GTAP Resources: Resource Display
| GTAP Resource #6075 |
|---|
|
"Optimal Environmental Border Adjustments Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade" by Balistreri, Edward J., Daniel Kaffine and Hidemichi Yonezawa Abstract A country choosing to adopt border carbon adjustments based on embodied emissions is motivated by both environmental and strategic incentives. We argue that the strategic component is inconsistent with commitments under the General Agreement on Tari s and Trade (GATT). We extend the theory of border adjustments to neutralize the strategic incentive, and consider the remaining environmental incentive in a simpli ed structure. The theory supports border adjustments on carbon content that are below the domestic carbon price, because price signals sent through border adjustments inadvertently encourage consumption of emissions intensive goods in unregulated regions. The theoretic intuition is supported in our applied numeric simulations. Countries imposing border adjustments at the domestic carbon price will be extracting rents from unregulated regions at the expense of ecient environmental policy and consistency with international trade law. |
| Resource Details (Export Citation) | GTAP Keywords | ||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
- Climate change policy - Trade and the environment - Multilateral trade negotiations - Not Applicable |
| Attachments |
|---|
|
If you have trouble accessing any of the attachments below due to disability, please contact the authors listed above.
Public Access  Paper (581.8 KB) Replicated: 0 time(s) Presentation (381.8 KB) Replicated: 0 time(s)Restricted Access No documents have been attached. Special Instructions No instructions have been specified. |
| Comments (0 posted) |
|---|
|
You must log in before entering comments.
No comments have been posted. |
Last Modified: 9/15/2023 2:05:45 PM
