

Overview and key findings from the global economic model comparison component of the Agricultural Intercomparison and Improvement Project (AgMIP)

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Abstract

Recent studies assessing plausible futures for agricultural markets and global food security have had contradictory outcomes. Ten global economic models that produce long-term scenarios were asked
10 to compare a reference scenario with alternate socio-economic, climate change and bioenergy scenarios using a common set of key drivers. Results suggest that, once general assumptions are harmonized, the variability in general trends across models declines, and that several common conclusions are possible. Nonetheless, differences in basic model parameters, sometimes hidden in the way market behavior is modeled, result in significant differences in the details. This holds for
15 both the common reference scenario and for the various shocks applied. We conclude that agro-economic modelers aiming to inform the agricultural and development policy debate require better data and analysis on both economic behavior and biophysical drivers. More interdisciplinary modeling efforts are required to cross-fertilize analyses at different scales.

Keywords: computable general equilibrium, partial equilibrium, meta-analysis, socio-economic
20 pathway, climate change, bioenergy.

JEL Codes: C63, C68, Q11, Q16, Q24, Q42, Q54

Introduction

Long-term scenarios for global agriculture, food and the environment have become increasingly important for the public debate on agricultural priorities. Recent developments such as the sharp

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25 increase of agricultural and food prices in 2007/08 and 2010, and projections for persistently higher
real commodity prices in the medium term when compared to the decade preceding these years
(OECD/FAO 2011) give rise to concerns about the ability of the global food supply system to keep
pace with increasing demand. Given the long time lags associated with developments that impact
the future paths of agricultural markets, trade and the environment, the debate covers
30 developments well beyond the coming decade. To help explore possible developments in the future
and alternative strategies to influence these developments, scenarios – statements about the future
of a system where complexity and uncertainty require more precise language than “likely” or “most
plausible” developments (Zurek and Henrichs, 2007) – can provide alternative views of the
pathways, and a tool to test policy strategies.

35 Recent studies assessing plausible futures for agricultural markets and global food security have had
contradictory outcomes (e.g., Nelson et al., 2010, INRA-CIRAD, 2009, and van der Mensbrugghe et al.,
2011). This variability arises from the interaction of differences in perspectives on future drivers, in
the responses of producers and consumers to those drivers, and in the way the results are reported.
Because these scenarios are undertaken independently, with assumptions reported in technical
40 annexes or not at all, it is difficult for decision makers to assess why the outcomes differ, and in
particular to tell whether differences in the scenarios are due to differences in assumptions about
key driving factors or to methodological differences in the modeling frameworks.

This paper gives an overview on an extensive scenario comparison exercise undertaken in the
context of the Agricultural Model Intercomparison and Improvement Project (AgMIP,
45 www.agmip.org), involving ten of the world’s leading global economic models (see below). The
paper provides details on how the comparison was done, putting emphasis on steps taken to make
the results of the various models actually comparable. It then reports selected results of the
comparison, both from the reference scenario and the various counterfactual scenarios. A discussion
of the main findings and a concluding section round out this paper.

50 **Method of analysis**

The model suite

A total of ten global multi-region multi-sector models ran a set of well-defined scenarios for 2030 and 2050. These include six computable general equilibrium (CGE) models and four partial equilibrium (PE) models (see Table 1). Both the spatial resolution and the level of disaggregation of the agricultural sector are very different across these models – both are functions of their histories and original purposes.

These models differ in a number of other characteristics, as shown in Table 1. Importantly for this paper, half of the models can be used to model alternative levels of second-generation bioenergy production, while the other models either have no explicit representation of bioenergy or focus on feedstock use for first-generation biofuels, electricity and/or heating. The table also shows that most CGE models have a spatially explicit representation of bilateral trade flows using the Armington approach (except AIM which only represent net trade), while most PE models consider only net-trade to a spot world market (except GLOBIOM which represents bilateral trade flows).

Table 1 about here.

65 **Scenarios analyzed**

The goal of the model comparison exercise was to understand the differences in model projections and model behavior and to identify their sources; *not* to choose scenarios for their plausibility.

Great effort was made to harmonize the values of key drivers - socioeconomic (population and GDP growth), productivity assumptions for crop yields, energy price assumptions (based on the crude oil price), and, for two of the scenarios (S7 and S8, see below), assumptions on the production of biomass-based energy.

Scenarios were constructed around a common reference scenario (S1) by varying the drivers in one of three dimensions – socio-economic change (S2), climate change impacts (S3-S6), and bioenergy

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demand (S8) and comparing the results to a reference scenario (i.e. S2-S6 are compared to S1, S8 to
75 a modified reference scenario S7 which, unlike S1, applies common assumptions on bioenergy
production; Table 2).

Table 2 about here.

Making results comparable

A major step towards comparability of model results was the harmonization of output reporting,
80 commodity groups analyzed, spatial aggregation, variable definitions, and periodicity.

For this analysis, the following eight groups of agricultural commodities are considered: wheat
(WHT), coarse grains (CGR), rice (RIC), oilseeds (OSD), sugar (SUG), ruminant meat (RUM), non-
ruminant meat (NRM), and dairy products (DRY). In addition, aggregates were calculated for the five
crop aggregates (CR5), for all crops combined (CRP), and for all agriculture combined (AGR).

85 It should be noted that for some models, the boundaries of individual commodity groups could not
be harmonized completely. In particular, other temperate cereals including rye, barley, triticale and
oats are grouped together with wheat rather than coarse grains in MAGPIE, while GLOBIOM only
includes sugar cane in the sugar aggregate.

In representing results, the world was broken down into 13 regions, including five individual
90 countries (Canada – CAN, United States – USA, Brazil – BRA, China – CHN, India - IND) and nine
country aggregates (Other South and Central America – OSA, Europe – EUR, Former Soviet Union –
FSU, Middle-East and North Africa – MEN, Sub-Saharan Africa – SSA, South-East Asia – SEA, Other
Asia – OSA, Australia and New Zealand – ANZ). To accommodate differences in model
disaggregation, several larger regional aggregates were additionally included.

95 However, the regional aggregates may differ from those in Figure SI-1 for individual models,
depending on the models' original spatial aggregations. For instance, in MagPIE, the ANZ region,
defined for the rest of the models as Australia and New Zealand, also includes Japan as well as

numerous Pacific Islands, and the China region (CHN) also includes Cambodia, Laos, Mongolia and Vietnam.

100 A widely used metric of agricultural performance is the ‘world price’. While most PE models use one reference price of a key exporter or importer for each commodity (assuming that prices across regions largely move in parallel), CGE models using the Armington assumption calculate weighted averages of their regional producer or export prices. Each of these concepts has its own deficiencies, and depending on the relative shares in global production and exports these prices can develop
105 quite differently (see Robinson et al., 2013 for a discussion). The concept used in this analysis that is most comparable across all the models is the producer price averaged across world production regions, weighted by output. In addition, we are interested in ‘real prices’, i.e. free of inflation. The deflator used in this analysis is the global GDP deflator – we will show the importance of using a common deflator when discussing the results of the reference scenario.

110 All models reported results for the years 2030 and 2050 as indices relative to a 2005 base year. As models’ base years differ, ‘hypothetical’ base year data for 2005 were calculated using the average annual growth rates between the actual model’s base year and 2030 values.¹ It should be understood that the indices for 2030 and 2050 do not represent ‘projected’ values for these years specifically. Rather they indicate medium- and long-term scenario values describing how agricultural
115 markets could, on average, develop within the next 20 and 40 years, respectively, under the scenario model assumptions.

Reviewing the results

This overview paper provides a ‘bird’s eye’ perspective on the results. The paper groups key results into five broad categories, key results finding large agreement across the range of models, and four
120 different types of differences (called Type-1 to Type-4 differences).

¹ MAGNET and FARM are exceptions to this rule as these models provide data for both 2004 and 2007. It is therefore data for these two years which were used to interpolate the hypothetical 2005 base year values.

This paper also includes an econometric meta-analysis of the differences in price changes (both over time in the reference scenario, and between the reference scenario and alternative scenarios) as a function of model characteristics. Of particular interest is the generic distinction between CGE and PE models: we test the hypothesis that CGE models, due to their assumed larger degree of flexibility derived from the ability to allocate production factors to alternate sectors, dampen exogenous shocks (such as increased food demand due to population and income growth, or reduced agricultural production due to climate change), and hence have smaller price changes. In contrast, models that include bilateral trade flows based on either the Armington assumption (ENVISAGE, EPPA, FARM, GTEM and MAGNET) or on trade costs (GLOBIOM) assume more segmented global markets which could increase international price movements. We therefore test the hypothesis that these spatial-equilibrium models report larger price changes than net-trade models (AIM, GCAM, IMPACT and MAgPIE). To analyze the specific effects of model characteristics, we estimate fixed-effect models across model results for both 2030 and 2050, where price changes are used as dependent variables, while model characteristics are used as independent variables. We also control for the differences across commodities, by estimating commodity-specific constants.

Key results of the analysis

The reference scenario

For the reference scenario, economic assumptions, including on population and GDP growth, are based on the Shared Socio-economic Pathway (SSP) 2, corresponding to “middle of the road” projections largely following past trends and SSP3 characterized as “fragmentation” (see O’Neill et al., 2012, van Vuuren et al., 2012, and Kriegler et al., 2012, for a discussion of SSPs. The SSP data are available for download at IIASA/OECD, 2013²). In SSP2, global population reaches 9.3 billion by 2050,

² A consortium of research institutes are developing a new set of scenarios for climate change research encompassing earth systems, crop and other specialized models and socio-economic scenarios. Currently there are three sets of so-called shared socio-economic pathways (SSPs), for each of five different storylines designated by SSP1 through SSP5. The three sets of SSPs have harmonized on a common set of five population scenarios developed at IIASA. The GDP scenarios have been developed by IIASA, OECD and PIK. For the

an increase of 35 percent from 2010. Population growth slows significantly over time and shows large differences across countries. Global GDP triples between 2010 and 2050, more rapidly during the first half of that period than after 2030. Growth in most OECD countries is assumed to be moderate, while GDP in a number of developing countries is assumed to grow more than 10-fold. Figure 1 provides a regional overview on assumptions for population and per capita GDP.

Figure 1 about here.

Apart from population and GDP, common assumptions were made on productivity growth rates for crops. The *intrinsic productivity rates* (IPRs) used within the IMPACT model (see Nelson et al., 2010, pp. 23ff. for details) were used as exogenous shifters in the reference scenario³, which assumes no effects of climate change (see Figure 2). While the IPRs are used in PE models to shift the yield function, the shifters move the agricultural production function in CGE models such that it represents land-saving technical progress (see Robinson et al., 2013, for more details).

Figure 2 about here.

Focusing on comparability, the reference scenario (S1) assumes no climate change, a very restrictive assumption. Between 2005 and 2050, the S1 model results for the AGR aggregate price range from a decline of 15% to an increase of 39%, relative to the global GDP price index (Figure 3). As discussed above, ensuring comparability is of key importance to this exercise. However, as reflected in Table 1 above, the five CGE models almost all use different numeraires, i.e. prices relative to which agricultural price changes are reported. To see the implications of basing results on different numeraires, Figure 3 shows price changes reported by CGE models both based on the model-specific numeraire and relative to a common one, the price index for the global GDP. As the figure shows,

purposes of the AgMIP exercise, all modeling teams have harmonized on the OECD GDP scenarios and the common set of population scenarios. The data have undergone a light transformation to make them broadly compatible for the various participating models.

³ This exogenous productivity growth was added in all models to reflect technological change and other drivers exogenous to the system. In addition most models include an endogenous component to yields that allows adjustments to input and output prices. The exception is MAgPIE, which models technological change endogenously instead and hence does not use the exogenous productivity shifters.

the choice of the numeraire in CGE models has significant implications for the prices reported.

165 Throughout the rest of this paper, we will therefore discuss prices based on the common numeraire.

Figure 3 about here.

Even after harmonization of the numeraire, however, Figure 3 above still reveals a significant degree of variability in the price results across models. Indeed, the variability is little affected by this

harmonization overall, despite the changes for individual models' results. In addition, the average

170 prices shown in Figure 3 hide substantial variation across commodities, as we will see below. Before

we try to analyze these differences in some more detail, however, it appears important to put them

into perspective by looking at historical price patterns. On average, real agricultural prices⁴ have

declined by some 4% p.a. between the 1960s and the 2000s. Average annual rates of change

between the trended 2005 base year and 2050, as reported by the models, range between -0.4%

175 and +0.7%. These results do not incorporate the negative productivity effects of climate change

which, as we will see below, lead to greater prices increases. In other words, there is a clear

agreement across models that, under the set of (sometimes strong) assumptions taken for this

exercise, the historical trend of falling prices is unlikely to continue over the coming decades, and

that, compared to past developments, agricultural prices would remain fairly close to the levels seen

180 during the 2000s.

While there remain important differences across models concerning future price directions, these

ranges are also much more narrowly defined than the range of results found in the literature - a

consequence of substantial harmonization of assumptions and of reporting standards.⁵ That said, we

will look into the differences in scenario results in greater detail now.

⁴ Price index of agricultural products (World Bank, 2013a), deflated by the global GDP inflation rate (World Bank, 2013b; for years preceding 1966, average GDP inflation rate for the USA, EU area, Japan, China, Canada and India, weighted by their 1960-1966 GDP in US Dollars – these six regions accounted for 80% for global GDP during that period).

⁵ It is worth noting that the range of prices – even if still significant – has narrowed considerably since the project was initiated, resulting from both increased efforts in harmonizing basic assumptions and continued model improvements.

185 Looking at crop prices versus ruminant meat ones shows that the ten models can be divided into
three groups of three to four each: according to four models (the CGE ENVISAGE and the three PE
models GCAM, IMPACT and GLOBIOM), the reference scenario would be characterized by increasing
livestock prices (+8% - +26% by 2050 for ruminant meat) but largely unchanged crop prices (-4% -
+8%). Three models (MAGNET, EPPA and FARM) report falling prices for both crops and livestock
190 products (although MAGNET expects prices for oilseeds and notably sugar to increase), while the
remaining three models (GTEM, MAgPIE and AIM) report crop prices increasing by 30% and more –
but price developments for ruminant meat vary significantly among them (-11% - +25%).

Figure 4 about here.

The global averages hide much larger variations in regional producer prices, notably for the CGE
195 models featuring an Armington trade specification that provides some degree of market insulation.
The average price change for agricultural products in 2050, relative to the harmonized 2005 basis, in
China ranges between +139% (AIM) and -41% (MAGNET). All models predict prices in India to
increase, but the magnitude varies between 2% and 193%. Prices move much more symmetrically
for partial equilibrium models due to the direct price transmission represented – an exception is
200 given by MAgPIE which, given the trade shares largely fixed based on historical data, reports
variations in changes of regional marginal production costs as large as most CGE models do.

Price changes are related to significant differences in market developments. World agricultural
production⁶ increases by between 60% and 111% across models with detailed representations of the
agricultural sectors. Production growth is particularly strong for sugar, coarse grains and oilseeds –
205 commodities used in the production of current biofuels, so partly this reflects the expansion of
biofuel markets – as well as for ruminant meat. In contrast, production and use of wheat and rice –
key staple commodities in large parts of the world – should grow more slowly. Indeed, food use of

⁶ Volume aggregates are calculated on the basis of base year prices with the exception of GCAM which
calculated aggregates on a ton-by-ton basis.

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agricultural products grows less significantly than total use, with rates towards 2050 between 43% and 99%.

210 Other key results largely common across models include the following:

- Africa and the Middle-East are relative hotspots for growth in agricultural consumption, while the increase in Europe is modest.
- Africa, together with Latin America, represents the region with the largest gains in agricultural production, driven by the growth in their own markets and fuelled by above-average growth in agricultural land use and productivity.
- Despite the significant production growth over the coming decades, Africa, and most notably North Africa and the Middle East, expand their net imports of agricultural products.
- North America and Oceania would significantly expand their role as net food suppliers for import markets, particularly in crops.
- Brazil, too, increases net exports, in particular of meat.

As seen above, however, important differences across model results remain in spite of the significant degree of harmonization. These differences are caused by a variety of factors and will form important input to future work. Four types of differences in the modeling of long term developments in agricultural markets can be distinguished, and we will briefly discuss each of these in turn using specific examples from this comparison exercise without, however, trying to be exhaustive in listing all the differences across models.

A first category (“Type-1 differences”) can be defined as areas of heterogeneity across model approaches or their parameterization where the existing literature would suggest a more narrowly defined range of approaches could be achieved, without relying on substantial additional research. It has been shown, for instance, that agricultural commodities in general, and staple food in particular, have income elasticities significantly lower than unity (Engel’s law: the share of food decreases as income increases) and in many cases close to or even below zero. In addition, income elasticities for

staples generally fall with rising incomes (see, e.g., Foresight, 2011, p. 51; Cirera and Masset, 2010; Gale and Huang, 2007). Two of the CGE models, however, generally have increasing income
235 elasticities over time, with some of the values, especially for staple crops, being much higher than suggested by the literature. While it needs to be noted that these parameters apply to direct household demand for the agricultural commodities only and hence exclude processed food, high income elasticities contribute to projections of strong growth in food demand and hence relatively high levels of agricultural prices. See Valin et al. 2013 for a more detailed discussion of food demand
240 developments.

We also find that several models have price elasticities increasing (in absolute value) over time. In contrast, empirical research shows that demand for basic commodities such as food becomes less price elastic as incomes grow and the share of incomes spent for these basics becomes smaller (see e.g. Muhammad et al., 2011, pp. 14 ff.).

245 A second category (“Type-2 differences”) refers to areas where more economic research and better economic data would likely narrow the differences between model outputs. For instance, current own price elasticities for non-ruminant meat in China range from -0.09 in AIM to -0.56 in GLOBIOM. Spreads for other commodities and regions are similarly large. More elastic demand implies that exogenous shocks are absorbed more by demand adjustments and hence result in smaller price
250 changes.

Another Type-2 difference is that agricultural land use declines significantly both at the regional and global level for some models and increases in others. For instance, AIM reports a 45% decline in agricultural land use for China. The reason for the strong decline in China according to AIM is mainly driven by two factors: productivity growth together with slowing (and eventually negative)
255 population growth allows for meeting demand with lower land use- At the same time, increasing labor costs pushes down land demand. The obvious question will be to what degree agriculture in China (and elsewhere) could switch to less labor intensive production, i.e. substitute land and capital

for labor as relative prices change. The issue also raises questions with respect to the sustainability of such changes from a rural development point of view.

260 Models also differ in their assumptions on the level of technological change for the other production factors, such as labor and capital, the rate of tech change in agriculture versus the rest of the economy and the rate of intermediate technological change – a third example of a Type-2 difference. In CGE models labor, capital and intermediates are key cost components and their development has a major impact on price developments. Assumptions on these variables are a key
265 driver behind the different results (see, Robinson et al., 2013). The consequences of these differences can be seen in the falling real prices reported by MAGNET, which models labor productivity in the agricultural sector endogenously and higher than in the rest of the economy that is dominated by the service sector.

The third category (“Type-3 differences”) relates to areas of uncertainty where economists need
270 better information from their colleagues from other disciplines, such as on biophysical relationships. An example of this kind of uncertainty is the strong increase in land used for agricultural production reported for China (e.g. ENVISAGE: +21%), India (e.g. AIM: +31%) or South-East Asia (ENVISAGE and GCAM: +41% and +46%, respectively)⁷. These regions are known for their scarcity of land (see e.g. Alexandratos and Bruinsma, 2012), and more work is required to better understand whether these
275 countries can increase significantly their agricultural land use in a sustainable way.

More generally, however, we find a negative relationship between the expansion of global agricultural area and the average agricultural producer prices in 2050 – even though the results from EPPA and FARM fall somewhat outside this correlation (Figure 5). Such a relationship is not
surprising per se, but it shows the importance of alternative representations of land use changes and
280 reinforces the need for further research in land-use oriented disciplines to better and more narrowly

⁷ Note that the increase reported by the two CGE models AIM and ENVISAGE is an expansion in value terms at constant prices, and hence could partly reflect changes in the composition of land used. For instance, the conversion of (lower-value) pasture land into (higher-value) crop land would result in an increase of the land value reported by the models.

define future scenarios of land use and land conversion.⁸ See Schmitz et al. (2013) for a more detailed discussion on land use changes.

Figure 5 about here.

Finally, a fourth category (“Type-4 differences”) refers to areas of uncertainty that will not be resolved by research within the foreseeable future. Examples include GDP growth (and, more specifically, growth in disposable incomes), agricultural productivity changes, and climate change outcomes. Exploring the outcomes from a range of plausible drivers is essential, not least as these drivers in part depend on decisions on public policies and private investments.

Alternative socio-economic assumptions

To analyze the implications of alternate socio-economic assumptions across models, a first counter-factual scenario is based on population growth and GDP from the SSP3 scenario (“Fragmentation”, see van Vuuren et al., 2012; O’Neill et al., 2012; Kriegler et al., 2012). When compared to the more middle-of-the-road SSP2 scenario, SSP3 implies higher population growth globally (+11% compared to SSP2) and in developing countries but lower population growth in the developed world. At the same time, economic output would be lower than under SSP2 virtually everywhere, with global GDP in 2050 more than 30% below its SSP2 level. Consequently, global per capita GDP falls by 39% relative to the reference scenario, with reductions by more than 50% in Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia. In contrast, per capita GDP in Canada would be 10% higher (see Figure 2 above).

In this scenario S2, higher population growth for the less developed world means more mouths to feed, but lower per capita GDP growth tends to shift demand from higher-value meats and oils to staple grains. In consequence, total food requirements in developing countries could change either way when compared to the reference scenario S1, depending on income elasticities of food demand. Across models that report it, global food calorie consumption per capita is 6-10% lower in S2 than

⁸ It is worth noting that the relationship between land use expansion and average prices is much less distinct when considering crops only, suggesting that the links between crop and livestock sectors are an important factor in determining agricultural developments.

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S1, with Sub-Saharan Africa, and parts of Asia affected more negatively as per capita incomes are lower. Total consumption, in contrast, could go up or down due to higher population growth. In India, for instance, consumption of agricultural products is predicted by the CGEs ENVISAGE and FARM to be between 7% and 24% lower in 2050 compared to the reference, whereas the models MAGNET and GCAM both predict a small increase in total agricultural use.

Consumers in developed countries, in contrast, consume more in S2 according to most models – although the results suggest changes in per capita food consumption relative to the reference scenario are moderate. Total consumption of agricultural products would decrease relative to the reference scenario in all developed regions and across models due to lower population growth.

Global consumption of agricultural products is simulated to fall relative to S1 by most models, albeit with varying magnitudes: For the agricultural aggregate, results range between barely any change (GCAM, GLOBIOM, IMPACT and AIM) and a reduction of global consumption by 26% (ENVISAGE).

Consumption of livestock products is reduced more strongly than that of crops, consistent with the higher income elasticities generally found for meat and dairy products when compared to crops.

With reduced domestic use in developed regions in S2, most models have increased net exports relative to S1. This is particularly true for North America and Europe across most models. The positive effects for net exports by Australia/New Zealand are smaller but equally consistent across models. Net exports from Latin America decrease due either to higher domestic demand in most models or reduced supply following lower world prices as reported particularly by ENVISAGE (see below). Key importing regions such as North Africa / Middle East are found by most models to face higher net import requirements due to stronger domestic consumption.

The differences in the demand effects of S2 relative to S1 translate into substantial variation of price effects across models, with a weak link across models between stronger reductions in global consumption and lower prices relative to the reference scenario. Two models (GCAM and GLOBIOM) show practically no impacts on world average producer prices in 2050 for the agricultural aggregate

or for individual commodities. Both of them also show little change in global consumption (see
330 Figure 6 – the picture for the five main crops is very similar). At the same time, two other models
(IMPACT and AIM) reporting virtually no change in aggregate consumption show declining prices
relative to the reference scenario. However, the models reporting the strongest decline in aggregate
use, EPPA and ENVISAGE, also suggest prices to fall strongly relative to the reference. FARM, MAgPIE
and MAGNET, in contrast, have higher prices with slightly falling aggregate consumption. One might
335 expect prices for commodities with higher income elasticities to fall relative to those products with
lower income elasticities. IMPACT results show this behavior with prices for rice (often an inferior
good today and in particular with rising incomes) slightly higher but those for meat and dairy
products falling by 15% and more relative to the reference. Other models do not show this as clearly,
with many of them simulating prices for non-ruminant meat to increase relative to other
340 commodities.

Figure 6 about here.

Climate change implications for long-term food security and agriculture⁹

This section reviews the model results for four climate change scenarios, all based on the highest
GHG emissions of the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs), RCP 8.5 (see Moss et al. 2010
345 for a discussion of RCPs). This RCP is used as an input into two general circulation models (GCMs) –
IPSL-CM5A-LR (scenarios S3 and S5) and HadGEM2-ES (S4 and S6) (see Müller and Robertson, 2013,
for more details). The resulting changes in regional temperature and precipitation were then used by
two different crop models - LPJmL (S3 and S4) and DSSAT (S5 and S6) (see Müller and Robertson,
2013, for a detailed discussion of this process) which produced climate change related changes in
350 average crop yields. It should be noted that the crop models assumed the absence of any
fertilization effects of higher atmospheric contents of CO₂, so the scenarios represent a “worst-case”
pathway within the range of possible climate change developments currently discussed.

⁹ A more detailed discussion on the climate change scenarios can be found in Nelson et al, (2013).

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Climate effects on biophysical productivity are negative in almost all cases, but differ widely across regions, commodities and scenarios. Globally, the scenarios using DSSAT results have greater yield declines for wheat, rice and, in particular, coarse grains and sugar, whereas the yield shocks are more moderate on average for oilseeds, when compared to the two LPJmL scenarios. Differences between the two GCMs are generally more moderate overall, although they differ for individual regions and crops.

The productivity changes were used by each model to change yield determinants. In partial equilibrium models, the shocks were used as additive shifters in the yield or supply function, while CGE models implemented them as shifts in the land efficiency parameters of the production functions for agricultural sectors (see Robinson et al., 2013, for a more in-depth discussion on differences between CGE- and PE-approaches of modeling yield effects).

Results from most models suggest that climate change will generate higher prices for agricultural commodities in general, and for crops in particular, irrespective of the GCM and crop model used (Figure 7). As one would expect given the yield shocks, the two DSSAT scenarios (S5 and S6) generally show stronger price increases than the LPJmL ones (S3 and S4), with little difference between the GCMs, although for MAGPIE the two HadGEM2-ES scenarios (S4 and S6) show higher prices than the IPSL-CM5A-LR scenarios (S3 and S5). Prices increase for all crops with the exception of sugar in the two LPJmL scenarios where sugar yields increase. Price effects for the average of the five main crop aggregates range between a low +2% and a high +79% across models and scenarios.

Figure 7 about here.

As discussed in more detail by Nelson et al. (2013) and Schmitz et al. (2013), differences in the price effects of climate change are accompanied by differences in land use change. Globally, land used in 2050 for the five main crops changes due to climate change by between -2% and +26% across models and climate change scenarios. While one could expect to see a negative relationship between the area expansion and price increase, no clear link can be found, suggesting that

differences in the area expansion are not only a driver for, but also a result of differences in price changes across models.

380 Similar results can be found for the link between final yield changes (i.e., after both being shocked from climate change and adjusting to higher prices) and changes in crop prices. Like area changes, yield changes in the climate change scenarios differ widely across models, but a clear link between stronger yield reductions (i.e., smaller endogenous yield adjustments due to changed economics) and higher prices cannot be established. As in the case of area changes, differences in yield
385 reductions are thus both cause and result of the differences in price changes across models. The same holds for adjustments in the use of crops.

Nonetheless, the implications of climate change for food consumption appear to be clear across models and climate change scenario: climate change reduces per capita calorie availability across the world, with only few and limited exceptions. Decline in per capita calorie availability could be as
390 large as 11% for India in 2050 when compared to a no-climate-change reference.

Irrespective of the differences in price changes, we also find strong evidence that climate change could result in substantially higher net food imports. This is particularly true for India which is consistently – with the exception of EPPA – shown to increase its net imports for the five main crops. On the other hand, Canada and Brazil are shown by most models to increase net exports. Clearly for
395 some regions trade will play an important role in adapting to increasing climate change. For other regions, results are more mixed (see Ahammad et al., 2013, for a more detailed discussion of trade in this comparison exercise).

Bioenergy: resource implications and agricultural markets¹⁰

A final set of scenarios, calculated only by a subset of five models (AIM, MAGNET, GCAM, GLOBIOM
400 and MAgPIE), looks at the implications of substantially increased biomass use for energy purposes. The focus here is on second-generation bioenergy, based on cellulosic raw materials. Two

¹⁰ A more detailed discussion on the bioenergy analysis can be found in Lotze-Campen et al, (2013).

counterfactuals are compared: first, the reference scenario is adjusted to harmonize on a zero second-generation biomass-based energy production assumption across the five models capable of running these scenarios. This is compared to a high-second-generation bioenergy scenario where global energy output from biomass-based energy output is increased to about 108 ExaJoule (EJ) in 2050, based on GCAM data. Biomass-based energy is assumed to be most significant – in absolute figures – in the Former Soviet Union (32 EJ), the USA (19 EJ), China (17 EJ), the Middle-East/North Africa region and in Europe (11 EJ each).

Depending on specific model implementations of bioenergy demand, the models differ with respect to the share of biomass coming from forest activities. In all models, some agricultural land is used for annual or perennial biomass production, thus reducing land available for crop production. In addition, the biomass production would compete for other resources otherwise used in the production of food and feed commodities.

In consequence, a substantial increase in bioenergy would, all else being unchanged, add upward pressure on agricultural prices, an impact that is confirmed by all model results. Most model results suggest, however, that the average price effects for all commodities remain rather limited at less than 9% in 2050 (Figure 8). The exception is MAgPIE which predicts substantial price increasing impacts notably for ruminants, wheat, sugar and oilseeds (less so for coarse grains and rice) as well as for other crops included by the model. The much stronger increase in prices suggested by MAgPIE can partly be explained by the fact that the model treats the demand for agricultural products as exogenous, thus limiting adjustments to the supply shock. In addition, MAgPIE assumes all biomass for energy to come from specific bioenergy crops, as opposed to other models which allow significant shares of the biomass to be provided from forest area or wastes of wood and crop residues. The five models also differ in the available area for agricultural land expansion. A more detailed discussion of the bioenergy scenarios can be found in Lotze-Campen et al. (2013).

Figure 8 about here.

An econometric meta-analysis of model results

As indicated above, we undertake an econometric meta-analysis to analyze simulated world price changes in the reference scenario between the 2005 base year and the 2030 and 2050 simulation

430 years with respect to key model characteristics. In particular, we test the hypothesis that model types (CGE versus PE models) and the representation of bilateral trade flows (i.e. spatial-equilibrium models versus non-spatial equilibrium models¹¹) systematically impact the simulated price changes. We do this analysis by estimating the following set of equations (1):

$$XRPR_{m,i}^t - 1 = a_i^t + b_{c(m)} + \varepsilon_{m,i}^t \quad (1)$$

435 where $XRPR_{m,i}^t$ is the price index of commodity i in period t (2005** = 1) as simulated by model m, a_i^t is the estimated commodity specific constant, $b_{c(m)}$ is the estimated fixed effect of characteristic c of model m, and $\varepsilon_{m,i}^t$ is the error term.

Similarly, we analyze simulated world price changes for the various alternate scenarios relative to the reference scenario, i.e. for the socio-economic (S2) and climate change shocks (S3-S6) relative to
440 the reference scenario S1, and for the bioenergy scenario S8 relative to the adjusted reference scenario S7. We test the same hypotheses as for the reference scenario itself. The corresponding set of equations for these alternate scenarios looks as follows:

$$rXRPR_{m,i}^t = a_i^t + b_{c(m)} + \varepsilon_{m,i}^t \quad (2)$$

445 where $rXRPR_{m,i}^t$ is the relative price change for commodity i in period t between the reference scenario S1 and the SSP3 scenario S2 as simulated by model m, a_i^t is the estimated commodity specific constant, $b_{c(m)}$ is the estimated fixed effect of characteristic c of model m, and $\varepsilon_{m,i}^t$ is the error term.

¹¹ Models with a spatially explicit representation of bilateral trade flows include most CGE models (except AIM) via an Armington approach, as well as GLOBIOM, one of the four PE models, applying a Takayama-Judge approach.

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The estimated coefficients for the model characteristics b , together with their respective p-values, are reported in Table 4 below.

450 For price projections in the **reference scenario** (which, on average, show increasing price changes), there appears to be a systematic difference in price changes between PE models on the one hand, and CGE models on the other, in that CGE systems tend to simulate lower prices than PE models. This result thus gives some support for the original hypothesis that CGE models generally allow for greater degrees of substitution within the production and demand systems, thus increasing the
455 likelihood that market responses dampen price changes due to exogenous shocks, such as increased demand from population and income growth.

The spatial explicitness of bilateral trade flows represented in several models also tends to result in smaller price increases – a result that requires further research as it seems to contradict the original hypothesis of dampened prices due to more segmented markets in these models. All these effects
460 are noticeable for both the medium-term (2030) and the longer term (2050), and are statistically significant at the 1%-level for both years (with the exception of the CGE estimate in 2050 which is significant only at the 5%-level).

We find an equally clear and statistically significant difference in the impact of the **SSP3 scenario** on world average producer prices between CGE and PE models. Compared to PE models, simulated
465 price reductions across commodities are dampened by about 3 percentage points for CGE models when compared to PE models on average. Again, this dampening effect of CGEs on average prices can be explained by the higher substitution possibilities within their supply systems (see Robinson et al., 2013, for a more detailed discussion of the differences between CGE and PE models) and more flexible demand.

470 We find a similar dampening effect on average price changes for models representing bilateral trade in a spatially explicit way. As for the reference scenario, this appears to contradict the hypothesis that these models, due to their inherently assumed more limited price transmission between

domestic and international markets, would produce stronger price changes due to changes in agricultural demand.

475 In light of the general increase in average producer prices due to **climate change**, we find that CGE models predict smaller price increases than PE models – a result that is statistically highly significant across all four climate-change scenarios and for both 2030 and 2050.

Reasons for this may be two-fold: first, and similar to the results for the socio-economic scenario above this result could confirm the hypothesis that CGEs have built in a higher degree of flexibility in
480 the production and demand systems as well as in the allocation of production factors within the agricultural sector. With more flexibility, the production shock could be dampened through other or higher use of production inputs, or reduced demand, thus reducing the impact on output and markets. Second, however, this result may partly be the consequence of how the climate change shock is applied in CGEs when compared to the PE models. See Robinson et al. (2013) for a
485 discussion of how the yield shocks are applied in CGE and PE models, respectively.

We also find that models with a spatially explicit representation of bilateral trade flows (which include ENVISAGE, FARM, GTEM, MAGNET and GLOBIOM) tend to produce stronger price increases due to the climate shocks – although this result does not hold for cases. This result appears to support the original hypothesis of the lower price transmission resulting in stronger price changes
490 following exogenous shocks. Given the contradicting results for the reference and SSP3 scenarios, however, such a conclusion seems to be premature. Additional research is required to better understand the implications of different trade representations on global simulation results.

Finally, we find a distinct difference between CGEs and PEs in the price effects of increased **bioenergy production**. Once again we find the dampening effects of CGEs, resulting in smaller price
495 increases when compared to those reported by PE models. This effect is magnified by the inclusion of the MAGPIE results (see above) and in 2050 no longer holds when excluding that model, however.

We also find that models with a spatially explicit representation of bilateral trade flows (MAGNET and GLOBIOM) report lower price increases than the non-spatial trade models (AIM, GCAM and MAgPIE). This result appears inconsistent with expectations. As noted above, more work is required to understand the implications of modeling international trade differently.

The relatively small number of models participating in this analysis, and consequently the even smaller number of models featuring particular characteristics, form an important caveat to this meta-analysis. This is particularly true for the bioenergy scenario, which uses data from only five models. Despite the statistical significance of most of the results, largely supportive of the postulated hypothesis notably for the difference between CGE and PE models, additional research is thus required to further clarify the links between alternative model types and scenario outcomes.

Table 3 about here.

Discussion

Despite the substantial differences the scenario results exhibit across models, the comparison of scenarios across a number of global economic models has revealed a number of largely common outcomes, including on relative hotspots for future growth in agricultural demand and production, the relative importance of productivity progress as compared to area expansions, and an increasingly important role for international trade. Such results, which appear fairly robust across the different scenarios simulated but to be the more significant, the more climate change will affect agricultural production, give preliminary indications that national and international policies as well as private investments will need to be prepared. Strong production growth will need take place in a sustainable manner, as key growth regions feature large areas that are both environmentally sensitive and of global importance. The growth in domestic markets will furthermore require large investments to ensure that the infrastructure – from transport facilities to well-functioning market structures – keeps pace with the requirements. With expanding trade in agriculture, investments in the necessary infrastructure is only part of the story: at least as importantly, further liberalization of

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international trade in agriculture will help to transfer food more easily and more efficiently from surplus to deficit regions.

Notwithstanding these general conclusions, a number of important differences across model results

525 highlight the need for further research, which will be required across various disciplines.

A fundamental difficulty arises from estimating future demand over a long-term horizon. Most importantly, massive income growth needs to be translated into increased food consumption and changed consumption patterns. While Engel-curves provide some indication on how the relationship between income and consumption might develop, small differences in income elasticities assumed

530 add to substantial differences in projected food consumption. The comparison across the participating models suggests that the applied parameters – either explicit in the case of several PE models or implicitly embedded in the utility functions used to describe consumer behavior – vary significantly.

As these parameters are not known for sure, more basic econometric research is required to better

535 understand how consumers respond to rising incomes, and future changes in their behavior is subject to large uncertainty. Still the ranges of applied income elasticities, and some of their developments over times, give rise to concern, and to some degree the existing body of literature provides guidance on how to narrow the range of parameters used in economic models.

A second key area of uncertainty is the question to what degree – and at what speed – new land can

540 be brought into agricultural production, how such a process might depend on the economic conditions, and to what degree such expansions might risk to bring environmental and other social costs. Expanding into uncultivated – and often uninhabited – areas comes at considerable costs in terms of infrastructure, societal development and potential environmental pressures.

A better understanding of these linkages will require substantial research efforts on local

545 possibilities, risks and costs. Some of this research is of an economic nature; others require the involvement of natural and social scientists or legal experts. Full clarity is unlikely to be achieved on

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these questions, so this is a mixture of Type 2, Type 3 and Type 4 uncertainties requiring economic and other research as well as continued scenario approaches.

Several of the model results on agricultural land use appear to be noticeable. Along the process of

550 comparing, criticizing and adjusting model results, a number of extremes could be eliminated.

Within the data set used for this special issue, most area developments can be seen as fairly moderate. However, notable differences occur in the reporting of physical land areas. This is partly due to the fact that the CGE models are based on monetary units, and especially for land the translation into physical units is not without problems.

555 Some results continue to raise questions: for several countries, subsets of models report substantial deviations of future agricultural land use from historical trends, e.g. strongly expanding land use in Canada or China, or shrinking land use in Brazil. Such results, too, require more analysis to better understand their underlying drivers.

The third vast area of uncertainty is the accounting of technical progress in agricultural production.

560 For PE models, this generally translates into assumptions on agricultural yield growth, thus ignoring the fact that some of that growth may come from increased use of other inputs, both variable and fixed. CGE models generally account for these different production factors, albeit at different levels of aggregation. Related to that, macro and sectoral total factor productivity (TFP) growth is another uncertainty. Evidence from the level of technological change for the other production factors, such as labor and capital, the rate of intermediate technological change and the rate of tech change in
565 agriculture versus the rest of the economy are far from conclusive. Assumptions differ widely among models and are another important driver behind the different results. More empirical research is needed to open the black box of macro and sectoral technical change.

Looking across the various scenarios discussed in this paper, an additional important message seems

570 to arise: The effects of alternative socioeconomic assumptions or assumptions on future growth in second-generation bioenergy, as simulated for this study, are small when compared to those arising

from climate change (Figure 9). Both the climate change scenarios and the bioenergy scenario represent fairly strong differences relative to the reference scenario which represents a “middle-of-the-road world” (although the limitation of the bioenergy scenario to growth in second-generation biofuels excludes possible effects of first-generation biofuels which arguably have a much larger impact on agricultural markets on a per unit of energy basis; see e.g. OECD, 2008), whereas one could imagine larger differences in socio-economic assumptions by comparing an SSP3 (“Fragmentation”) to an SSP1 (“Sustainability”) world. In addition, the assumptions on population and GDP changes in the SSP3-scenario tend to impact markets in opposite directions, thus reducing its overall effects. It should also be noted that the climate change scenarios calculated here are based on a relatively small subset of existing GCMs and crop models and do not necessarily cover the spectrum of potential yield reductions resulting from climate change (for a wider representation of climate change effects see the work done by the Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project ISI-MIP, www.isi-mip.org). Nonetheless, the comparison across the scenarios discussed in this paper suggests that climate change needs to be seen as a key variable in the discussion on future developments of agricultural markets and food securities, and the uncertainty around climate change and its implication for agricultural productivity represents a major obstacle in providing clear guidance on future agricultural pathways.

Figure 9 about here.

Conclusions

In summary, this paper has shown that a structured and consistent comparison of quantitative scenarios developed with the help of a large number of different global economic models provides an important input to the discussion about future developments in agricultural markets and food security. Harmonizing assumptions as well as reporting has helped to significantly narrow the spread of scenario outcomes in terms of agricultural prices and other key variables, highlighting the importance of assumptions and reporting on overall results. However, while the reporting principles

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defined for this comparison exercise were an important step for this work, individual scenarios will continue to report in purpose-driven ways. Similarly, differences in key assumptions partly represent the uncertainty on major drivers for agricultural markets, and having harmonized them means that the results presented in this paper do not represent the full range of plausible outcomes. Indeed, the scenarios presented here and their underlying assumptions should be seen as quite restrictive.

That said, the results do provide strong indications on the relative importance of key driving forces for agricultural markets. They also show that, despite the harmonization of assumptions and reporting, important differences remain across the various models that have participated in the comparison, and that should not be viewed as covering the range of possible model outcomes.

The analysis has shown that principal differences can be found between results derived from CGE models and those produced with PE models. Indeed, and as postulated above, CGE models are found to report “smoother” price paths: lower price increases (or even decreases) in the reference scenario, and smaller price changes relative to alternative assumptions on exogenous drivers. This is an important outcome, but raises questions with regard to the approach that best reflects economic behavior and adjustment processes, or, more precisely, how the different modeling approaches can “learn” from each other. This comparison is an important step towards more exchange among modeling groups and a better informed dialogue about approaches, data and findings.

More work will be required in numerous areas, and this paper has discussed some of them without aiming to be exhaustive. Economic research will be important to better understand the adjustments made to changed prices and growing incomes by private households, but also by enterprises (including farms). Biophysical research – and increased efforts to combine biophysical with economic knowledge – will be crucial to better understand natural adjustment processes, such as potentials for future crop yields and their dependence on various climate variables. Some areas of uncertainty will, however, remain for the foreseeable future, and scenarios will continue to represent an important tool for informing the debate about decisions for public policies and private investments.

Finally, and in light of the importance scenarios can have for policies and investment decision, it will be necessary to bring decision makers and modeling groups closer to improve exchange and dialogue between them. This will help to define the scenarios most relevant for policies and investments, and allow decision takers to better understand the results and implications of the different models and scenarios – and to make best use of them.

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
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Figures and Tables


Figure 1: Population and per capita GDP growth to 2050 by region, SSP2 and SSP3



Source: modified from IIASA/OECD (2013)


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Figure 2: Exogenous yield growth by region and crop, 2050 relative to 2005 base year



Source: IMPACT model output as of February 15, 2013.


715 Figure 3: Price projections for the agricultural aggregate, 2005** - 2050



Source: Model results as of February 15, 2013

Note: no rebasing for partial equilibrium models, nor for MAGNET which uses the price index of the global GDP by default.


Figure 4: Crop versus ruminant prices in 2050 across models



Source: Model results as of February 15, 2013

Note: All price changes are relative to a “trended 2005”, i.e. the hypothetical base year data in the absence of short term shocks.


Figure 5: Agricultural area expansion versus average agricultural prices in 2050 across models



Source: Model results as of February 15, 2013

Note: All price and area changes are relative to a “trended 2005”, i.e. the hypothetical base year data in the absence of short term shocks.


730 **Figure 6: Changes in global consumption and average producer prices of agricultural products, SSP3 relative to SSP2, 2050**



Source: Model results as of February 15, 2013

Note: All changes relative to the reference scenario for the same year. No aggregate consumption data available for GTEM.


Figure 7: Changes in world average producer prices for five main crops (CR5) in 2050 due to climate change relative to no-climate-change



Source: Model results as of February 15, 2013


Note: All changes relative to the reference scenario for the same year.

Figure 8: Changes in world average producer prices due to second-generation bioenergy, 2050



Source: Model results as of February 15, 2013

Figure 9: Comparison of changes in world average producer prices due to alternative SSP assumptions, climate change and second-generation bioenergy, 2050



Source: Model results as of February 15, 2013

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Notes: SSP refers to the effect of SSP2 relative to SSP3; CC refers to the effect of climate change relative to no climate change - shaded areas represent the range of price changes simulated for the different climate change scenarios; Bioen. refers to the effect of the production of 108EJ of energy from second-generation biomass.

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Table 1: Key characteristics of participating models.

Model	Institution	Type	Economy coverage	Agr. sectors *	Regions **	Base year	Agr. Policies	Bioenergy	Global numeraire	Agric. supply	Final demand	Trade
AIM	NIES, Japan	CGE	Full economy	8 / 1	89 / 17	2005	Implicitly assumed unchanged	Endogenous 1 st and 2 nd generation	US CPI	Nested CES	LES utility	Non-spatial; Armington gross-trade
ENVISAGE	FAO/World Bank	CGE	Full economy	10 / 5	11 / 9***	2007	Price wedges (based on GTAP)	None explicitly represented	High-inc. manuf'ed exports	Nested CES	LES utility (with dynamic shifters)	Armington spatial equilibrium
EPPA	MIT, USA	CGE	Full economy	2 / 0	7 / 9	2004	Subsidies, taxes, tariff equiv's	Endogenous 1 st and 2 nd generation	US CPI	Nested CES	Nested CES utility	Armington spatial equilibrium
FARM	USDA, USA	CGE	Full economy	12 / 8	5 / 8***	2004 (& 2009)	Price wedges (based on GTAP)	Little for electricity and heating	European Service Sector	Nested CES	LES utility	Armington spatial equilibrium
GTEM	ABARE, Australia	CGE	Full economy	7 / 7	5 / 8***	2004	Implicitly assumed unchanged	Endogenous 1 st generation	Capital goods	Nested Leontief and CES	CDE utility	Armington spatial equilibrium
MAGNET	LEI-WUR, The Netherlands	CGE	Full economy	10 / 9	29 / 16	2001 (& 2004 & 2007)	Price wedges (adjusted from GTAP); milk quotas	Biofuel targets w/ endogenous allocation	World GDP Deflator	Nested CES	CDE private demand and Cobb-Douglas utility	Armington spatial equilibrium
GCAM	PNNL, USA	PE	Agriculture, Energy	18 / 0	7 / 9***	2005	Implicitly assumed unchanged	Endogenous 1 st and 2 nd generation	n.a.	Leontief	Iso-elastic****	Heckscher-Ohlin non-spatial, net-trade
GLOBIOM	IIASA, Austria	PE	Agriculture, forestry, Bioenergy	31 / 6	10 / 20	2000	Implicitly assumed unchanged	Exogenous demand	n.a.	Leontief	Iso-elastic****	Enke-Samuelson-Takayama-Judge spatial equilibrium
IMPACT	IFPRI, USA	PE	Agriculture	32 / 14	101 / 14	2000	Price wedges (based on PSE/CSE)	Exogenous demand for feedstock crops	n.a.	Iso-elastic****	Iso-elastic****	Heckscher-Ohlin non-spatial, net-trade
MAgPIE	PIK, Germany	PE	Agriculture	21 / 0	0 / 10	2005	Implicitly assumed unchanged	Exogenous demand	n.a.	Nested CES	exogenous	Based on historical self-sufficiency rates

Notes: * Figures indicate the number of raw and processed agricultural products represented, respectively; ** Figures indicate the number of individual countries and multi-country aggregates represented, respectively; *** Regional break-out specific for this application; **** Elasticities adjusted over time.

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Table 2: Summary of scenarios analyzed in this project

Scenario code	SSP	RCP	GCM	Crop model	Bioenergy
S1	SSP2	Present climate	none	none	Model-specific
S2	SSP3	Present climate	none	none	Model-specific
S3	SSP2	RCP8p5	IPSL-CM5A-LR	LPJmL	Model-specific
S4	SSP2	RCP8p5	HadGEM2-ES	LPJmL	Model-specific
S5	SSP2	RCP8p5	IPSL-CM5A-LR	DSSAT	Model-specific
S6	SSP2	RCP8p5	HadGEM2-ES	DSSAT	Model-specific
S7	SSP2	Present climate	none	none	1st-gen. ca. 6ExaJoule; no 2nd- gen. (2050)
S8	SSP2	Present climate	none	none	1st-gen. ca. 6ExaJoule; 2nd-gen. ca. 108EJ (2050)

Table 3: Estimated effects of key model characteristics on world average producer price changes, 2005-2050 reference scenario and SSP3, climate change and bioenergy relative to the reference

Scenario	Model characteristics	2030		2050	
		coefficient	p-value	coefficient	p-value
S1 – Reference	CGE	-0.074	0.000	-0.052	0.049
	Spatial	-0.126	0.000	-0.221	0.000
S2 – SSP3 compared to S1	CGE	0.028	0.000	0.029	0.037
	Spatial	0.044	0.000	0.082	0.000
S3 – RCP 8.5 (IPSL-CM5A-LR / LPJmL) compared to S1	CGE	-0.052	0.000	-0.087	0.000
	Spatial	0.048	0.000	0.048	0.000
S4 – RCP 8.5 (HadGEM2-ES / LPJmL) compared to S1	CGE	-0.071	0.000	-0.129	0.000
	Spatial	0.014	0.068	-0.030	0.190
S5 – RCP 8.5 (IPSL-CM5A-LR / DSSAT) compared to S1	CGE	-0.122	0.000	-0.156	0.000
	Spatial	0.052	0.000	0.046	0.014
S6 – RCP 8.5 (HadGEM2-ES / DSSAT) compared to S1	CGE	-0.144	0.000	-0.213	0.000
	Spatial	0.038	0.001	0.029	0.221
S8 – High 2nd-gen. bioenergy compared to S7	CGE	-0.084	0.000	-0.033	0.004
	Spatial	-0.073	0.000	-0.033	0.004

Source: own fixed-effects estimation based on results of participating models, controlling for differences in commodities. For details and equations see text.