade weighted preference margins by source country




Source: GTAP database; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Annex Figure 3. Japan: average trade weighted preference margins by source country




Annex Figure 3, continued. Japan: average trade weighted preference margins by source country




Source: GTAP database; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Annex Figure 4. Australia: average trade weighted preference margins by source country




Annex Figure 4, continued. Australia: average trade weighted preference margins by source country.




Source: GTAP database; OECD Secretariat calculations.

Annex Figure 5. Canada: average trade weighted preference margins by source country



Annex Figure 5, continued. Canada: average trade weighted preference margins by source country



Source: GTAP database; OECD Secretariat calculations.